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ABSTRACT 
An MINLP optimization model has been created that optimizes the layout of a 
set of sections with fixed footprint areas bound to an offshore platform of a given size 
based on safety considerations due to fire, explosion, and toxic scenarios. Process 
parameters are used to estimate the probability of an event as well as the magnitude of 
the possible impact on other sections, which can be weighted in importance in the 
objective. The magnitude of the impact is directly dependent on several factors: the 
spacing between the sections, the congestion in the general vicinity of the section, escape 
routes, and domino effects of fire and explosion. 
Explosion modeling is carried out both for vapor cloud explosions ignited within 
the area that they are created, and dispersed flammable clouds with footprints based on 
weather conditions, congestion, and process conditions. Modeling uses an approximation 
to the TNO multi-energy method which takes into account the amount of congestion and 
confinement in the area and the size of the flammable cloud. 
Fire modeling is used to ascertain the adequacy of layout of both sections and 
muster points that the sections are assigned to. Modeling is done using three different 
correlations for different fire scenarios: pool fire, fireball, and jet fire. Toxic effects of 
combustion products and escape-hindering effects of smoke production are also 
incorporated into the model, accounting for weather conditions and local congestion.  
Toxic modeling is based on the same dispersion modeling estimation as the 
explosion and fire scearios use and focuses on the effect of hydrogen sulfide leaks 
causing incapacitation, escape difficulties due to eye irritation and disorientation, and 
death. 
Dispersion modeling to determine effects of smoke, dispersed gas clouds, and 
toxic vapors is carried out in three-dimensions using the CFD software FLACS and the 
anticipated congestion model (ACM), a method that has not yet been applied to 
generalized dispersion. The results are correlated to an expression as a function of flow 
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rate, congestion, windspeed, and their interactions that can be used in the optimization 
formulation. 
Mitigations are also considered; blast walls and fire walls, both ideal (non-
failing) and with failure mechanisms, are incorporated into the model as a key 
component considered during the layout. 
It is shown that the model is a positive step into an area that has sparsely been 
considered, contributing a framework for the integrated consideration and minimization 
of several key risk factors in the offshore realm that, as yet, have been unexplored from 
the numerical optimization viewpoint. 
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NOMENCLATURE 
Sets  
F a set of floors that sections may be allocated to 
J 
a set of sections to be placed in the layout, generally an 
intermediate section in impact modeling 
K 
a set of sections to be placed in the layout, generally the 
affecting section in impact modeling 
L 
a set of floors that sections may be allocated to, used in 
comparisons with set F 
M 
a set of monitor regions for dispersion, used on left side of 
variables and parameters 
M a set of muster points that are allocated to the platform 
R 
a set of release directions for dispersion, used on left side of 
variables and parameters 
S 
a set of sections to be placed in the layout, generally the 
affected section in impact modeling 
 
Scalars and Parameters 
ARS 
the maximum aspect ratio between the longest and shortest 
side of a section, s 
AreaS the footprint area per floor that a section, s, occupies 
CCK characteristic congestion in section k 
CCB characteristic background congestion 
costS 
scaling factor for the objective function, synonymous with 
the number of personnel within a section s 
FloorSpacing 
the height of a floor and the separation distance between the 
deck of one floor and another 
LBxS the lower bound on the x-direction size of section s 
LByS the lower bound on the y-direction size of section s 
M a “Big-M” scalar for use in the non-overlap 
MaxWalls maximum number of blast walls that can be allocated 
N maximum number of personnel a muster point can 
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accommodate 
Prated rated yield pressure for a blast wall 
P1% dest 
overpressure at which 1% destruction, calculated from probit 
function, occurs 
PersonnelS number of personnel allocated to section s 
SectionCostS 
the relative cost of a section, s, that is used in the objective 
function as a scaling factor 
sep a minimum separation distance between two sections 
  
StoriesS the number of floors that a section, s, occupies 
R,Mtac 
base flow coefficient for a release in the R-direction in the 
M-direction monitor region 
R,Mte 
base congestion coefficient for a release in the R-direction in 
the M-direction monitor region 
R,Mtfi 
proportional wind coefficient for a release in the R-direction 
in the M-direction monitor region 
R,Mtg 
base wind coefficient for a release in the R-direction in the 
M-direction monitor region 
UBxS the upper bound on the x-direction size of section s 
UByS the upper bound on the y-direction size of section s 
WX the x-direction width of the platform 
WY the y-direction width of the platform 
 
Variables 
aS,K,F 
binary non-overlap variable defining whether section k exists 
to the +x-direction of section s (1) or not (0) 
bS,K,F 
binary non-overlap variable defining whether section k exists 
to the –x-direction of section s (1) or not (0) 
MBRS,F calculated blockage ratio in the M-direction of s on floor f 
BWs,k 
binary variable denoting that a blast from section k is 
affected by any blast wall if 1, not affected if 0 
MBWS,K 
binary variable denoting that an explosion from section k is 
affected by an allocated blast wall on section s in the M-
direction if 1, not affected if 0 
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cS,K,F 
binary non-overlap variable defining whether section k exists 
to the +y-direction of section s (1) or not (0) 
R,Mc’S,K,F 
scaled explosion coefficient for a dispersed cloud explosion 
in section s on floor f in monitor region M due to an R-
direction release from section k 
R,MConcS,K,F 
concentration of flammable gas in a monitor region M in 
which section s resides existing on floor f due to a release in 
the R-direction in section k 
dD,K,F 
binary non-overlap variable defining whether section k exists 
to the –y-direction of section s (1) or not (0) 
DestructionProbabilityS,K 
the probability that an explosion in section k will cause the 
destruction of section s 
down*S,K,F,L 
binary variable denoting whether section s existing on floor f 
is on a floor lower than section k on floor l 
downS,K,F 
binary variable denoting whether section s existing on a floor 
f is below section k on any floor 
DxS,K 
the minimum separation distance between the midpoints of 
sections s and k in the x-direction 
DyS,K 
the minimum separation distance between the midpoints of 
sections s and k in the y-direction 
R,MES,K,F 
amount of energy in a section s in a monitor region M in 
which section s resides existing on floor f due to a release in 
the R-direction in section k 
EProbEscapeS,K,M 
component of escape failure related to the heat flux from a 
fire in section k on the escape route section s takes to muster 
point m 
EProbMusterS,K,M 
component of escape failure related to the heat flux from a 
fire in section k on muster point m to which section s is 
allocated 
EProbSectionS,K 
component of escape failure probability related to the heat 
flux from a fire in section k directly on section s 
EscapeProbabilityS,K,M 
the probability that a fire in section k will cause the failure to 
escape from section s to muster point m 
ex1S,M 
the x-direction intermediate point of interest between a 
section s and muster m used in radiation modeling 
calculations 
ey1S,M the y-direction intermediate point of interest between a 
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section s and muster m used in radiation modeling 
FS,K,F 
binary variable defining whether sections s and k both exist 
on floor f (1) or not (0) 
FaS binary variable for escape route choice x-to-y direction 
FbS binary variable for escape route choice y-to-x direction 
FcS binary variable for escape route choice direct 
FloorS the floor that section s is assigned to 
FOF 
binary variable defining whether a floor f is occupied (1) or 
unoccupied (0) 
IS,K,M 
the radiative flux on the escape of personnel from section s 
to muster m from a fire in section k 
LxS the length in the x-direction of section s 
LyS the length in the y-direction of section s 
MS,K,F generic term for non-overlap constraints a, b, c, and d 
maM 
binary variable assigning muster point m to the –x side of the 
platform 
mbM 
binary variable assigning muster point m to the +x side of 
the platform 
mcM 
binary variable assigning muster point m to the –y side of the 
platform 
mdM 
binary variable assigning muster point m to the +y side of 
the platform 
MProbS,K 
mitigated probability of section s destruction due to an 
explosion in section k 
mxM the x-direction coordinate of a muster point m 
myM the y-direction coordinate of a muster point m 
PS,K the overpressure on section s due to an explosion in section k 
R,MPJ,S,F 
the overpressure estimated on section j from a dispersed 
cloud explosion in section s that lies in monitor region M 
due to a release in section k in the R-direction 
PS,K(mitigated) 
mitigated pressure on a section s due to a blast from section 
k, considering failing blast walls 
PS,K(nom) 
nominal overpressure on a section s due to a blast from 
section k, considering failing blast walls 
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R,MSS,K,F 
binary variable for determining whether a release from 
section k in the R-direction causes a concentration exceeding 
the LFL in monitor region M in which section s resides 
R,MSDS,F 
scaled dispersion mass fraction in monitor region M due to 
an R-direction release in section s on floor f 
SectionMusterS,M binary variable for section s allocated to muster point m 
tesc time to escape to muster 
ToxicProbabilityS,K 
probability of death in section s due to a toxic release in 
section k 
RTProbS,K 
probability of death in section s due to an R-direction toxic 
release in section k 
up*S,K,F,L 
binary variable denoting whether section s existing on floor f 
is on a floor higher than section k on floor l 
upS,K,F 
binary variable denoting whether section s existing on a floor 
f is above section k on any floor 
vesc escape velocity to muster 
VS,F 
binary variable defining whether section s exists on floor f 
(1) or not (0) 
MWS 
binary variable denoting a blast wall allocated to the M-
direction of s (1) or not (0) 
XS,K,F generic term for non-overlap constraints a, b, c, and d 
xS the midpoint in the x-direction of section s 
yS the midpoint in the y-direction of section s 
 
Other 
 
a+c base flowrate coefficient for dispersion correlation 
AIT autoignition temperature of a material [K] 
C congestion ratio, multiplied by 100 
C concentration [ppm] 
CD orifice coefficient for mass flow of leak 
cS explosion severity constant from the modified TNO 
formulation 
CS extinction coefficient [m
-1
] 
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D pool diameter [m] 
e base congestion coefficient for dispersion correlation 
ES available explosion energy within a section s [J] 
F flow rate of material [kg/s] 
f+i proportional wind coefficient for dispersion correlation 
FR total heat flux from the surface of a fireball [kW/m
2
] 
FR flow rate of material [kg] 
g base wind coefficient for dispersion correlation 
g acceleration due to gravity [m/s
2
] 
H pool fire plume height [m] 
ΔHC heat of combustion [J/kg] 
k isentropic expansion factor 
m total mass [kg] 
m
.
 mass flowrate [kg/s] 
m” mass burning velocity [kg/m2s] 
MIE minimum ignition energy of a material [mJ] 
P probability derived from probit functions 
Patm atmospheric pressure [Pa] 
PP process pressure 
Q
.
 heat release from burning [J/s] 
R reactivity of materials 
rS,K euclidean distance between sections s and k [m] 
S shape factor for ignition considerations 
T process temperature [K] 
t time [s] 
tb pool fire burning time [s] 
te exposure time for probit formulation [s] 
u* effective wind speed [m/s] 
u wind speed [m/s] 
W wind speed [m/s] 
 xii 
 
x concentration of material [ppm] 
Y probit value 
χ pool fire experimental correlation factor 
ρamb ambient density [kg/m
3
] 
ρP process density [kg/m
3
] 
θ flame angle [deg] 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
Facility siting and layout is one of the principal considerations in any 
environment that equipment, people, resources, or labor has to be used. The motivation 
for this is largely economic, in that the optimal layout of resources can allow for a more 
efficient operation in a multitude of ways, which will then push down the cost of doing 
business. 
In the process industries, it must also be taken into account that, due to the 
inherent hazards of the materials that are worked with, layout should be done with a 
keen eye on safety considerations. Whether it be toxic hydrogen sulfide in a refinery that 
can disperse and harm those on-site as well as those off-site, or an explosive cloud of 
natural gas in the confined and congested areas of an offshore platform, it is necessary 
not only to plan for the responses to these events in the rare case that they occur, but also 
to design processes such that the probability of such an event occurring is minimized. 
Proper facility layout is a powerful tool to help ensure that the probability and 
consequence of these events are minimized. 
The consequences of poor siting and layout are well documented in the tragedies 
that have followed. Some of the most well-known incidents have been a direct result of 
poor choices of layout, and several have spurred the realization that a better 
understanding of the subject is needed to ensure safety to workers and the public. 
Perhaps the most infamous incident related to siting and layout was the Texas City 
Refinery explosion in March of 2005, where inadequate spacing between trailers and the 
isomerization process directly contributed to several fatalities. The trailers were as close 
as 121 feet from the release, and heavy damage to a trailer 600 feet from the explosion 
was reported [1]. The CSB investigation concluded that it was necessary to adopt a new 
regulation for the siting of temporary buildings and recommended that such a standard 
be issued [2]. This standard was produced by API in 2007 as RP 753 – Management of 
Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant Portable Buildings [3], and is 
considered standard practice under OSHA Process Safety Management guidelines. 
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Several other high-profile incidents have been attributed to poor decisions for 
facility siting and layout. Of the twenty-eight that died in the 1974 Flixborough incident, 
eighteen died in the control room, many due to a roof collapse and others due to severe 
injuries sustained from broken glass caused by the explosion overpressure of a vapor 
cloud of about 50 tons of cyclohexane [4]. Of the same profile was the Phillips 66 
Pasadena, Texas incident in 1989 which leveled the entire site, killing 24, many of 
whom were in occupied control rooms and other buildings [5]. 
Offshore installments have not been exempt from layout issues either. The two 
most infamous offshore incidents – Piper Alpha in 1988 and Deepwater Horizon in 2010 
could both be said to have inherent problems with their layouts. For Piper Alpha, which 
left behind 167 fatalities, design flaws were exacerbated by the fact that the electrical 
classification of the platform did not require production areas to be decoupled from 
accommodation areas such as the control room or living quarters, and thus the control 
room was placed on top of the production module and the quarters was placed directly 
next to it with no consideration given to spacing [6]. Not only did this have the effect of 
killing many people in the subsequent fire (mostly due to smoke inhalation and 
asphyxiation, not burning), it also had the effect of ‘decapitating’ the platform due to 
lack of redundancies in command and control. The layout of the platform was such that 
the escape routes were inadequate for the incident, also lacking redundancy, leaving 
many with their only feasible route off of the platform blocked by the destruction from 
the fire and explosion. Also contributing was the fact that the platform was not well-
designed for a low-probability catastrophic incident, as it was much more cost-effective 
to design for the smaller, more frequent incidents that occur on a platform. 
Though many improvements had been made between 1988 and 2010, the 
Deepwater Horizon incident shows that the problem of facility layout is still as 
complicated and important as ever. One of the contributing factors in the difficulty of 
evacuation from the drilling platform was the predetermined evacuation routes being 
blocked by debris from the explosion or otherwise inaccessible [7]. There were reports 
from employees that survived the incident that flooring panels were missing making it 
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difficult to proceed, stairwells were collapsed, and walkways were completely destroyed. 
Even those in the highly occupied quarters area had to fight wreckage and debris on their 
way to muster. Flames and smoke were also a large problem for workers in certain parts 
of the platform, but those affected were able to make it to their secondary muster 
through alternate routes, perhaps showing that in some ways the consideration for escape 
routes was effective in the face of such a disaster. 
 
1.1 Literature Review 
A literature review is presented in this section for general offshore operations, layout 
of these offshore facilities, numerical methods for layout, and identification of gaps 
between practice and this research as well as between other research and this research. 
This provides a general overview of the problem and the motivation for this research. 
More detailed literature review appears in the chapters that follow as it becomes 
necessary. 
 
1.1.1 Offshore Operations 
In order to understand the nuance to and differences in layout and siting for an 
offshore platform, it is first necessary to have some level of understanding exactly what 
operations are performed and what hazards are present. According to the Handbook of 
Offshore Operations [8], the following areas are important to consider in topsides layout: 
 
 Wellhead Area: Potential for uncontrolled flow and high pressures leads to the 
need for adequate ventilation and separation from other sources of ignition. 
Should be separated as best as possible from quarters and other occupied areas 
and be designed with egress in mind, as the area can become tightly spaced. 
Firewalls may be necessary. 
 Fired process units: Source of ignition and can also be a source of fuel if the units 
are run on or contain hydrocarbons. Firewalls may be necessary, and a safety 
spacing of 15 feet is recommended. 
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 Unfired process units: Source of fuel. Separate from sources of ignition. 
 Hydrocarbon storage: Source of fuel that is particularly important in the feeding 
of unplanned combustion incidents, since there is typically a relatively large 
amount of fuel located in one small area. Hydrocarbon tanks should be located 
on the top level, if possible, to minimize the impact of fire impingement on 
equipment above the tanks. 
 Machinery areas: A source of ignition, and possibly fuel if the machinery is run 
on hydrocarbon fuel. May be spaced near the quarters if the machinery is not a 
source of fuel (as the quarters is also a source of ignition) 
 Quarters and utilities: As a source of ignition and also the site of a large 
population, the quarters must be separated as best as possible from fuel sources. 
Secondary considerations are separation from noise and vibration. Escape routes 
are key, and should not lead personnel into dangerous situations. 
 Pipelines: Uncontrolled flows may originate in the pipeline area, and so ignition 
should be separated from this source of fuel. 
 Flares and vents: Both flares and vents are potential sources of both fuel and 
ignition. 
 
1.1.2 Offshore Facility Layout 
There are many factors that are taken into account in the practical layout of an 
offshore platform, of which safety is at the forefront along with design considerations 
that allow the platform to carry out its function. These range from the broad 
considerations for separation of ignition and fuel and weather conditions, to the minutia 
of design specifications for handrails and placement of staircases. The main contributing 
factors to the difference in between onshore layout and offshore layout are as follows: 
 
 Lack of adequate space for separation of units, exclusion zones 
 Congestion and confinement created by this lack of space 
 Three-dimensional modeling of hazards and layout 
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 Design for human safety factors such as escape routes and muster points 
 
Each of these factors presents unique and often conflicting challenges in the layout 
of an offshore facility – for example, space can be made for separation of units to reduce 
congestion and enhance exclusion zones, but this would require a larger platform at 
higher cost and a greater weight, both of which are undesirable consequences [9]. An 
alternative may be to space equipment with a large longitudinal spacing while 
minimizing transverse dimension, but this may lead to low stability and poor balance in 
the transverse direction. This becomes a concern in the case of floating production 
storage and offloading units [8]. Likewise, the multi-story layout of platforms allows 
equipment to be spaced ideally for transport between modules, but also adds to 
congestion, leads to considerations for the upward propagation of fire, and spaces all 
equipment closer together so that an incident has the potential for greater damage. The 
quarters may be separated to an entirely different platform connected to the main 
platform by a bridge, but this is not always possible in deeper water [10], and not always 
economically feasible in certain areas or under certain circumstances [11]. 
The problem, primarily due to the tradeoffs associated with most safety decisions 
made in layout, is that minute details can make a large difference in the risk level of a 
platform. Compounding this problem is the human factor – though undeniably necessary 
and indispensable, it is inevitable that humans will make mistakes in complex problems. 
Though there are many guidelines, heuristics, and a wealth of experience in offshore 
operations, incidents continue to happen and improvements are commonly found in the 
aftermath of incidents. 
A computational method for the improvement of layout for offshore operations based 
on safety considerations, utilizing strategies for estimating the effect of different 
catastrophic events on the platform and personnel, with an aim of minimizing the risk 
can circumvent this human factor and deliver an optimal solution based on the input 
model, free of bias and considering all pertinent information. A brief introduction to the 
optimization of facility layout is given in the following section. 
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1.1.3 Numerical Methods for Facility Layout 
Facility layout optimization using numerical methods has been an area of interest 
since at least 1957, when Koopmans and Beckmann published their work on assignment 
problems and the location of economic activities [12], proposing a method to account for 
the benefit of an economic activity that depends on the activity in another location using 
the quadratic assignment problem, which spurred a world of new research and interest 
into the objective-based design of facility layouts, whether based on manufacturing 
facilities, process plants, or in the very siting of facilities themselves. 
It was not until 1996, when Penteado and Ciric published their MINLP model for 
process plant layout with respect to safety considerations [13] that process safety was 
incorporated into facility layout optimization. The objective function minimizes four 
financial factors – piping costs and land costs, both strictly economical, cost of 
protective devices, the first safety factor, and the financial risk of a process safety 
incident. The piping and land costs are based on the rectilinear length of piping between 
process units and the total footprint of the facility, respectively. The protective devices, 
used either to prevent an incident or minimize the impact of the incident, include 
concepts of waterspray or blast walls. Finally, the financial risk of a process safety 
incident is simply the monetary consequence of an incident scaled by the probability of 
that incident. The hazard faced by such a facility is explosion overpressure, as 
determined using the TNT method. The goal is to site several different units with 
circular footprints so as to minimize the total financial risk. 
As the subject became more popular within process systems and chemical 
engineering academia shortly after Penteado and Ciric’s paper, new formulations to the 
plant layout problem began to be published. Papageorgiou and Rotstein [14] created an 
MILP model in the same vein of the MINLP model of Penteado and Ciric, but using 
rectangular process units and a safe separation distance parameter between certain units. 
Thus, the safety factor came from a standard acceptable distance rather than from an 
explosion overpressure damage function. Georgiadis and Macchietto proposed a general 
programming model to the process plant layout problem [15], which could, as they 
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pointed out, be modified for safety considerations by excluding certain process units 
from certain zones in a method that would require some level of expertise and common 
sense in the field of plant design. 
Multi-story optimization of facility layout has been a subject of research since 
the 1999 publication of a grid-based general MILP method for process plant layout 
published by Georgiadis, et. al. [15], focusing on minimizing piping and land costs, and 
the 2002 publication by Patsiatzis and Papageorgiou [16], which presented an MILP 
model for allocating equipment to multiple floorson a continuous basis based on an 
objective of minimizing total cost comprised of pumping costs and area costs, 
incorporating minimum safety distances between equipment.  
These formulations, though they were not in any way associated with offshore 
facilities, nor was it indicated that offshore applications were aforethought, in a sense 
opened the door to the realm of offshore layout optimization. An MILP model proposed 
by Park, et. al. [17], explored the layout of an onshore multi-floor ethylene plant with 
simple consideration given to VCE effects balanced against piping costs and land costs. 
However, whereas an offshore platform may have equipment spanning several floors, 
this model allocates equipment to only one floor. This was improved by Ku, et. al. [18], 
in their application of the multi-floor layout to an FPSO, which allowed equipment to 
occupy multiple floors if needed. However, this study does not account for the effects of 
explosions, fire, or toxic release, instead opting to consider safety through minimum 
separation distance, and disregard the complexities of hazard management along 
multiple floors. 
In recent years, work has been done on the facility layout problem specifically 
with respect to process safety by the Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center at 
Texas A&M University. This work has included safety-based optimal layout of new 
process units in the case of fire and explosion [19] and toxic gas releases [20], using both 
continuous-plane methods and a grid-based method  [21]. The approach for fire and 
explosion scenarios is MINLP and takes into account the TNT-scaled blast overpressure, 
fire radiation found using PHAST, and an interconnection cost as a balance. The results 
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of the model are validated using the FLACS software. The approach for toxic effects 
uses the DEGADIS model to approximate footprint using a Monte Carlo simulation to 
sample meteorological conditions that affect dispersion. Both continuous methods make 
use of the disjunctive formulation for non-overlap constraints as described in the work 
by Vazquez-Roman, et. al [22] and based on the computational optimization work of 
Grossman and Lee [23]. 
 
 
Table 1: Comparison of relevant optimization formulations for the facility layout problem (partially 
compiled by Ku, et al. [18]) 
Study Year Setting Floors Safety Considerations 
Penteado and 
Ciric [13] 
1996 EO Plant (onshore) Single Minimum spacing, explosion 
Georgiadis, et 
al. [24] 
1997 Batch Plant (onshore) Multi None (transportation cost) 
Georgiadis, et 
al. [15] 
1999 Batch Plant (onshore) Multi None (layout and transportation cost) 
Patsiatzis and 
Papageorgiou 
[16] 
2002 EO Plant (onshore) Multi None (layout cost objective) 
Diaz-Ovalle, et 
al. [25] 
2010 
Chemical Plant 
(onshore) 
Single Worst-case toxic dispersion 
Jung, et al. 
[21] 
2010 
Distillation unit 
(onshore) 
Single Explosion (grid-based plane methodology) 
Jung, et al. 
[20] 
2010 
Loading facility 
(onshore) 
Single Toxic dispersion 
Jung, et al. 
[19] 
2011 
Hexane distillation 
unit (onshore) 
Single Minimum spacing, fire and explosion 
Park, et al. [17] 2011 EO Plant (onshore) Multi Explosion 
Ku, et al. [26] 2012 LNG-FPSO (offshore) Multi Minimum spacing 
Ku, et al. [18] 2013 LNG-FPSO (offshore) Multi Minimum spacing 
This study 2015 
Widely-applicable 
offshore 
Multi 
Vapor cloud explosion (local and dispersed 
cloud), fire, toxic dispersion, combustion 
effects (toxic products, smoke obscuration 
of sight),  escape optimization, mitigation, 
congestion effects, weather effects 
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1.1.4 Gaps between Practice and This Research 
In practice, the current method of offshore facility layout is much like that of 
onshore facility layout – the initial layout is created when the process and other 
parameters are well-defined, and much of the layout consideration is given to a logical 
progression of flows through the process, as well as to safety consideration. Size of the 
platform is dictated by the intended function of the platform, and space is generally 
minimized due to economic concerns. 
Experience, as it should be, is highly valued in this process. Blast and fire 
surveys are conducted, and the process iterates between layout and new information 
input which creates a new layout. However, as always with human input, mistakes can 
be made. The advantage of a proper model for this application is that based on the 
inputs, an optimal solution can always (with certain caveats) be found. Thus, if the 
model is a quality model, the output should be useful. This research aims to provide that 
model to bridge the gap between the current practice and the optimization approach. 
 
1.1.5 Gaps between Prior Research and This Research 
Though much research has been done on the facility layout problem with respect 
to onshore process plants, offshore layout has not been to nearly the same extent. Several 
possible reasons for this exist. It may be because there is a feeling that since offshore 
platforms often perform nearly the same function as one another, there is not the same 
level of variability between platforms as there is between process plants. It may also be 
thought that the lack of space to lay out a platform actually makes the job easier since 
there are fewer options for placing units. Finally, it could also be thought that there are 
not as many options for addition of units to an offshore platform, while an onshore 
process plant is constantly in flux. 
Each of these assertions is fallacious. Though it may be true that there is less 
variability in the operations of an offshore platform, there are still incidents occurring 
that can be attributed, at least in part, to facility layout. As can be seen between the Piper 
Alpha incident and the Deepwater Horizon event, there are still difficulties in keeping 
 10 
 
employees safe, especially in the face of unforeseeable disaster. Though the lack of 
space on a platform lessens the options for placement of equipment and modules, it also 
makes it increasingly important that they are arranged properly, as the difference 
between complete destruction and protection of workers and assets is hidden in the many 
permutations of placement possible in the confined area of a platform. And though the 
flux in the layout of an offshore platform may not be of the same magnitude as that of a 
process plant, it is just as important to be able to plan what changes might be necessary 
and how they might be incorporated, because there is no simple option to add more 
space as there might be in an onshore plant. 
 In the case of multi-floor optimization, safety has not been taken into account in 
as much detail as economic and process flow considerations. Though simple explosion 
modeling has been examined, fire and toxic considerations have been largely ignored in 
the offshore formulation. The secondary effects of congestion have not been 
incorporated into existing models, and escape modeling, perhaps the area with the 
highest risk contribution in a catastrophic event, has not been examined. Indeed, there 
are many gaps to be filled in the current research landscape. This research aims not only 
to advance the understanding and formulation of offshore facility layout models with 
respect to safety considerations, as well as the models upon which the layout formulation 
relies upon, but to also create a foundation upon which further offshore facility layout 
optimization work can be built. Detailed information on the goals and objectives of this 
research follows in Chapter 2. Additional literature review on pertinent topics is 
presented in the following chapters as the need arises. 
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2. OBJECTIVES 
The main objective of this research is to create an optimization formulation for 
the layout of an offshore platform with respect to minimization of combined risk, 
advancing the offshore layout problem by taking into account the following 
considerations: 
 
 Account for the lack of space on an offshore platform as it relates to the added 
risk from catastrophic events and balance trade-offs that occur due to this lack of 
space 
 Create a multi-floor model that resolves the differences in risk from catastrophic 
events at different points in space with different elevations 
 Quantify effects of added congestion and confinement on explosions, fire, and 
dispersion 
 Facilitate escape through optimal placement of sections and muster points 
associated with the sections to minimize the effects of heat radiation and smoke 
effects from fire 
 Incorporate domino effect, where flammable gas may disperse to another section 
and be ignited, and account for directional effects of the ensuing blast 
 Ensure that the optimization models solve in a reasonable amount of time, and 
create the model in such a way that efficiency is maximized 
 Take into account relevant existing guidance in the field of offshore layout and 
design as useful 
 Verify the findings using advanced risk analysis models such as CFD 
 
2.1 Practical Objectives 
Practically, offshore platforms should be in compliance with API RP 75 – 
Recommended Practice for Development of a Safety and Environmental Management 
Program for Offshore Operations and Facilities [27], which specifies implicitly that 
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layout should be taken into account during design. One of the references to API RP 75 is 
API 14J – Recommended Practice for Design and Hazards Analysis for Offshore 
Production Facilities [28], which includes more detail about the concept of layout for 
offshore production facilities. It states that among platform equipment arrangement 
factors, important considerations are: 
 
 Separation of fuel and ignition sources 
 Adequate space in between equipment 
 Consideration of wind direction for venting of hydrocarbon vapors 
 Escape routes 
 Use of firewalls and barrier walls 
 Ease of maintenance of equipment 
 Streamlining of process flow 
 
While acknowledging that the major problems in arrangement of equipment are the 
lack of space and the inherent difficulty that it causes in all of the recommended 
elements. 
In practical terms, the objective of this research is to create a framework through 
which numerical optimization can be used to efficiently solve the problems posed by the 
unique nature of offshore platforms by taking into account all of the aforementioned 
elements recommended in practice. 
 
2.2 Research Objectives 
 In order to satisfy the practical objectives, it is necessary to create a model that, 
although simplified, gives a complete understanding of the hazards and risks of an 
offshore platform during a catastrophic event. Original mathematical formulation of the 
constraints and decisions for how to model the hazard phenomena are the key 
considerations in this research. Translation of physical phenomena into mathematical 
constructs is not always straightforward and requires creative solutions, particularly in 
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the field of numerical optimization where highly complicated problems are not always 
tractable and simplifications must routinely be made in order to come to a solution. 
It is expected that the model will provide a positive step into an area that has 
sparsely been considered, contributing a framework for the integrated consideration of 
several key risk factors in the offshore realm that, as yet, have been unexplored from the 
numerical optimization viewpoint, both standing alone as a work and providing a 
foundation for future work into facility layout optimization as well as other fields. 
 Finally, it must be proven that the results that are given by the model are superior 
to the results given in the current method of layout formulation based on the model 
criteria, i.e. the model must be better at reducing risk in fire, explosion, and toxic release 
scenarios than the current method of human design. To test this, the results will be tested 
against the calculated risk by the model in base cases as well as optimized cases, and the 
layouts will be compared quantitatively against risk analysis tools such as CFD for 
dispersion and explosion and integral models for fire hazard.  
  
 14 
 
3. A MODEL TO OPTIMIZE LAYOUT FOR OFFSHORE EXPLOSION AND 
ESCAPE SCENARIOS 
3.1 Practical Layout Concerns 
Because there are many subtle factors that go into the design of an offshore 
platform, it is quite a challenge to create a model that will both accurately reflect that 
subtlety but also be possible to solve to an optimal solution. Thus, a balance of 
simplicity and complexity must be struck for the model. 
 
3.2 Mathematical Modeling and Optimization Formulation 
Of paramount importance is the mathematical model to be used in the 
optimization formulation. It must reflect not only physical reality, such as the fact that 
two pieces of matter cannot occupy the same space or that it is impossible that a section 
of a platform be outside of the domain of that platform, but also the inherent practical 
complexities of platform management, such as the fact that some sections will take up 
more than one level of the platform, or that it is necessary to have two routes of escape 
from any point in the layout. The following sections outline the necessary information 
and constraints needed to create the model. 
 
3.2.1 Selected Sets, Scalars, and Parameters Used in the Base Model 
The following sets, scalars, and parameters are used in this formulation, not 
including those used as process parameters, which are discussed in sections 3.3 – 3.6: 
 
   , a set of sections to be placed in the layout 
   , a set of floors that occupy the platform 
   , a set of floors that occupy the platform 
Wx, the x-direction size of the platform footprint 
Wy, the y-direction size of the platform footprint 
sep, a minimum separation distance between sections 
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FloorSpacing, the height of a floor, and the separation distance between the deck of one 
floor and another 
Storiess, the number of floors that a section, s, takes up 
Areas, the area that must be allotted to a section, s 
ARs, the maximum aspect ratio between the longest and shortest side of a section, s 
SectionCosts, the relative cost of a section, s, to be used in the objective function 
N, a big M scalar 
UBxs: the upper bound on the x-direction size of section s 
LBxs: the lower bound on the x-direction size of section s 
UBys: the upper bound on the y-direction size of section s 
LBys: the lower bound on the y-direction size of section s 
 
3.2.2 Selected Variables Used in the Base Model 
The following variables are used in this formulation: 
xs: the midpoint in the x-direction of a section, s 
ys: the midpoint in the y-direction of a section, s 
Lxs: the length in the x-direction of a side of section s 
Lys: the length in the y-direction of a side of section s 
NF: total number of floors on the platform 
Floors: the floor that section s is assigned to 
FOf: binary variable defines whether floor f is occupied (1) or unoccupied (0) 
Vs,f: binary variable that defines the assignment of section s to floor f (1 if section s is 
assigned to floor f, 0 otherwise) 
Fs,k,f: binary variable that determines whether sections s and k are assigned to the same 
floor f (1 if sections s and k are both assigned to floor f, 0 otherwise) 
as,k,f: binary variable for the non-overlap constraint (sections s and k on the same floor f 
must not overlap to the left) 
bs,k,f: binary variable for the non-overlap constraint (sections s and k on the same floor f 
must not overlap to the right) 
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cs,k,f: binary variable for the non-overlap constraint (sections s and k on the same floor f 
must not overlap below) 
ds,k,f: binary variable for the non-overlap constraint (sections s and k on the same floor f 
must not overlap above) 
Dxs,k: the minimum separation distance between the midpoints of sections s and k in the 
x-direction 
Dys,k: the minimum separation distance between the midpoints of sections s and k in the 
y-direction 
mxm: the x-direction muster coordinate of muster m 
mym: the y-direction muster coordinate of muster m 
ex1s: an intermediate x-dimension point of interest used in fire modeling calculations 
ey1s: an intermediate y-dimension point of interest used in fire modeling calculations 
Ps,k: the overpressure on section s as a result of an explosion in section k 
Is,k: the fire radiation intensity on section s as a result of a fire in section k 
Fas, Fbs, Fcs: decision variables to determine which path to take from section s to its 
associated muster point 
DestructionProbabilitys,k: the probability that an explosion in section k will completely 
destroy section s 
EscapeProbabilitys,k: the probability that an fire in section k will render escape from 
section s to its associated muster point impossible 
 
3.2.3 Constraints 
The constraints used in this formulation are presented in the sections that follow: 
 
3.2.3.1 Area, Aspect Ratio, and Side Length Expressions 
The area, aspect ratio, and side length expressions ensure that the footprint area 
of the section is satisfied, while keeping the ratio of the sides in the x-direction and y-
direction to a reasonable value, so that the section is not practically unusable. The ARs 
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parameter sets the maximum aspect ratio for a section, and would be set as an input 
based on acceptable dimensions in practice. 
 
              
              
              
 
Where LBxs and UBxs are determined as a function of the footprint area and 
aspect ratio parameters: 
 
         √              
     
     
    
 
 
With the y-dimension bounds calculated in a similar manner. The range of 
allowed side-lengths is illustrated in the figure below. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: An example of possible footprints for a section of a given area and a defined maximum aspect 
ratio 
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This formulation is different from most existing process plant facility layout 
formulations in that most existing formulations use defined side lengths that may be 
flipped between the x- and y-directions, but still are rigid in the fact that no intermediate 
sizes are allowed. By using the area formulation, it is possible to have a more flexible 
layout based on the space allowed. 
 
3.2.3.2 Separation Distance Expressions 
The separation distance expressions define how far away from each other the 
midpoints of two sections must be in order to maintain a non-overlapping system. This 
takes into account the length of the side in the x- or y-direction and the minimum 
separation distance parameter. 
 
      
       
 
     
      
       
 
     
 
This formulation is illustrated in the figure below: 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Visual representation of the minimum separation between midpoints constraint 
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3.2.3.3 Platform Boundary Constraints 
The platform boundary constraints operate in the same way as the minimum 
separation distance constraints, except that the overlap constraint is with the edge of the 
platform rather than another section. 
 
   
 
       
   
 
 
   
 
       
   
 
 
 
3.2.3.4 Non-Overlap Constraints 
The binary variables for non-overlap constraints are modified from the convex 
hull relaxation of a disjunctive programming approach to non-overlapping. The non-
overlapping constraints require the model to define where a section is in relation to 
another section, not only with respect to the x- and y- direction, but also with respect to 
which floors the sections occupy. This is an extension of the method found in the work 
of Jung, et. al. [20], where the sections were forced to be either left of, right of, above, or 
below each other. In this model, an additional possibility is introduced: the sections do 
not occupy the same floor, and thus can occupy the same x- and y-dimensional space 
without overlapping. The original constraints can be visualized as in the following 
figure: 
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Figure 3: Relative facility placement for non-overlap constraint definition, modified from Jung et. al [20] 
 
 
And be expressed mathematically as follows: 
 
   (        )    (        ) 
   (        )  (        )    
   (        )    (        ) 
   (        )  (        )    
                              
 
Where M is a suitably chosen Big-M parameter. The first four expressions define 
where section s is placed in relation to section k, where a, b, c, and d define section s as 
left of, right of, below, and above, respectively. As only one binary variable can be true 
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(fixed by the fifth expression), three of the constraints collapse, and only one is held 
active. 
However, because of the extra dimension being considered in this formulation, it 
is necessary to add an extra binary variable, Fs,k,f. The definition of this binary variable is 
explained in the next section and is true (value equal to one) when sections s and k 
occupy the same floor, and false when they do not. The fifth expression from above is 
now modified to: 
 
                                     
 
Forcing one of the constraints to be active if and only if s and k occupy the same 
floor. Thus, if F is false, there is no non-overlap constraint between s and k. 
 
3.2.3.5 Floor Constraints 
The first constraint that must be met is the assignment of a section to the proper 
number of floors using the Storiess parameter. Because there is the possibility of a single 
section (such as the quarters or wellhead area) requiring multiple floors, this constraint 
must be modified from the usual ‘one facility allocated to one site’ constraint to reflect 
the new ‘one facility allocated to multiple floors’ constraint: 
 
∑             
 
 
 
Where Vs,f is a binary variable that is true if section s is assigned to floor f. In 
order to make the new non-overlapping constraints (previous section) work, it is 
imperative to know whether two sections occupy the same floor. This can be 
accomplished using the following system of constraints, first used by Patsiatzis and 
Papageorgieu [16]: 
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Table 2: List of values for the floor definition series of constraints 
s on floor? k on floor? 
Constraint 
1 
Constraint 
2 
Constraint 
3 
F value 
Yes Yes Fs,k,f ≥ 1 Fs,k,f ≤ 1 Fs,k,f ≤ 1 1 
Yes No Fs,k,f ≥ 0 Fs,k,f ≤ 0 Fs,k,f ≤ 2 0 
No Yes Fs,k,f ≥ 0 Fs,k,f ≤ 2 Fs,k,f ≤ 0 0 
No No Fs,k,f ≥ -1 Fs,k,f ≤ 1 Fs,k,f ≤ 1 0,1 
 
 
In the case of neither s nor k occupying a given floor, the F value is not 
constrained and can be either true or false. In the formulation, since the F value is used 
to decide whether two sections are constrained and must not overlap with each other, and 
since the optimization is based upon maximum spacing when possible to lessen the risk 
of fire and explosion hazards, the F value will always optimize to zero if s and k do not 
occupy the same floor, simply because it is needed to come to the optimal solution. 
 
3.2.3.6 Muster Expressions 
Because one of the main points of focus in offshore operations is the ability to 
escape in the case of an emergency, muster points must be taken into account with a 
value equal to, if not greater than, that of the effect of fire and explosion on the 
individual sections themselves. Because it is necessary to spread the muster points across 
the platform for ease of access, four muster points are defined, each assigned to a 
different side of the platform: 
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Where mam assigns a muster to the left side of the platform, mbm assigns a 
muster to the right side of the platform, mcm assigns a muster to the bottom side of the 
platform, and mdm assigns a muster to the top side of the platform. The constraints 
ensure that one muster point is only allocated to one side, and that each side is only 
allocated once. Once assigned to a side, the muster points may move along their 
assigned edge such that the musters on the left and right sides have their x-coordinates 
fixed and may vary in their y-coordinates, and the musters on the top and bottom have 
their y-coordinates fixed, and may vary in their x-coordinates: 
 
               
             
               
             
 
As illustrated in the following table: 
 
 
Table 3: List of values for the muster assignment set of expressions 
Muster Side Expression 1 Expression 2 Expression 3 Expression 4 
Left mxm ≤ 0 mxm ≥ 0 mym ≤ Wy mym ≥ 0 
Right mxm ≥ Wx mxm ≤ Wx mym ≤ Wy mym ≥ 0 
Bottom mxm ≤ Wx mxm ≥ 0 mym ≤ 0 mym ≥ 0 
Top mxm ≤ Wx mxm ≥ 0 mym ≤ Wy mym ≥ Wy 
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Each section must then be assigned to a single muster using the SectionMusters,m 
binary variable which is defined as 1 if section s is assigned to muster m and 0 
otherwise: 
 
∑                 
 
 
 
And further, to assure that one muster isn’t over-utilized by personnel trying to 
escape, another constraint is added: 
 
∑                            
 
 
 
Where N is the maximum number of people that can be accommodated by a 
muster point. 
 
3.2.4 Objective Function 
The objective function is as follows: 
 
     ∑∑                            
  
 
 
Which can be termed as the sum of the calculated probability that a section will 
be destroyed due to explosion, thus causing the loss of the personnel in that section, and 
the probability that escape from a section to its muster will be unsuccessful, also causing 
the loss of the personnel in that section. Each probability is scaled by a cost for that 
section, which can be defined by any criteria, but will be defined as the number of 
personnel assigned to the section in this formulation. In this way, the only objective 
taken into account by this model is that the probability that personnel are lost due to an 
explosion or blocked escape is minimized. 
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The methodology for determining the probabilities of destruction and failure of 
escape is given in the sections that follow. 
 
3.3 Explosion Modeling 
 
 
 
Figure 4: TNO scaled blast curves [29] 
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Explosion modeling is based on the TNO multi-energy model [29]. This model 
requires knowledge of the amount of confinement and congestion in an area, material 
that is ignited, amount of that material, and relative spacing of points of interest in order 
to find the overpressure at a given point.  
For the figure above, the combustion energy scaled distance is the distance 
between the origin of the explosion and the point of interest, scaled by the amount of 
energy in the congested portion of the vapor cloud as such: 
 
   
 
 
 
    
    
 
 
Where r is defined in meters, E is defined in joules, and pressure is defined in 
pascals. The scaled overpressure is simply the overpressure generated by the explosion 
scaled by the atmospheric pressure: 
 
  
   
 
    
 
 
Normally the proper correlation from distance to overpressure is made by first 
determining the scaled distance of interest, then determining which blast level curve 
should be used, and finally reading from the chart the scaled overpressure and 
converting to a true overpressure. However, for the optimization formulation, using a 
graphical representation directly will not work, so each of the curves has been converted 
to a mathematical expression in order that a continuous function relating distance from 
the explosion and explosion overpressure at the point of interest can be found. 
Noting that the curves appear linear on a log-log plot up until a certain minimum 
value of scaled distance, and further noting that for curves of power level 1-6, the slopes 
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are very nearly, if not totally, equal, an expression for this linear portion can be found of 
form: 
 
y = cx
b
 
 
where b is the apparent slope of the log-log plot and c is the constant that defines 
the y-intercept on the log-log plot. The b exponent is the same for all power levels 1-6, 
and is defined as -1, as the apparent slope of the log-log plot is -1. The c coefficient is 
the scaled pressure value at which the curve crosses the scaled distance value of 1 (or, 
the y-intercept of the curve when the x-axis is defined as log[r’]). This value changes 
with every curve, as tabulated below: 
 
 
Table 4: c-value constants for the TNO curves 
Explosion Level c-value 
1 0.0065 
2 0.015 
3 0.035 
4 0.075 
5 0.12 
6 0.35 
 
 
Unfortunately, there is little guidance as to how the severity levels should be 
chosen, other than that they should be chosen based on the amount of congestion and 
confinement present. TNO suggests this guidance, based on the work of Kinsella [30]: 
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Table 5: Suggested severity levels for the TNO Multi Energy Method [30] 
Now, substituting the expressions for the scaled pressure and distance back into 
the general equation, we can rearrange to find: 
 
      
 
    
    
 
Which is valid for scaled distances greater than 0.6 and explosion levels less than 
or equal to 6. This expression can be used to find the overpressure at a unit that is a 
certain distance away from the center of an explosion and then, using impact modeling, 
the probability of total structural damage occurring at that point. For more information 
on impact modeling, see sections 3.4 and 3.5. 
3.4 Fire Modeling 
Fire is the most frequently reported accidental process safety event for offshore 
platforms [31] and can have devastating primary and secondary consequences. The 
primary consequences are the destruction of equipment and harm to personnel by 
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radiation, but fire can also cause secondary consequences of smoke exposure, blockage 
of escape routes, and domino effect. In fact, these secondary effects are quite often more 
damaging than the primary effects. A study by DiMattia, Khan, and Amyotte finds that 
the probability of human error during the egress phase of escape in gas release and 
explosion scenarios is significant, especially for those with lower levels of experience 
aboard a platform [32]. Thus, it is supremely important to design for safety in the case of 
a fire, not only with emphasis on protecting personnel and processes directly, but also 
taking account of the secondary effects that may be present, especially with an emphasis 
on ensuring that escape routes are clearly known and adequately chosen. 
Several different types of fire hazard are possible within an offshore 
environment. Pool fires are possible due to the heavy hydrocarbons that are extracted 
and processed. Jet fires are a key concern, as they can occur with many different 
hydrocarbon materials, and can impinge on other process units, causing failure of 
structural components or piping. Fireballs can occur when a fire impinges on a vessel 
containing pressure-liquefied gas, causing the boiling of the liquid, rupture of the tank 
due to overpressure, and flashing of the escaping fuel. Finally, flash fires are also 
possible in uncongested and unconfined areas of a platform, though the main hazard 
from this fire is the possibility of ignition of a pool fire, jet fire, or fireball from BLEVE. 
The main hazard with fire to be considered in this model is not the direct burning 
of personnel, but the fact that fire causes the blockage of escape routes, leaving 
personnel in danger of harm or fatality due to inability to flee the site. To this end, fire 
modeling will be used to determine optimal layout of sections to facilitate escape. 
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Figure 5: Event tree for fire scenarios in the case of a gas-phase release, from CCPS Guidelines for Fire 
Protection in Chemical, Petrochemical, and Hydrocarbon Processing Facilities [33] 
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Figure 6: Event tree for fire scenarios in the case of a liquid release, from CCPS Guidelines for Fire 
Protection in Chemical, Petrochemical, and Hydrocarbon Processing Facilities [33] 
 
 
Flash fire, pool fire, jet fire, and fireball are all considered in the model. Flash 
fire modeling is done on the basis of the accumulated cloud that is used for the explosion 
calculation, but assuming that the local confinement and congestion is not adequate to 
create a vapor cloud explosion. Thus, the heat flux on a given point is related to the 
amount of energy in the cloud and the distance from the point of ignition [33], assumed 
to be the center of the section that the flash fire originates from: 
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Where Ek is the total amount of energy in the cloud (assumes full combustion), 
and r is the distance between the ignition and a point of interest. In this case, as in all 
other cases, because the main hazard from fire is the blockage of escape routes, the 
points of interest are not just the sections that may be affected by the fire, but also the 
muster points and intermediate points of interest, as illustrated in the following figure: 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Points of interest in the fire modeling calculation 
 
 
In this figure, the starred areas are the points at which the heat flux is explicitly 
calculated for the optimization formulation. There are three different paths that a muster 
can be reached by in this formulation. The escape can be by a route that moves first in 
the x-direction, then the y-direction, a route that moves first in the y-direction, then the 
x-direction, and finally by a direct route. The heat flux from one section on another on 
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each of the points of interest for each escape method is calculated, and the maximum of 
those heat fluxes is then used as the value for all escape probability calculations between 
those two sections. Thus, there are three escape methods, one of which is chosen during 
the optimization in order to minimize the risk of failure to escape. 
Pool fire modeling is done in much the same way as flash fire modeling. The 
following information must be known or assumed in order to initiate a pool fire model: 
 
 Material released, often hydrocarbon condensate in offshore operations 
 Mass released, m, in kilograms based on process conditions 
 Mass burning rate, m”, in kg/m2s 
 Heat of combustion of the material, ΔHc, in kJ/kg 
 
From this information, the steady state diameter of the pool can be determined using 
the simplified pool diameter model: 
 
  (
  ̇
  ̇ 
)
   
 
And the heat release can be determined using: 
 
 ̇        ̇  
 
From these expressions, the height of the plume can be found: 
 
       ̇          
 
The burning time can be found: 
 
   
 
 ̇  
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And the heat flux on a point of interest away from the center of the fire can be 
found: 
 
     
               
    
 
 
The burning time is used in this case to scale the amount of heat dosage a point 
receives from a pool fire, as unlike a flash fire or fireball (which typically have a 
duration of a few seconds), the duration of a pool fire can be significantly long to cause 
damage from prolonged exposure. It is taken into account in the probit function (see 
section 3.6). 
For a jet fire, several pieces of information must be known as well. These are: 
 
 Material being released 
 Process pressure (PP) and ambient pressure (Pamb) in Pa 
 Flammable material density (ρP) and ambient density of air (ρamb) in kg/m
3
 
 Area of leak (Ah) in m
2
 
 Isentropic expansion factor, k 
 Discharge coefficient, CD, usually assumed to have a value of 0.85 
 
To determine the mass released from an orifice, the following fluid flow equation is 
utilized: 
 
 ̇          √(
   
  
) (
 
   
)(  [
    
  
]
   
 
) 
 
The total heat released and heat flux are calculated similarly to the other 
scenarios: 
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 ̇      ̇  
 
And 
 
     
    ̇
    
 
 
Where the 0.2 is a correction factor to the heat release. 
Fireball modeling is based on the Roberts model [34] which gives an empirical 
correlation of fireball diameter and duration to mass released: 
      
 
  
 
And 
 
       
 
  
 
Along with a correlation for scaling the heat flux from the surface of the fireball: 
 
        
     
 
Where P is the vapor pressure of the flammable material in MPa, and FR is 
usually found to be between 0.2 and 0.4. The surface emissive power of a fireball 
depends on the flammable material. For the probable materials used in this study, a 
fireball of LPG has a surface emissive power of about 270 kW/m
2
 and natural gas has a 
surface emissive power of 150 kW/m
2
. 
In the current model, heat flux at points of interest are calculated for all fire 
scenarios, but only the heat flux with the greatest magnitude on a point of interest is 
considered in the objective. This is a valid simplification because two fire events are not 
likely to happen concurrently in the same section, and so there would be no 
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superposition of the heat fluxes. Therefore, there is no need to consider reinforcing 
effects of multiple events, and the event with the greatest heat flux is sufficient for a 
worst-case scenario. This does not imply that only one type of fire event is considered 
for the whole optimization – one section may have a jet fire as the worst-case event 
while another may have a flash fire as the worst case event. However, since all fire 
events scale in the same way, as a function of the inverse-square of the distance between 
the sections, one section will produce the same worst-case event for all points of interest.  
 
3.5 Ignition Probability Modeling 
Ignition probability modeling is based on the work of Moosemiller [35] for fire 
and explosion frequencies. Default values for ignition probability are often used, such as 
0.15 for immediate ignition and 0.3 for delayed ignition, but these values do not capture 
the variability of ignition probability based on process conditions such as temperature, 
material, and presence of various types of ignition source. The algorithms for ignition 
probability modeling used in the model are as follows: 
 
3.5.1 Immediate Ignition 
Immediate ignition (prompt ignition) is ignition that occurs early enough in vapor 
cloud formation that it does not allow an appreciable vapor cloud to form. The 
probability of this event occurring is based on the process temperature (T), auto-ignition 
temperature of the material (AIT), pressure of the process material (P), and minimum 
ignition energy (MIE) in the following manner: 
 
          [       
    (
 
   )]  [
       
 
 
   
 
 
] 
 
Where the first term is equal to 0 if T/AIT < 0.9 and equal to 1 if T/AIT > 1.2, 
and the maximum value of the probability of immediate ignition is 1. Values for AIT 
and MIE are well-documented in literature, and T and P are process parameters. 
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3.5.2 Delayed Ignition 
Delayed ignition occurs when a vapor cloud has accumulated over time before 
finding a source of ignition. This can result in a flash fire or an explosion if the area is 
congested. The probability of delayed ignition is based on the flowrate of material (FR), 
the minimum ignition energy (MIE) of the material, a “source factor” (S), and the time 
that the material is allowed to accumulate (t) in the following manner: 
 
            
   
                                                           
 
 
For a denominator greater than 1, and: 
 
                               [  
                ][                   ] 
 
If the multiplicative factors other than the 0.3 are less than 1. 
 
Where the first term represents ignition probability based on material factors and 
cannot exceed 3 or be below 0.1, the second term represents ignition probability based 
on amount of material released and cannot exceed 2, and the final term represents 
ignition type and response time. The S parameter in this factor is based on the sources of 
ignition present in the area of the release. This can be replaced with either the fraction of 
the cloud within a process unit, or generic values based on equipment density from [35]. 
 
3.5.3 Delayed Explosion Probability 
Given a delayed ignition of a vapor cloud, it is possible that an explosion can 
occur. The probability is based on the flow rate of flammable material (FR) and 
modified by a factor for the reactivity of the material (R) as follows: 
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Where R is 0.3 for low reactivity materials (e.g. natural gas), 1 for medium 
reactivity materials (most materials), and 3 for high reactivity materials (e.g. hydrogen). 
 
3.5.4 Event Frequency 
The probabilities for these events can be visualized as an event tree: 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Event tree for fire and explosion probabilities, adapted from [35] 
 
 
The events that can occur are immediate ignition, delayed ignition, or no ignition 
and from delayed ignition the cloud can burn as a fire or explode. Each of the associated 
probabilities is calculated through the process parameters that are input, and then the 
probabilities illustrated in the event tree for fire, explosion, and environmental incident 
are calculated. It can be seen that the cumulative probability of an event sums to 1, as is 
expected. Environmental incidents are not considered in the optimization formulation. 
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3.6 Impact Modeling 
Impact modeling is the determination of the impact of the above-mentioned 
hazards on the structure of the platform and the personnel on it. Overpressures and 
radiation levels can be assumed to cause a certain damage at a certain level, but it is 
important in the optimization formulation to have a mathematical expression that can be 
used to relate hazards to impact. One widely-used way of measuring impact of a single-
exposure event is through the use of experimentally-obtained probit functions [36]. 
Probit functions are a way of taking a sigmoid dose-response curve and 
linearizing the response based on the dose. Then, once the proper probit coefficients are 
determined, the probit value can be found for any dosage and then be converted to a 
probability of the response occurring. Though dose-response is usually thought of in 
terms of toxic dosage to humans, the dose could be any single exposure event, such as an 
explosion overpressure or heat radiation dose, and the response could be the probability 
of structural failure or shattering of glass. 
Probit functions are generally of the form Y = k1 + k2lnV, where Y is the probit 
value that can be converted to a probability and the k parameters are based on fitting 
response data to dosage data. V is the variable of interest in determining the response. 
For vapor cloud explosions, structural damage probability is linked to overpressure using 
the following probit function: 
 
Y = -23.8 + 2.92lnP 
 
Where the overpressure is measured in pascals. The probability measured in this 
expression is that of total structural damage, as correlated by Eisenberg [37]. It is more 
complicated to correlate heat radiation to structural stability, so there are few (if any) 
probit models that attempt to describe the probability of destruction of a structure in a 
fire scenario. However, the effect of heat radiation on humans is well-studied. The probit 
function for the lethality of heat radiation dosage on humans is as follows [31]: 
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Y = -36.38 + 2.56ln(teqe) 
 
Where q is the heat flux value and t is the exposure time. When the Y value is 
found, the specific equation to convert to a probability of response is: 
 
    [  
   
|   |
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|   |
√ 
)] 
 
Where erf is the error function. Tabulated data is also available to determine the 
probability from the Y variable. This formulation can be used in the optimization model 
to estimate the probability of a fatal incident, which can be minimized in the objective 
function. 
 
3.7 Case Studies 
Two case studies have been formulated to demonstrate the applicability of the 
model. The first is based on a very well-known offshore process safety event, where the 
layout is shown to be inadequate, then optimized and improvement is shown. The second 
is based on an actual layout used in the offshore industry that is not glaringly deficient, 
but requires that muster points are assigned to the layout. The full optimization is also 
carried out on this layout and the results are compared with the original. 
 
3.7.1 Case Study: Piper Alpha Layout Deficiency 
An initial case study has been prepared to demonstrate the ability of the model to 
optimize the layout of an offshore platform. This case study has been modeled off of the 
Piper Alpha incident: a well-known accident that affected the way that process safety is 
perceived in the offshore industries. The purpose of this case study is to take an actual 
layout that is known to have significant design flaws which led to a catastrophic loss of 
life and assets, and apply the prior-defined optimization model to it to evaluate the 
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improvement in the layout that is obtained, and then turn a critical eye to the advantages 
and disadvantages of such a model, and find where the model can be improved. 
Information for the scenarios and layout of the platform were taken from 
Drysdale and Sylvester-Evans’ case study on the explosion and fire aboard Piper Alpha 
[38]. Because detailed information about the actual dimensions of the platform and 
platform modules are not available, the dimensions were estimated from drawings given 
in this paper. All scenarios that are presented in the paper as contributing to the disaster 
are assumed to have been credible and foreseeable scenarios that could and should have 
been taken into account in the design stage of the platform. In addition to the scenarios 
that contributed to the actual event, several other common-sense scenarios were added to 
the formulation, as they would likely have been found in a formal risk assessment, and 
thus would be considered in the design. 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Elevation layout of the Piper Alpha Platform, from Drysdale and Sylvester-Evans [38] 
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Figure 10: Production deck layout of the Piper Alpha Platform, from Drysdale and Sylvester-Evans [38] 
 
 
3.7.1.1 Inputs 
The following inputs were used in the case study: 
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Table 6: Input parameters for the optimization formulation – General Properties 
Input Value(s) 
Platform Dimensions 184’ x 184’ 
Sections 
Wellhead, Quarters, Shop, Process, 
Compressors, Control, Storage, Utilities 
Floors Four possible floors 
Musters Four possible musters 
Stories 
Wellhead: 4 
Quarters: 2 
All others: 1 
Area [ft
2
] 
Wellhead: 8464 
Quarters: 8464 
Shop: 8464 
Process: 2116 
Compressors: 6348 
Control: 8464 
Storage: 1058 
Utilities: 1058 
Maximum Aspect Ratio 5 
Section Population (Cost) 
Wellhead: 5 
Quarters: 30 
Shop: 10 
Process: 1 
Compressors: 1 
Control: 10 
Storage: 1 
Utilities: 1 
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Table 7: Input parameters for the optimization formulation – Vapor Cloud Explosion and Flash Fire 
Input Value(s) 
Sections Possible Wellhead, Compressors, Utilities, Process 
Material 
Wellhead, Utilities, Process: Natural gas 
(properties of methane) 
Compressors: Gas condensate (properties 
of diesel fuel) 
Explosion Severity Level 
Wellhead: 6 
Compressors: 5 
Utilities: 3 
Process: 3 
Minimum Ignition Energy [mJ] 
Natural gas: 0.28 
Gas condensate: 0.80 
Autoignition Temperature [F] 
Natural gas: 1112 
Gas condensate: 406 
Reactivity Value 
Natural gas: 0.3 
Gas condensate: 1.0 
Heat of Combustion [kJ/kg] 
Natural gas: 55700 
Gas condensate: 46800 
Mass of Gas Cloud [kg] 
Wellhead: 45 
Compressors, Utilities, Process: 40 
Process T [F] All: 200 
Process P [psi] 
Wellhead: 500 
Compressors, Utilities, Process: 100 
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Table 8: Input parameters for the optimization formulation – Jet Fire, Pool Fire, Fireball 
Input Value(s) 
Sections Possible Wellhead, Compressors, Utilities, Process 
Material Crude Oil 
Heat of Combustion [kJ/kg] 
Natural gas: 55700 
Crude oil: 42800 
Hole Diameter (Jet Fire) 1 inch 
Mass Flowrate (Pool Fire) 1 kg/s 
 
 
3.7.1.2 Results 
The optimization formulation was run using DICOPT as the MINLP solver. 
DICOPT utilized CONOPT as its solver for the NLP subproblem and CPLEX for its 
MIP subproblem. A simplified MILP problem was solved with CPLEX before solving 
the layout problem in order to initialize the variables and decrease infeasibility in the 
initial MINLP problem. The total time to solution was 99.5 seconds on a 2.13 GHz 
processor with 4 GB RAM. The problem consisted of 3192 individual variables and 
8110 individual constraints. 
Because of the nonlinearity of the model, it is essential to have a good initial 
estimate of the values of the variables. In this case study, the initial values were found by 
solving two optimization sub-problems before solving the main problem. When a sub-
problem is solved, the solution information is then passed on to the next optimization as 
an initial guess where possible. In this way, solution time was cut and infeasibility 
problems were lessened. The first optimization is an MILP initialization to ensure a 
feasible layout with respect to non-overlap constraints. All linear constraints are used, 
and the objective is simply equal to a constant to obtain feasibility. As it would be 
expected that the optimal muster, more often than not, is the muster point closest to a 
section, the second optimization is an MINLP optimization to assign sections to the 
musters closest to them. This is done by setting the objective to minimize the distance 
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between the midpoints of each section and the respective muster it is assigned to. After 
this optimization is done, the main problem is initialized. 
The results are illustrated in the following figures: 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Output footprint of the original Piper Alpha layout 
 
 
The original footprint of Piper Alpha, as given in the case study by Drysdale and 
Sylvester-Evans is replicated by fixing the side lengths, x- and y-coordinates, and floor 
assignment of each of the sections. The scenarios considered are defined in the previous 
section, and include the events of the disaster, namely the possibility of vapor cloud 
explosion in the compressor module, and pool fire and fireball in several modules, as 
well as other credible scenarios that did not occur. Through the use of the optimization 
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model, though the layout has not been changed, probabilities and an objective value for 
the original layout can be obtained. 
 
 
Table 9: Calculated probability of escape failure for original layout 
 Fire From Weighted 
Cost Wellhead Compressors Utilities Process 
E
ff
ec
t 
o
n
 
Wellhead - 0.367 0.424 0.384 5.875 
Quarters 0.000 0.007 0.163 0.000 5.100 
Compressors 0.000 - 0.659 0.377 1.036 
Storage 0.001 0.086 0.012 0.080 0.179 
Utilities 0.000 0.086 - 0.000 0.086 
Process 0.230 0.394 0.639 - 1.263 
Control 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.060 
Shop 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Sum = 13.599  
 
 
Table 10: Calculated probability of section destruction for original layout 
 Vapor Cloud Explosion From Weighted Cost 
Wellhead Compressors Utilities Process 
E
ff
ec
t 
o
n
 
Wellhead - 0.025 0.000 0.039 0.320 
Quarters 0.039 0.090 0.046 0.012 5.610 
Compressors 0.050 - 0.015 0.039 0.104 
Storage 0.050 0.087 0.003 0.030 0.170 
Utilities 0.039 0.079 - 0.011 0.129 
Process 0.054 0.090 0.002 - 0.146 
Control 0.036 0.043 0.004 0.007 0.900 
Shop 0.034 0.024 0.002 0.005 0.650 
Sum = 8.029  
 
 
It can be seen from the information in the preceding two tables that the original 
layout performed relatively poorly in the fire scenario, particularly with respect to the 
quarters and wellhead. Not only was the quarters highly populated on the platform, but it 
was also the main muster point for the platform and carried the helideck. The probability 
of escape blockage for the quarters is almost in total due to the utilities, the section that 
coinhabits the x- and y- coordinates of the quarters, but on a lower floor. 
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In the case of the explosion scenario, the sum of the probability of destruction is 
less than that of the fire scenario, but mostly because the calculated probability of a 
vapor cloud explosion event is much smaller on average than the calculated probability 
of a fire event (the highest probability of an explosion event was 0.090 for the 
compressors, as opposed to 0.659 for a fire event). As was expected based on real-life 
events, the greatest probability of destruction came from the compressors (module C) on 
the process (module B). This correlates well with actual observation, as the B/C firewall 
was destroyed during the initial explosion, causing an increase in fire and explosion 
hazards for the whole platform. This probability value is shared with the quarters, which 
is an equal distance away from the process and should thus share the same probability 
based on the explosion calculation. This leads to a high weighted cost for the section, 
which accounts for about 60% of the explosion cost. 
The optimized layout, shown below, fares significantly better in the fire and 
explosion calculations. Because the same process parameters are used, the probability of 
a fire or explosion occurrence stays the same, but the probability that a section of interest 
will be affected is changed by the spacing of the sections and allocation of muster points. 
In this way, an objective value decrease of 68.7% is obtained (21.628 to 6.778). The 
weighted cost of the fire scenario has dropped 78.8% (13.599 to 2.885) and the weighted 
cost of the explosion scenario has dropped 51.5% (8.029 to 3.893). The main factor 
contributing to the drop in both costs is the fall in the probability of escape blockage and 
destruction of the most populated sections: the quarters, control room, and shop, which 
are achieved by the adequate spacing from potential sources of fuel, while allocating 
logical muster points and escape paths to avoid possible escape blockage. Although the 
greatest gains are seen in the sections with the highest value, gains are seen almost 
universally with the exception of several of the lower value sections seeing slight 
regressions in the explosion scenario. 
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Figure 12: Optimized footprint of the Piper Alpha layout 
 
 
Table 11: Calculated probability of escape failure for optimized layout 
 Fire From Weighted 
Cost Wellhead Compressors Utilities Process 
E
ff
ec
t 
o
n
 
Wellhead - 0.118 0.015 0.139 1.360 
Quarters 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Compressors 0.000 - 0.044 0.660 0.704 
Storage 0.000 0.024 0.012 0.010 0.046 
Utilities 0.004 0.011 - 0.005 0.020 
Process 0.339 0.394 0.012 - 0.745 
Control 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Shop 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.010 
Sum = 2.885 
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Table 12: Calculated probability of section destruction for optimized layout 
 Vapor Cloud Explosion From Weighted Cost 
Wellhead Compressors Utilities Process 
E
ff
ec
t 
o
n
 
Wellhead - 0.020 0.004 0.010 0.170 
Quarters 0.048 0.009 0.005 0.004 1.980 
Compressors 0.048 - 0.015 0.054 0.117 
Storage 0.035 0.017 0.005 0.008 0.065 
Utilities 0.052 0.079 - 0.034 0.165 
Process 0.048 0.133 0.015 - 0.196 
Control 0.032 0.017 0.003 0.008 0.600 
Shop 0.032 0.017 0.003 0.008 0.600 
Sum = 3.893  
 
 
3.7.1.3 Analysis 
In this case study, it can be seen that the objective value is improved, and thus 
ostensibly the platform should be safer in the case of an event. However, as there are 
always tradeoffs in offshore layout, it is important to turn a critical eye to what has been 
found. 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Quarters muster assignment and recommended path 
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Of interest is the muster allocation for the problem. One consequence of the 
radiation intensity model is that the muster point assignment for a section may not 
always seem to be the logical point if the midpoint of a section is the closest point of fire 
intensity assessment.  
Take, as an example, the quarters section, which is allocated to M2 while M4 is 
much closer with no apparent drawback. Notice, however, that the sources of fire are all 
closest to the midpoint of the quarters whether M2 or M4 is chosen. Therefore, 
according to the model, the escape routes are equivalent and neither can be identified as 
better than the other. The less obvious path is chosen, which according to the model is 
not strictly incorrect. 
A practical concern is whether it is acceptable that certain sections be separated 
from each other. For all of its failings, the Piper Alpha platform was laid out in a logical 
manner from a production standpoint. The production modules (wellhead, process, 
compression) were near each other and the control room and shop were near the 
production modules. However, this proximity of different modules, though logical in 
that way, also helped lead to the ultimate demise of the platform due to the 
‘decapitation’ of operations when the control room was destroyed. In the model, sections 
can easily be fixed near each other if there is a need, but this also limits the options for 
how the sections can be arranged. There must be a balance between feasibility and 
freedom. 
Of technical concern is the non-linearity of the model. Unfortunately, because of 
the nature of the explosion and fire probability determination, the model is non-linear 
and non-convex. Thus, it is not guaranteed that the solution that has been given is 
globally optimal – only locally optimal. Though the result of the optimized model is 
significantly better than the original layout, it is not known how close to globally optimal 
this answer is. This is confirmed by the volatility of the objective value with respect to 
an initial value of certain variables. 
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3.7.2 Case Study: Placement and Assignment of Muster Points 
An important application of the model is to determine the optimal route of escape 
and, if necessary, the optimal placement of muster points. This application can still be 
used even in the case that the layout is already known. In this case, the sections of the 
platform can simply be fixed and the optimization can be used to vary the muster points 
in relation to the sections in order to minimize the fire hazard. Though the correct 
placement of a muster point seems like a trivial matter, it is believed that this is one of 
the most important considerations in the design of an offshore platform, as a poorly 
placed or poorly assigned muster can lengthen the amount of time it takes to escape or 
take an escape path through a hazardous area. 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Example layout from API 14J [28] 
 53 
 
The preceding layout is an example that has been taken from API Recommended 
Practice 14J: Recommended Practice for Design and Hazards Analysis for Offshore 
Production Facilities. This layout is based on a platform that was actually used and 
exhibits many of the tradeoffs that come with offshore facilities. 
Some of the positive and negative points are listed below: 
 
 
Table 13: Tradeoffs associated with the API 14J layout 
Positive Points Negative Points 
Pipeline riser toward the opposite end 
from the living quarters 
Wellhead area immediately adjacent to 
quarters 
Machinery and vessels relatively spaced 
from the quarters 
Wellhead enclosed by quarters and 
process units restricting escape 
Fire pump located near quarters and 
isolated from process 
Process units near compressors 
No fired process units Generator near quarters 
 Compressor near treatment area 
 
 
The following case study aims to illuminate first how the model can be used to 
assign muster points to sections, and then to compare it to a fully optimized layout 
created by allowing the sections the be placed on the platform freely. 
 
3.7.2.1 Formulation of the Muster Point Assignment Case Study 
In the initial phase of the case study, the above layout is converted into model 
code, fixing each of the sections to their coordinates and fixing the side lengths to the 
proper dimensions. Muster points are allowed to vary along the assigned edge, and paths 
to the muster points are allowed to vary to be subject to the least amount of heat 
exposure. The process inputs to the muster point assignment formulation are similar to 
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those of the Piper Alpha case study. The main change is that the control room is not 
present, and risers and treatment sections are added. The risers contain flammable 
material that is assumed to be similar in nature to the material in the compressor section 
(all of the riser process parameters are identical to those of the compressor section). 
Thus, this is an extra flammability and explosion hazard. The treatment area is not a 
source of flammable material and only serves to take space with a minimal section cost. 
Otherwise, the sections that were present in the Piper Alpha case study have the same 
process inputs as before; the only changes made were in dimensions and layout. The 
sections are free to go to any muster without constraint – there is no limit on the number 
of sections assigned to a certain muster point. 
The second phase of the case study allows the whole layout to be optimized in 
order to compare results. In this phase, the process parameters are all identical to the first 
phase. The areas to be satisfied are equal to the original layout and the maximum aspect 
ratio allowed is the aspect ratio of the sections in the original layout.  
In the study by DiMattia, Khan, and Amyotte, it is noted that the highest 
probability of human error during the egress phase is when an alternate escape path must 
be identified because the first is inaccessible [32]. To balance the accessibility of 
primary and alternate escape routes, as well as to ensure that the alternate is known to a 
hypothetical person attempting escape, two muster points are now selected, in 
accordance with the API 14J assertion that there should be at least two escape points for 
every area. This is accomplished with a simple modification to the muster point 
assignment constraint: 
 
∑                          
 
 
 
Both escape routes are weighted equally in the optimization. Both phases of this 
case study use the same initialization method as the Piper Alpha case study.  
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3.7.2.2 Results 
The figure below shows the optimized muster placement for the API layout. Two 
musters appear in the top corners, one on the right edge of the platform parallel with the 
midpoint of the quarters and shop, and one on the bottom edge of the deck parallel with 
the midpoint of the storage section. The total objective value is 19.6. The output 
information from the optimization is summarized below. 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Optimized placement of muster points for a pre-existing layout from API 14J  
 
 
The figure above shows the optimized muster placement for the API layout. Two 
musters appear in the bottom left corner, one on the top left corner near the midpoint of 
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the quarters and shop, and one on the right edge of the deck nearly parallel with the 
midpoint of the wellhead section. Solution was reached in 280.8 seconds, The problem 
included 2873 variables and 9648 constraints. The total objective value is 19.607. The 
output information from the optimization is summarized below. 
 
 
Table 14: Calculated probability and weighted cost of escape failure for optimized musters, fixed layout 
 
Fire From Weighted 
Cost Wellhead Compressors Utilities Process Risers 
E
ff
ec
t 
o
n
 
Wellhead - 
0.367/ 
0.000* 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.104/ 
0.104 
0.000/ 
0.000 
2.875 
Quarters 
0.056/ 
0.056 
0.031/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
4.290 
Compressors 
0.000/ 
0.008 
- 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.003/ 
0.003 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.014 
Storage 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.147/ 
0.147 
0.136/ 
0.136 
0.162/ 
0.162 
0.090/ 
0.090 
0.818 
Utilities 
0.000/ 
0.014 
0.031/ 
0.000 
- 
0.005/ 
0.014 
0.392/ 
0.392 
0.848 
Process 
0.156/ 
0.156 
0.000/ 
0.228 
0.005/ 
0.005 
- 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.550 
Risers 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.042/ 
0.042 
0.660/ 
0.660 
0.015/ 
0.015 
0.000/ 
0.000 
1.434 
Shop 
0.056/ 
0.056 
0.031/ 
0.031 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
1.740 
Treatment 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.049/ 
0.049 
0.276/ 
0.276 
0.315/ 
0.315 
0.011/ 
0.011 
1.302 
Sum = 13.871 
 
*Probability of escape from first allocated muster point/probability of escape from 
second allocated muster point 
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Table 15: Calculated probability and weighted cost of section destruction for optimized musters, fixed 
layout 
 Vapor Cloud Explosion From Weighted 
Cost Wellhead Compressors Utilities Process Risers 
E
ff
ec
t 
o
n
 
Wellhead - 0.052 0.003 0.045 0.025 0.625 
Quarters 0.054 0.017 0.000 0.016 0.007 2.820 
Compressors 0.053 - 0.003 0.033 0.029 0.118 
Storage 0.053 0.078 0.028 0.046 0.120 0.325 
Utilities 0.051 0.027 - 0.034 0.133 0.245 
Process 0.054 0.075 0.015 - 0.079 0.223 
Risers 0.051 0.036 0.054 0.038 - 0.179 
Shop 0.054 0.017 0.000 0.016 0.007 0.940 
Treatment 0.053 0.027 0.033 0.045 0.103 0.261 
Sum = 5.736 
 
 
Table 16: Muster assignment for the API layout 
Section Muster Path 
Muster 
Point 
x-
coordinate 
y-
coordinate 
Wellhead 2,4 x-y,direct M1 0 0 
Quarters 2,4 x-y,direct M2 0 0 
Compressors 1,4 direct,direct M3 110 79.5 
Storage 1,2 direct,direct M4 0 150 
Utilities 1,4 y-x,y-x    
Process 3,4 direct,x-y    
Risers 1,2 direct,direct    
Shop 1,2 x-y,x-y    
Treatment 1,2 direct,direct    
 
 
The assignment of the muster points is, for the most part, sensical and 
straightforward. The most costly sections, the quarters and shop, are directed to the 
nearest muster, and the muster is placed so that it is the shortest possible distance from 
the quarters on the right side of the platform. Several other sections are assigned to the 
same muster and follow logical paths to get there, avoiding routes through the sources of 
fire.  
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Figure 16: Optimized layout for the API platform  
 
 
The objective value is decreased by 77.5%, mostly owing to an improvement in 
the fire scenario. This shows that while allocation of muster points is effective, a full 
layout decreases the total cost of the layout even further. It does this once again through 
spacing of possible fire and explosion sources while allocating muster points such that 
escape is not forced through high-risk areas. 
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Table 17: Calculated probability and weighted cost of escape failure for optimized musters, optimized 
layout 
 
Fire From Weighted 
Cost Wellhead Compressors Utilities Process Risers 
E
ff
ec
t 
o
n
 
Wellhead - 
0.000/ 
0.000* 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000 
Quarters 
0.002/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.060 
Compressors 
0.000/ 
0.000 
- 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000 
Storage 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.007/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.022/ 
0.000 
0.029 
Utilities 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
- 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.047/ 
0.000 
0.047 
Process 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
- 
0.026/ 
0.000 
0.026 
Risers 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.013/ 
0.013 
0.000/ 
0.000 
- 0.026 
Shop 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000 
Treatment 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000/ 
0.000 
0.000 
Sum = 0.188 
 
*Probability of escape from first allocated muster point/probability of escape from 
second allocated muster point 
 
 
Table 18: Calculated probability and weighted cost of section destruction for optimized musters, 
optimized layout 
 Vapor Cloud Explosion From Weighted 
Cost Wellhead Compressors Utilities Process Risers 
E
ff
ec
t 
o
n
 
Wellhead - 0.070 0.023 0.018 0.054 0.825 
Quarters 0.026 0.017 0.000 0.019 0.004 1.980 
Compressors 0.054 - 0.006 0.004 0.024 0.088 
Storage 0.052 0.011 0.000 0.047 0.005 0.115 
Utilities 0.054 0.042 - 0.008 0.131 0.235 
Process 0.052 0.009 0.002 - 0.008 0.071 
Risers 0.054 0.031 0.051 0.005 - 0.141 
Shop 0.026 0.017 0.000 0.019 0.004 0.660 
Treatment 0.050 0.006 0.000 0.054 0.005 0.115 
Sum =4.230  
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Table 19: Muster assignment for the optimized API layout 
Section Muster Path 
Muster 
Point 
x-
coordinate 
y-
coordinate 
Wellhead 1,4 x-y,direct M1 0 0 
Quarters 1,3 y-x, x-y M2 0 150 
Compressors 3,4 y-x, direct M3 110 150 
Storage 2,3 y-x, y-x M4 0 0 
Utilities 1,2 direct, y-x    
Process 2,4 y-x, x-y    
Risers 2,3 direct, y-x    
Shop 1,3 y-x, x-y    
Treatment 1,4 y-x, y-x    
 
 
3.7.2.3 Analysis 
As can be seen, the quarters and shop occupy the same area on different floors 
and are sent to the same set of muster points. Both points are situated on corners of the 
platform, away from most sources of fire.  
The layout itself is predicated on separating the high-value sections, the quarters 
and shop, from the high hazard sections, particularly the wellhead and compressors. The 
wellhead is an intermediate in this formulation, as it has a moderate cost but is also a 
source of hazard. The layout is constrained by the fact that the wellhead and the 
compressors, two of the largest sections, are also multiple-story objects, thus not 
allowing other sections to be placed on top of or below them, but this likely isn’t a large 
concern as any section placed directly on top of or below these sections would have a 
heavy risk of both fire and explosion hazards. 
Though it does not explicitly aim to do it, the model does relieve some of the 
negative points of the original layout. The quarters area is no longer directly adjacent to 
the wellhead, and escape routes (particularly that of the wellhead) are no longer blocked. 
However, the treatment area is still relatively close to the compressors and ignition 
sources are not well spaced from fuel sources. This was not a specific concern of the 
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model as created, so this is to be expected, but the implicit power of the model to 
improve the layout concerning most hazards that require trade-offs is encouraging. 
Of interest is the fact that the model predicts the same configuration of shop and 
quarters as the original layout. This makes sense as they are the highest-value sections, 
the exact same footprint area, and neither is a source of hazard. Thus, they can fit in the 
same space, they are both valued highly to move away from hazard, and do not affect 
one another other than for the non-overlap constraints. The optimization model 
corroborates that this is a good design decision. 
Validation for the explosion overpressure scenarios was carried out in FLACS 
for both the fixed case and the optimized layout case, focusing on impact on the highest-
cost sections – the quarters, shop, and wellhead. Full-section vapor clouds of natural gas 
were put on a geometry approximating the congestion of the platform, and were ignited 
in the center of each section. Monitor points were placed in the center of the sections of 
interest to obtain overpressure values against time. The results are summarized below: 
 
 
Table 20: Comparison of CFD results for overpressure and probit-calculated probability of destruction 
 Wellhead Compressors Process 
 Max P [bar] 
Destruction 
Probability 
Max P 
[bar] 
Destruction 
Probability 
Max P 
[bar] 
Destruction 
Probability 
Fixed 
Quarters 0.55 1.00 0.11 0.27 0.05 0.00 
Shop 0.49 1.00 0.11 0.27 0.05 0.00 
Wellhead 0.80 1.00 0.24 0.99 0.11 0.27 
Optimized 
Quarters 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Shop 0.11 0.27 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Wellhead 0.80 1.00 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.00 
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As can be seen, the overpressure on the quarters, shop, and wellhead area is 
drastically reduced with the exception of the effect of an explosion in the wellhead on 
the wellhead. The destruction probability, calculated by the probit function with the CFD 
overpressure values, is shown improve in greater proportion than predicted by the 
optimization, implying greater gains in risk performance than expected. 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Overpressure profile at monitor points (red: quarters, black: shop) and maximum overpressure 
for fixed case, wellhead area explosion 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Overpressure profile at monitor points (red: quarters, black: shop) and maximum overpressure 
for free case, wellhead area explosion 
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3.8 Base Model Conclusions 
An optimization formulation has been created that takes into account many of the 
main points of interest when laying out offshore platforms. The formulation accounts for 
the relative lack of space, the possibility of multiple floors, anticipated process 
conditions in order to predict the interactions between the sections of interest and the 
personnel that inhabit them. Practical concerns of explosion and fire events are 
considered in the ways that they would be expected to have the highest impact – 
infrastructure destruction for explosions and escape route blockage for fires. Sections are 
placed so as to minimize the human risk in a probabilistic manner, and escape routes and 
muster points are concurrently optimized. 
The formulation has been proven to be a significant improvement over actual 
layouts, both when initializing the layout with no prior fixing of section locations, and 
also when using the model to evaluate an existing layout for an improvement in muster 
points. Other possible uses of the model would include the ability to evaluate current 
layouts for risk level, ability to site new equipment and sections with respect to 
minimum risk, and sensitivity analysis of layout risk with respect to changes in platform 
dimensions, number of floors, process conditions, or monetary considerations. 
The formulation will be extended to include improved escape modeling, 
mitigation techniques such as blast and fire wall allocation, weather conditions for 
dispersion modeling, and domino effect in the following chapters. 
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4. AN APPROACH FOR INCORPORATING WEATHER CONDITIONS, TOXIC 
DISPERSION MODELING, AND MITIGATION SYSTEMS INTO THE 
OPTIMIZATION MODEL 
Whereas the base model accounts for a large portion of the probable events on an 
offshore platform, it does so in a way that ignores several basic criteria that should be 
taken into account according to API 14J [28]: It does not account for weather conditions, 
it does not allow for mitigation systems, and it does not consider toxic dispersion 
modeling. Nor does it make any attempt at resolving any dispersion modeling 
considerations. 
Each of these omissions can be justified for the base model. The dispersion 
modeling can be overlooked initially, as the greatest process safety risks posed to a 
platform are generally considered to be fire and explosion over toxic exposure. Realistic 
integration of weather conditions cannot be implemented without a satisfactory 
dispersion model, as a main function of weather conditions, in conjunction with platform 
geometry, is the effect on dispersion of gases that may result in a fire, explosion, or toxic 
exposure. Mitigation systems are an important aspect of facility layout, but are not 
always considered as a key factor during the layout phase – that is to say, while they are 
ubiquitous and indisputably play a major role in risk-reduction, a human performing a 
layout evaluation may not consider them in the same detail or with the same weight 
during the layout as an optimization model may be able to. 
Though the omissions can be justified in some ways, it is of paramount importance 
that they be implemented if the model is to be considered realistic and robust, in addition 
to satisfying the goals of compliance with best practices and standards. Thus, the 
objectives of this methodology are as follows: 
 
 Devise a methodology to model effects of dispersion, particularly of toxic 
material, in the offshore platform environment. Take into account material 
properties, process conditions, weather conditions, and geometry considerations 
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in order to realistically estimate concentrations at any given point on the 
platform, effects on personnel, and cumulative risk to be used in the objective 
function. 
 Weather conditions will be governed by wind speed and direction, which will be 
used in conjunction with layout considerations that affect air circulation in the 
platform geometry. 
 Incorporate mitigation systems into the model with special emphasis given to 
blast walls and fire walls, as these are two key mitigations used in the offshore 
environment. 
 
The improvements will be assimilated into the existing base model and performance 
will be evaluated by FLACS CFD simulation with respect to fire, explosion, and toxic 
gas dispersion 
 
4.1 Background Information on Use of Mitigation Systems in an Offshore 
Environment 
 Mitigation systems that are commonly encountered in an offshore environment 
include passive mitigations such as blast and fire walls, active mitigations such as gas 
detection, structural decisions such as additional cladding on existing structures, and 
non-structural such as control systems [39]. Optimization of gas detection, a layout 
problem of a different kind than that studied here, has been examined in the offshore 
environment for a fixed layout by Legg and Benavides in order to minimize time to 
detection, maximize number of releases detected, and optimize number of detectors 
placed [40], as well as incorporate voting strategies and unavailability [41]. However, 
although detection could be incorporated into the layout phase, it is expected that it 
would be a less efficient and less accurate use of resources than to lay out the facility and 
then optimize gas detection. This allows for more accurate estimations of gas cloud 
concentrations for the placement of detectors. 
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Blast walls are simply used to segregate areas that have a relatively high 
probabilities of explosion from areas that are sensitive to the effects of explosion – for 
example, highly populated areas or areas where explosion could lead to domino effects 
[42]. They are often constructed of corrugated stainless steel welded to the top and 
bottom of the floor they occupy, and are rated as acceptable to a certain pressure, though 
there is no universally utilized manner of determining the rating of a blast wall. They 
have been studied extensively in academia and industry, primarily for load-response data 
for different materials and configurations with respect to deflection and deformation of a 
wall. This information is invaluable when designing a blast wall for an expected impact; 
however, it is not necessary in the optimization model to design a blast wall, only to 
explain the effects of a possible explosion on the section that has a wall that is assumed 
to be properly designed. Thus, the measure of importance in the optimization is how a 
properly designed wall reacts to an overpressure impact probabilistically, so that the 
mitigated probability can be taken into account in the objective. 
Fire walls mirror blast walls in several ways. They are used to separate areas of 
possible high-consequence events from sensitive areas that may be compromised and 
lead to escalation or direct impacts [43]. They are especially useful in lengthening the 
time available for escape by postponing structural failure or direct human consequences, 
although they typically only last a finite amount of time under load [44]. Indeed, API 14J 
[28] recommends that firewalls, as well as blast walls, be considered when quarters areas 
are in proximity to hydrocarbon-containing areas. Like blast walls, they are often 
constructed of corrugated stainless steel [45].  As with blast walls, much of the literature 
focuses on the response of a wall to a heat radiation load. This is very important in the 
design of firewalls, but is not of interest in the optimization formulation. The key is 
relating the mere presence of a blast wall to the probability of escape in the case of a fire 
event. 
Human factors and control systems are also important in the mitigation of fire 
and explosion effects, and although it could be argued that layout affects either of these 
factors, they are considered outside of the scope of this layout formulation. 
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4.2 Weather Conditions and Dispersion Modeling Formulation 
Dispersion modeling is based upon a probabilistic formulation that penalizes 
congestion in each direction relative to the section of the release based on the amount of 
congestion that is present in that direction. The principle behind the modeling is that a 
jet-type leak can occur in any direction, non-preferentially. The area congestion ratio 
(ACR) is calculated in each direction for each leak source.  
In conjunction with the congestion, the weather conditions, particularly wind 
direction and magnitude affecting ventilation, can play a large role in the dispersion 
footprint of a cloud. Higher ventilation allows for more egress of gas from the platform 
and is an important design criterion in the offshore case. The dispersion expression 
provided takes into account both of these factors and their interactions in order to 
describe how gas disperses without a full pre-known layout to work with. 
In this chapter, dispersion modeling is used to describe a release of a toxic gas, 
hydrogen sulfide, based on the layout of the sections to each direction of the release, 
only on the same floor as the release. This concept is extended in chapter 5 to include 
dispersion to floors above and below, such as through a grated deck, and the 
consideration of the dispersion of other materials such as flammable gas, smoke, and 
combustion products. 
 
4.2.1 Dispersion Modeling using ACM in FLACS 
FLACS is a specialized computational fluid dynamics (CFD) software package 
developed especially to address certain process safety applications[46], key among 
which is the dispersion of flammable and toxic gas. The governing equations for fluid 
flow are the Navier-Stokes conservation equations which are solved using the finite 
volume method on a Cartesian grid. Conservation equations for mass, momentum, 
enthalpy, and mass fraction of species closed by the ideal gas law are included. 
 Geometry is written as an obstruction file, which is then converted into an area 
porosity component in the x-, y-, and z-directions. This is done through the use of the 
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defined Cartesian grid file to dissect the obstruction into intermediate control volumes, 
and then averaging the obstructed and unobstructed projection in each direction into a 
uniform porosity in the control volume. In this way, when the simulation is run the 
program does not ‘see’ the geometry, but a generalized version of the geometry that 
adequately represents the key contributor the physics of the application. 
 Because of the way that the geometry is converted into a porosity, if the relative 
level of congestion of an object is known beforehand, then an accurate simulation can be 
produced even if the detailed geometry is not known [47]. This method, known as the 
anticipated congestion method (ACM), is very useful in the design-phase of facilities 
offshore as well as onshore because detailed siting and layout does not necessarily have 
to be done before a preliminary layout evaluation can be done, as long as the relative 
blockage can be estimated. However, in this application, the objective is not to evaluate 
a known layout or even a prospective layout, but to understand how the dispersion 
pattern of a gas will change as the layout changes, then to relate that to the probability of 
a toxic incident – a very different problem that can be attacked in a very similar way. 
 The ACM method has been used with excellent results in practice for blast 
modelling, but has not been used widely in dispersion modeling. It is contended in this 
work that the ACM method is equally applicable to dispersion as it is to explosion 
simulations because both are, with respect to the modeling in FLACS, two applications 
of the same problem: fluid flow, which is influenced geometrically by the porosity of the 
object within a grid cell. FLACS does not ‘see’ a difference between an actual geometry 
and a simulated geometry given that the pososities are the same for each grid cell. This is 
not to imply that the approximation is perfect; there is a natural loss in accuracy by a 
homogeneous approximation of a heterogeneous congestion, and there is no account 
taken for solid obstructions such as walls. However, because the nature of the problem is 
that the location of major obstructions is unknown, this is a necessary approximation. 
 ACM geometries were generated in FLACS for a platform of a fixed 150’ x 150’ 
footprint with a height of about 15’. Congestion was simulated for 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 
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0.9 congestion ratios using a repeating 1x1x1 m grid of square-faced beams with 
dimensions calculated to give the correct amount of congestion in each direction. 
 
 
 
Figure 19: ACM geometry for 0.5 congestion ratio, top: anticipated congestion; middle: one unit cell for 
ACM; bottom: full ACM geometry 
 
 
4.2.2 FLACS Simulations and Correlation Modeling 
In order to formulate a suitable correlation for the effect of wind on dispersed 
toxic gas, a set of 720 simulations were run, varying key parameters that are expected to 
have the greatest effect on gas concentration. These are congestion, flow rate, wind 
speed, leak direction, and monitor direction. Of interest is the parameter of monitor 
direction, which is defined as which section of the four sections of the platform the 
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dispersion of the gas is being recorded for with respect to the leak – positive-x, negative-
x, positive-y, or negative-y. 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Monitor regions for the correlation modeling simulations: clockwise from top-left - -X-
direction, -Y-direction, +Y-direction, +X-direction   
 
 
This is a convenient formulation for the optimization formulation because the 
relative cardinal positions of the sections in relation to each other are naturally calculated 
within the model because of the disjunction formulation of the non-overlap constraints. 
A correlation can be derived for each of the monitor regions with respect to each of the 
release directions, which can then be summed over each release direction using the 
relative congestion level that is calculated during the solution of the optimization 
formulation in order to find the expected fraction of toxic gas in the region, and from 
that the probability of toxic effects. More detail is given in section 4.4.3.  
 A key advantage of the CFD simulation formulation is that, naturally, not all of 
the gas from a leak in a certain direction will end up in that certain direction unabated. In 
the hypothetical case of a leak in the negative-x direction, particularly if the wind is in 
the positive-x direction, some of the gas will end up in each of the four monitor regions 
– an amount that is expected to gain even more significance if the wind speed is high and 
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that may possibly be a strong function of the congestion level. Simple dispersion models 
such as the Pasquill-Gifford [48] dispersion model, though well-suited for applications 
such as finding worst-case scenarios in an onshore scenario, nonetheless cannot model 
key phenomena that may cause toxic gas to recirculate behind the leak or lose 
momentum and disperse further in the transverse direction. Indeed, the Pasquill-Gifford 
model is unable to calculate a footprint accounting for any wind other than that which 
occurs directly downwind of the leak. In an offshore environment when there is 
commonly a prevailing wind direction, the assumption that every release will occur 
directly downwind, giving unwarranted symmetry between relative placement of 
sections, is unacceptable. Thus, although the CFD correlation simulation formulation is 
simplified, it is asserted that the results reflect actual conditions better than other 
simplified approaches that could are also suitable for implementation in the optimization 
formulation.  
 Static parameters used in the simulation are as follows: 
 
 
Table 21: Static parameters used in the dispersion correlation scenarios 
Parameter Value 
Platform Size 150’ x 150’ with 15’ ceiling 
Leak Position 75’,75’ (center of platform) 
Material Hydrogen sulfide 
Leak Diameter 2 inches 
Leak Temperature 50°C 
Leak Duration 600 seconds (ensure steady state) 
Grid Size within Monitor Domain 1x1x1 meter 
Wind Direction Blowing toward +X 
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 The parameter values varied in the simulation are listed in the table that follows. 
All combinations were enumerated and correlated. 
 
 
Table 22: Parameters varied in the dispersion correlation scenarios 
Congestion Level Flow Rate Wind Speed Leak Direction Monitor Direction 
0.1 0.1 1 +X +X 
0.3 0.5 3 -X -X 
0.5 1 5 -Y +Y 
0.7 2   -Y 
0.9 5    
 10    
 
 
All simulations were run using the incompressible release model in order to 
expedite results. The incompressible model in FLACS simplifies the governing 
equations for fluid flow by assuming that the solver can neglect compressibility 
phenomena, thereby reducing the number of equations to be solved and allowing for a 
longer stable time step with minimal loss in accuracy [49]. The applicability of the 
incompressible solver depends on the scenario – it is never applicable in an explosion 
scenario, and high-velocity dispersion simulations may experience a significant loss in 
accuracy. A Mach number (ratio of release velocity to sound velocity) of less than 0.5 is 
generally accepted as the upper limit for the incompressible solver. This is not 
problematic for these simulations, as the maximum Mach number is about 0.2. 
The following figures illustrate sample differences in dispersion footprint due to 
the changes in the aforementioned variable parameters. The scale of the axes is equal in 
all side-by-side comparisons, and the colors that represent concentrations are constant 
through all figures. All figures are taken at the time step of the maximum cloud size. 
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Figure 21: Comparison of congestion ratio 0.5 runs, 10 kg/s releases in the –Y-direction. Left: 1 m/s +X 
wind; Right: 5 m/s +X wind 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Comparison of congestion ratio 0.5 runs, 10 kg/s releases in the –X-direction. Left: 1 m/s +X 
wind; Right: 5 m/s +X wind 
 
 
 74 
 
 It is plain in these figures that the wind speed can play a significant role in the 
dispersion of the gas – Figure 21 shows that the dispersed gas dominates the –X side of 
the platform with a slight wind against the release, while with a moderate wind against 
the release, the +X side of the platform is dominated. This result, particularly when the 
wind direction is opposed to the leak direction, would not be reflected with a simpler 
method of estimating the footprint of the dispersed cloud. Likewise, the difference in 
cloud behaviors due to congestion shows that congestion cannot be discounted: 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Comparison of 2 kg/s releases in the +X-direction, 1 m/s +X wind: Left: congestion ratio 0.1; 
Right: congestion ratio 0.5 
 
 
As can be seen, not only is the footprint of the cloud highly influenced by a 
change in the congestion ratio, but the amount of gas that is actually trapped within the 
area of interest is highly variable as well. Note that in the preceding figures, the red 
region is not a region of equal concentration, but rather a region where the gas 
concentration is above a certain threshold. It is safe to assume that as one approaches the 
center  of the red region of the cloud, the concentration will be higher than at the outer 
edge of the red region away from the release point. 
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Finally, the relation between flowrate and cloud footprint is presented below. As 
expected, a higher flowrate introduces more gas into the monitor region and in general 
causes a higher mass fraction in the reason, but the interplay between the higher flowrate 
and congestion level is of interest, as a higher congestion level will obstruct the escape 
of the gas while a lower congestion level will allow for the gas to be vented from the 
platform. This means that as congestion level rises, the relative proportion of the gas that 
is trapped within the monitor region will rise between the low-flowrate and high-
flowrate case. 
 
 
 
Figure 24: A comparison of flowrates and congestion levels. Top left: 0.5 kg/s flow in 0.5 congestion 
ratio geometry; Top right: 2 kg/s flow in 0.5 congestion ratio geometry; Bottom left: 2 kg/s flow in 0.1 
congestion ratio geometry; Bottom right: 10 kg/s flow in 0.1 congestion ratio geometry 
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 Data from the monitor files was extracted in order to identify trends that could be 
correlated for use in the optimization model. For each monitor region, total mass of gas 
and fuel mass were taken at the time of maximum fuel mass. Both are necessary, as the 
higher congestion ratios have a lower total mass of gas due to the blockage of volume by 
the congestion. This is used to calculate the maximum mass fraction for the scenario. 
 Data was fitted linearly by least-squares regression to each of the parameters of 
interest: release rate, wind speed, and congestion level, for each of the release directions. 
The linear fit was chosen because it trends with the data relatively well in the cases of 
wind speed and release rate, and is expected to give a better prediction outside of the 
bounds of the correlation than a high-level polynomial. Because these parts of the 
correlation are non-variable parametric in the optimization formulation, a more complex 
fit would not hinder solution efficiency; this is not true, however, of the congestion 
regression. Although the linear fit performs relatively well for the congestion level 
variable, the key consideration here is to have a function that will accurately portray the 
relation, but will also be expedient for the optimization model. A base linear 
formulation, if of acceptable predictive power, is ideal.  
 Correlation was done in a piecewise manner. First, all data was separated by 
congestion level, release direction, and monitor region. Regression was performed with 
respect to the independent variable of flow rate and the dependent variable of mass 
fraction for1 m/s and 5 m/s wind speeds. A y-intercept of zero was assumed, as when 
there is no flow, there should be no mass fraction of toxic gas. The slope of the 
correlation was then calculated for each of the congestion levels, and a regression was 
taken of these slopes with respect to congestion level for both wind speeds. Finally, the 
difference in slopes between the wind speeds was assumed to follow a linear correlation 
with a non-zero y-intercept, as when the wind speed is zero, there is still the opportunity 
for mass accumulation. Thus the form of the correlation is as follows: 
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Where C denotes the congestion ratio (multiplied by 100), W denotes the wind 
speed (in m/s), and F denotes the flow rate of material (kg/s). The parameters a and c 
represent the base contribution of the congestion and wind, respectively. They are 
largely arbitrary individually, but their sum is meaningful as the base coefficient for the 
flowrate when wind and congestion are both zero. The b and d coefficients represent the 
scaled contribution that wind and congestion have, respectively, on the congestion and 
wind contribution to the slope of the flowrate. In other words, congestion and wind 
within the brackets modifies how the mass fraction linearly depends on flowrate. These 
modifiers are, in turn, variable with respect to the other. Again, this is assumed to be a 
linear dependence; b and d are replaced with functions of W and C: 
 
                              
 
In this equation, e is the base contribution of congestion to the change in mass 
fraction with the change in flow rate, and g is the analog for wind speed. These values 
are the limit of the slope as the opposing variable (wind in the case of the e value) 
approaches zero. The fW term reflects how the wind speed modifies the congestion 
contribution to the slope of the relation, and iC is the analog with respect to the wind 
contribution. It can be seen that both components are now intertwined, such that the 
congestion contribution is a function of the wind and the wind contribution is a function 
of the congestion. This is physically reasonable because of the negative effect that a 
rising level of congestion has in allowing wind ventilation, expressed in the i term, and 
the negative (or positive, largely depending on the relation of wind direction to release 
direction) effect that a rising level of wind has on the effectiveness of congestion to trap 
gas, expressed in j.  
Rearranging and grouping all C values together, the equation can be put into a 
more useful form: 
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The derivatives of the function are used to derive the coefficients and constants: 
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
  
 
  
  
  
     
 
  
  
  
                  
 
  
  
  
        
 
  
  
  
                  
 
  
  
  
        
  
  
                              
  
  
                  
 
The first equation can be used to find f+i directly. Both third derivatives are 
theoretically equal, so either can be used. Both methods were used, then compared and 
verified to be equal. The second equation can be used to find g: the slope values for the 
second derivative with respect to wind are related as a function of congestion with the 
prior calculated value of f+i. In order to find the base wind contribution, the congestion 
level is set at zero, eliminating the f+i term and leaving the value of the second 
derivative with respect to wind at C = 0. This can be found by correlating an intercept 
from the values of the second derivatives at each congestion level. Likewise, the third 
equation can be solved for e in a similar manner, setting W to 0 and correlating the y-
intercept of the second derivative with respect to congestion. Finally, a+c, the base 
change in mass fraction with respect to a change in mass flow, can be found by 
correlating the slope as C and W approach zero. 
Correlated parameters are presented below: 
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Table 23: Correlation parameters for the dispersion model 
Release 
Direction 
Monitor 
Region 
Base 
Congestion 
Coefficient (e) 
Proportional 
Wind 
Coefficient (f+i) 
Base Wind 
Coefficient 
(g) 
Base Flowrate 
Coefficient 
(a+c) 
+X 
+X 9.75E-5 1.25E-6 -2.41E-4 1.12E-3 
-X 2.71E-5 -2.98E-6 5.04E-5 -5.09E-4 
+Y 5.80E-5 -9.22E-7 -8.92E-5 3.23E-4 
-Y 6.46E-5 -9.71E-7 -9.04E-5 2.97E-4 
-X 
+X 3.63E-5 -9.77E-7 5.99E-4 -8.90E-4 
-X 7.14E-5 -7.59E-6 -3.82E-4 1.29E-3 
+Y 5.68E-5 -6.02E-6 2.90E-4 7.17E-4 
-Y 6.37E-5 -6.17E-6 2.46E-4 7.06E-4 
+Y 
+X 6.19E-5 3.39E-6 -5.91E-6 5.96E-4 
-X 5.92E-5 -6.30E-6 -1.36E-4 3.22E-4 
+Y 9.18E-5 -3.07E-6 -1.60E-4 1.43E-3 
-Y 3.15E-5 -3.28E-7 1.80E-5 -4.99E-4 
-Y 
+X 6.19E-5 3.39E-6 -5.91E-6 5.96E-4 
-X 5.92E-5 -6.30E-6 -1.36E-4 3.22E-4 
+Y 3.15E-5 -3.28E-7 1.80E-5 -4.99E-4 
-Y 9.18E-5 -3.07E-6 -1.60E-4 1.43E-3 
 
 
 The base congestion coefficient (e) describes how a change in congestion 
proportionally changes the mass fraction of dispersed material in the area without 
respect to wind speed. All are positive numbers, meaning that an increase in congestion 
increases the mass fraction of material contained, as expected. A higher magnitude 
implies more effect in the monitor direction.  
The proportional wind coefficient (f+i) describes how congestion and wind speed 
interact to affect the mass fraction. A positive value shows that an increasing wind speed 
causes a higher mass fraction, as can be seen in the monitor region corresponding with 
the wind direction in most cases, while a negative value implies that the combined effect 
of wind and congestion is to push dispersed material out of the monitor region. The 
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effect of this coefficient lessens with a smaller congestion or wind. Intuitively, this 
makes sense – considering the positive coefficient in the monitor region in the direction 
of the wind, a greater wind will push gas in other monitor regions toward the positive 
wind direction monitor region and the greater congestion will hold the vapor closer to 
the release so that the wind can more easily move it to the monitor region of interest, 
which will then be retained more effectively in the positive wind monitor region.  
The base wind coefficient (g) describes how the wind effects the dispersion 
without regard to congestion. This has mixed effects depending on the release direction, 
where the wind may push dispersed gas off the platform, or lessen its momentum so that 
it stays on the platform and accumulates. 
Finally, the base flowrate coefficient (a+c) simply relates flowrate to dispersed 
mass fraction in absence of the effects of wind and congestion. This should, 
theoretically, always be positive; however, the values in the direction opposing the 
release are each negative. This indicates an imperfection in the correlation that arises at 
low congestions and wind speeds where the estimated mass fraction will be negative. 
However, the combination of the low levels of wind speed and congestion imply that the 
mass fraction would be orders of magnitude smaller in the direction of interest than 
would be expected to cause any effect, so a negative result can be approximated as zero 
mass fraction. 
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Figure 25: Parity plot for all +X-direction releases. Line denotes equality between correlation and 
simulation value. 
 
 
As can be seen in the above figure, the correlation agrees very well with the 
positive-x direction release data. Data in this plot is not grouped by congestion or wind 
level, but the data shows a better fit for high congestion scenarios, and is rather more 
erratic with respect to the lowest congestion scenarios. This is because the initial data for 
low congestion scenarios is far more erratic and less linear than data from higher 
congestion scenarios. The divergence is pronounced at congestion ratio 0.1, while 
congestion ratio 0.3 shows a much smaller degree of divergence, mostly in the 
underestimation of mass fractions in the monitor regions in the opposite direction of the 
release. The remaining two parity plots are shown below. 
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Figure 26: Parity plot for all -X-direction releases. Line denotes equality between correlation and 
simulation value. 
 
 
 
Figure 27: Parity plot for all -Y-direction releases. Line denotes equality between correlation and 
simulation value. 
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The positive-y direction releases were not considered, as they have y-axis mirror 
symmetry with the negative-y direction releases about the center of the platform. 
Therefore, the y-direction parameters will be flipped and the x-direction parameters will 
remain the same. This is not true of the positive- and negative-x directions because of 
the wind effect. 
 The average relative error for mass fractions in each direction is less than 20% 
for all congestion ratios greater than 0.1. There is no significant trend in overall accuracy 
between wind speeds, as they are often within a percentage point of each other and 
neither is generally higher or lower than the other. However, the accuracy drops slightly 
at higher wind speeds in the monitor region opposite of the direction of the release. This 
manifests itself in the form of a general underprediction at low flowrates before 
converging to the data at high flowrates. As the low flowrates produce lower mass 
fractions, the higher relative error is caused by a very low absolute error. 
The average relative error for mass fractions for a congestion ratio of 0.1 is 
between 40 and 50%. However, this is misleading because the mass fractions that are 
found at this congestion level are normally very low, where a large relative error does 
not imply a large absolute error. As an example, these numbers are highly skewed by an 
abnormally large relative error in the direction opposite the release where the actual 
mass fraction is on the order of 10
-7
-10
-8
 – so small that it would ostensibly add almost 
no value to the optimization over a zero estimate or over an estimate that is even an 
order of magnitude higher. In the optimization, it is unlikely that in most cases there will 
be a congestion level this low due to the relative lack of space on the platform. 
To summarize the conclusions in this section, a simple correlation between 
several parameters was created in order to implement into the layout program, including 
weather conditions in the form of wind in a set direction. The correlation gives sufficient 
accuracy in a form that is a linear function of congestion, the only parameter that is 
variable in the optimization model, but diverges at low congestions, which is not 
expected to be a large factor. Because the correlation is a linear model of congestion 
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rather than a more complicated model, it is expected that the performance of the 
optimization will not suffer unduly.  
 Because the leaks were centered in the platform, sensitivity analysis was 
performed to ensure that the concentration of the gas does not change drastically if the 
position of the leak is changed. A further set of 20 simulations were run, varying the leak 
position along the x-axis and y-axis to study the effect of leak position on concentration 
within a monitor region for +x and –x-direction leaks. Leak positions were 10, 25, 75, 
and 90 percent of the length of the platform along one axis, holding the other at 50 
percent, as well as 25%/25% and 75%/75% in the x- and y-axis directions. The leaks 
were allowed to come to steady state and compared with the concentrations found in the 
base case. 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Relative deviation in concentration for various leaks in –x-direction 
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 As seen in the preceding figure, the concentration estimate is generally worst in 
along the edge of the platform in the direction of the leak and is best closest to the center 
and skewed toward the side that the monitor region lies in. This effect is mirrored in the 
+x-direction case not shown above. The greatest deviation is typically within 20% of the 
base value, but there is no obvious mathematical correlation between accuracy and leak 
position; there are only the general trends mentioned before. The relatively poor 
performance near the edge of the platform in the direction of the leak is not expected to 
highly impact the optimization results, as the closer to the edge of the platform a facility 
is, the less likely it is that another facility will be between it and the edge of the platform 
due to non-overlap considerations. 
 
4.2.3 Implementation into the Optimization Model 
Implementation of toxic gas dispersion into the optimization model requires the 
introduction of several new parameters and variables. These are briefly summarized 
below: 
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Table 24: Parameters and variables added in the toxic dispersion optimization model 
Base Parameters 
R,Mte 
Base congestion coefficient for a release in the R-direction in the 
M-direction monitor region 
R,Mtfi 
Proportional wind coefficient for a release in the R-direction in 
the M-direction monitor region 
R,Mtg 
Base wind coefficient for a release in the R-direction in the M-
direction monitor region 
R,Mtac 
Base flow coefficient for a release in the R-direction in the M-
direction monitor region 
Base Variables 
MBRs,f Calculated blockage ratio in the M-direction of section s on floor f 
R,MSDs,f 
Scaled dispersion mass fraction in monitor region M due to a 
releasein direction R in section s on floor f with a congestion ratio 
of BRs,f determined by correlation 
P(Toxic)s,k Probability of death in section s due to toxic release in section k 
 
 
The key component in the new facet of the optimization is the calculation of the 
congestion ratio in relation to a section. Because the positions of all sections are related 
to each other through the disjunctive nature of the non-overlap constraints, a convenient 
framework is inherent in the program. Using the binary non-overlap variables and the 
pre-defined footprint areas for each of the sections: 
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These are simply defined as the sum of the footprint areas of the sections in the 
direction of interest divided by the total area. The factor of half of the area of the 
considered section is necessary because the area calculation begins at the midpoint of 
section s, and so the total congested area would include that half of section s.  
 
 The dispersion mass fraction from a release in section s in a certain monitor 
direction M is then calculated straight away as the maximum contribution from 
directional releases: 
 
     
        
 
        
       
 
         
         
   
 
 There are several different methods for quantifying the toxic effect of hydrogen 
sulfide, the material that is expected to cause the greatest toxic threat (other than 
combustion products) in an offshore environment  [50]. It can be estimated through the 
use of a probit function, as radiation effect and overpressure effect can. Such a 
formulation could be used exactly as previously demonstrated in the prior chapter. The 
general parameters may vary greatly from source to source. Lees’ Loss Prevention in the 
Process Industries [51] gives the values in the following table for the form P = 
a+bln(tC
c
), where t is the exposure time and C is the concentration in parts per million: 
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Table 25: Parameters for hydrogen sulfide toxic probit function 
Parameter Value 
a -31.42 
b 3.008 
c 1.43 
 
 The expected toxic effect can also be estimated using the SLOT/SLOD method 
as explained by the United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive [52], which is based 
on experimental data which is then extrapolated to give a relation of toxic concentration 
to the time that 50% mortality would be expected. It takes the form of C
n
t = A, where C 
is the concentration [ppm], t is the exposure time [min], A is the dangerous toxic load, 
and n is a scaling exponent. This form is useful in a time-based formulation, where some 
function of the total escape time is maximized for the platform. 
A value that contributes to the probability of escape in a toxic release is the 
Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) value. The IDLH is defined by “an 
atmosphere that poses an immediate threat to life, would cause irreversible adverse 
health effects, or would impair an individual's ability to escape from a dangerous 
atmosphere.” [53]. Hydrogen sulfide has an IDLH of 100 ppm according to NIOSH [54]. 
This is a highly conservative number, as the threshold for unconsciousness, cessation of 
respiration, and death after several minutes is estimated to be 1000-2000 ppm [55], but it 
does give a well-accepted standardized value to work against. The 100 ppm threshold 
causes several secondary effects that prevent escape, such as severe eye irritation or 
disorientation [56]. As such, this value can be implemented in the model to account for 
low levels of toxic gas causing a secondary effect that impedes escape that can be 
implemented into the escape probability function that exists for fire radiation.  
Ideally, there would be some method of relating exact hydrogen sulfide 
concentration to the difficulty of escape or the extra time it would take personnel to 
escape (this concept is explored in Chapter 5 with smoke modeling), but there is not 
concrete information as to the magnitude of difficulty that a person would have fleeing 
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an incident with eye irritation or disorientation. As an approximation, it is assumed that a 
concentration of 100 ppm would begin the onset of effects that prevent escape, 
escalating linearly to the 2000 ppm threshold of certain (probability 1) failure to escape.  
 
        {
              
        
    
                      
               
 
 
 
 
Figure 29: Approximation of the probability of incapacitation due to hydrogen sulfide exposure. Dotted 
line depicts actual function, solid line depicts approximation to the actual function 
 
 
However, since the piecewise linear function has practical difficulties, most 
easily being implemented by two constraints – one which would limit the probability to 
values greater than zero, and the other a linear function corresponding to the escalation 
of probability in the preceding function relying on the addition of artificial slack 
variables (penalized in the objective function) to force the probability value to 1 when 
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the concentration exceeds 2000 ppm – a logistic formulation to approximate the 
piecwise function is used. The utilized logistic function is of the form: 
 
                       
 
Where c is the midpoint of the function , chosen to be 950 ppm, and a, b, and d 
are parameters that are optimized using a least squares approach to minimize the 
deviation from the piecewise function. The value for a is 1.13, b is 9.21x10
-4
, and d is -
0.05. The largest absolute deviation in probability is 0.088 at the 2000 ppm point and the 
largest percentage deviation, disregarding the first several points where the piecewise 
function has a low value or a zero value, is 9% at the 2000 ppm point. 
If data were to become available for a better approximation to the effects of 
hydrogen sulfide on egress, a different function could be substituted. 
 
4.3 Mitigation Formulation 
Among the most prevalent forms of mitigation on offshore platforms, due to the 
inability of spacing to mitigate consequences, are fire walls and blast walls [57]. Blast 
walls are used to protect the structure of the platform from destruction and firewalls are 
used to protect personnel from fire radiation concerns. Both failure to escape due to fire 
and section destruction due to explosion were implemented in the initial model described 
in the last chapter. However, because of the existence of these mitigation measures and 
the extra flexibility they give in the layout process, the model has been improved to take 
into account these consequence-reducing possibilities. 
 
4.3.1 Blast Walls 
 Several practical assumptions are made to ensure ease of implementation without 
sacrificing utility: 
 Blast walls can be implemented on any side of a section. 
 91 
 
 More than one blast wall can be allocated to a section, but not to the same side of 
a section  
 Blast walls on a side of a section are assumed to cover all of the floors of that 
section 
 A blast from a section k can only be deflected by a section s blast wall that is in 
the direction directly facing the blast based on the classification given by the 
disjunctive constraints. Therefore, if s is in the a-direction (left) of an explosion 
from k, it must have a b-direction (right) blast wall to deflect the overpressure.  
 Redirection of overpressures from the blast wall is negligible – a blast wall has 
no effect on the overpressure felt by any section but its own. 
 
The following parameters and variables are defined: 
 
 
Table 26: Parameters and variables introduced in the blast wall formulation 
Parameters 
MaxWalls Maximum number of blast walls that can be allocated 
Variables 
MWs 
Binary variable denoting a blast wall allocated to the M-direction of 
s if 1, no wall allocated if 0 
MBWs,k 
Binary variable denoting that an explosion from section k is affected 
by an allocated blast wall on section s in the M-direction if 1, not 
affected if 0 
BWs,k 
Binary variable denoting that a blast from section k is affected by 
any blast wall if 1, not affected if 0 
MProbs,k 
Mitigated probability of section s destruction due to an explosion in 
section k 
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The model is free to allocate a blast wall in any direction. If that direction faces 
an explosion from another section, it will mitigate that particular explosion. This is 
expressed in constraint form as follows: 
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 Where Ms,k,f denotes the disjunction binary variable defining to which direction 
of section s section k lies. The inequality is necessary because MBWs,k must be binary 
and the result of the right hand side will not necessarily be zero or one. The first term on 
the right hand side is always less than one. This implies that if MWs is zero, the second 
term must be less than or equal to one and the whole right hand side will always be less 
than one. This forces MBWs,k to zero. However, if MWs is equal to one and there is at 
least one floor that s and k both occupy with k in the M-direction of s, the right hand side 
will always be greater than or equal to one and MBWs,k may be either zero or one, but is 
not forced to one. The optimization will naturally force this number to one if allowed as 
long as the objective to minimize explosion effects is included in the objective and as 
long as there is a blast effect from k on s. If s and k do not cohabitate any floor, or if k is 
not in the M-direction of s, the ΣMskf term will be zero and the right hand side will 
always be less than one. Thus, if a blast wall is allocated in this direction, it has no effect 
on the blast from k, and the sum of the MBWs,k components is either one or zero. 
 The effect of the explosion overpressure is directly modified by the binary 
variable BWs,k, defined as: 
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 And that effect is implemented by modifying the calculated probability in the 
following way: 
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4.3.2 Fire Walls 
 Fire walls are also extensively used in the offshore environment. The formulation 
for firewalls is largely the same as the formulation for blast walls, except that it modifies 
the probability of failure to escape based on the heat radiation on the section of interest 
and does not affect the probability of failure to escape based on the escape route or 
muster point. The calculation of the three components of failure to escape – section 
effects, route effects, and muster effects, have been split from each other as explained in 
section 4.6.1.1. This formulation assumes that the wall can withstand any level of 
radiation it faces.  
 
4.4 Case Studies 
Two case studies are presented hereafter to demonstrate the vast effect that the 
assumptions of toxic effects and mitigation effects can have when considered during the 
layout phase. The first assumes mitigation is available and a low but non-negligible level 
of toxic gas being released in conjunction with the original fire and blast hazards. The 
second case study assumes the same features of the first, but with a much higher toxic 
concentration scenario. Recall that blast wall incorporation is usually thought of as an 
add-on to the layout, where layout considerations are set before adding walls, while the 
formulation considers this not as an add-on, but in conjunction with the layout. 
The first part of each case study looks at an existing layout and optimizes walls 
and escape routes as the sections are fixed. The cumulative effect of multiple walls on 
calculated risk is studied. The second part of the case study assumes that sections are 
allowed to vary in placement and dimension across the platform. It is shown that 
comparably lower risk can be achieved with less use of resources simply by optimizing 
the layout using the formulation outlined in this chapter. Validation of results for 
explosion and dispersion is carried out in FLACS.  
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4.4.1 Muster Point Case Study Revisited 
This case study is superficially equivalent to the second case study of chapter 
three, this time including the toxic and mitigation formulations in order to illuminate 
how these considerations change the overall layout, with the mitigations being 
considered in tandem with the layout as well as after the layout as an ‘add-on’ 
consideration. Performance is compared quantitatively as well as qualitatively and 
conclusions are drawn. 
 
4.4.1.1 Other Modifications to the Model 
Because of the increasing complexity of the model, it is necessary to make 
several changes in order to ensure efficient solution and tractability. The first 
simplification was to condense hazard constraints (explosion effect, fire effect, and toxic 
effect) to apply only to those sections that have a cost. In this way, the high-value areas 
can be emphasized for risk reduction, and the low value areas can be held simply to the 
base constraints. The high-value sections in this case study are the quarters, with section 
cost 30, the shop, with section cost 10, and the wellhead, with section cost 5. The rest of 
the sections are set to a cost of zero, and the hazardous effect on them is ignored. The 
effect of this change is to reduce solution time per major iteration from a scale of tens of 
minutes to tens of seconds. It also allows stochastic initial point sampling to become 
time-feasible. The stochastic method used is explained later. 
Redundant constraints are deleted in the escape model. This is accomplished 
through the use of a decision parameter that decides which fire scenario will cause the 
greatest effect, and then feeds this to the fire modeling constraints. This is possible 
because all fire models follow the same general form of reaction energy scaled by 
squared distance from the fire. Thus, the reaction energies, which are fully parametric, 
can be compared and the energy with the highest magnitude can be chosen for a section, 
relieving the need for four sets of constraints for four fire scenarios. In addition, fire 
effect on the affected section is considered separately, as is the fire effect on the affected 
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muster point, and each of the aforementioned five escape probability values are given 
equal weight in the overall escape probability: 
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Finally, because of the high non-linearity and non-convexity of the model, the 
global minimum risk is not guaranteed. Because of this, there may exist many local 
minima that can be expected to be greater than the global minimum [58]. Indeed, it is 
often necessary in this case to give a suitable initial guess for variables [59] that, 
depending on the difficulty of the problem, may have to begin relatively close to the 
global optimum , as the solution may come to rest in a local (non-global) optimum, or, in 
the case of the utilized solver DICOPT, the MIP master problem may cut off the global 
optimum, leaving only non-global local optima [60], though the global optimum may 
still be found as convexity of the objective and certain constraints are only sufficient 
conditions and not necessary conditions to find the global optimum. 
In order to find solutions closer to the global optimum, a stochastic method of 
sampling initial values is proposed. Methods that involve a stochastic sampling of points 
are often the most efficient method for finding a global minimum of a non-convex 
objective function [61]. In conjunction with the simplifications made to the model in this 
section, a stochastic method of sampling initial points becomes a feasible method of 
identifying optimal solutions – if not global then at least closer to global than one 
isolated guess. Accordingly, the model has been modified to sample 100 sets of initial 
midpoints, each set comprised of a random choice of midpoints over a uniform 
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distribution of points within the platform area. From these initial points, the solver is 
allowed to find the local optimum corresponding to the initial guess. The relevant data, if 
the objective value is superior to the current best objective value, is then stored as the 
properties of the current best optimum solution, and the solver runs anew with the next 
initial guess. No layout information from the prior solution is carried over from run to 
run, though some information about feasibility that can be used to expedite the next 
solution is. At the end of the sequence of runs, the best sampled solution is recorded as 
the optimal solution, if not global then sufficiently close to be acceptable.  
 
4.4.1.2 Case Study Specifications 
 The simulations were run on a personal computer with a 3.4 GHz processor and 8 
GB RAM.  The problem contains 3510 variables, of which 2158 are non-linear and 939 
are binary or integer, and 3177 constraints.  The GAMS software was used, with the 
DICOPT MINLP solver using CONOPT for the NLP subproblem and CPLEX for the 
MIP subproblem. The simulations take an average of 30-45 minutes to complete using a 
stochastic approach where initial guesses for midpoints are randomly sampled between 
iterations in an attempt to break free of local optima and find the global optimum.  
Because the model is non-linear and non-convex, the input guess plays a large role in the 
final answer for the layout, and may lead to objectives that are much greater than the 
global optimum.  In this formulation, the initial guess is randomly sampled and the 
model is allowed to solve.  If the solution is better than the current best, the new solution 
becomes the current best and the model is run again. 
The following parameters are used in the revisited muster point case study: 
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Table 27: Parameters used in the revisited case study 
Input Value(s) 
Platform Dimensions 110’ x 150’, 2 floors 
Sections 
Wellhead, Quarters, Shop, Process, 
Compressors, Risers, Storage, Utilities 
Stories Wellhead: 2, Compressors: 2, Risers: 2 
Area [ft
2
], per floor 
Wellhead: 4950, Quarters: 1800, 
Compressors: 2376, Storage: 825, 
Utilities: 330, Process: 900, Risers: 150, 
Shop: 1800 
Maximum Aspect Ratios 
Wellhead: 2.5, Quarters: 1.4, 
Compressors: 1.9, Storage: 1.4, Utilities: 
3.3, Process: 1.5, Risers: 6.0, Shop: 1.4 
Section Cost Quarters: 30, Shop: 10, Wellhead: 5 
Release Sections Wellhead, Compressors, Utilities, Process 
VCE Material Natural Gas (properties of methane) 
Jet Fire Release Natural Gas, release through 1 inch hole 
Pool Fire Release Crude Oil, at 1 kg/s 
Explosion Severity Level 
Wellhead: 6 
Compressors: 5 
Utilities: 3 
Process: 3 
Mass of Gas Cloud [kg] 
Wellhead: 45 
Compressors, Utilities, Process: 40 
Process T [F] All: 200 
Process P [psi] 
Wellhead: 500 
Compressors, Utilities, Process: 100 
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All physical properties and assumptions are kept from the original case study, 
with the only exceptions being the amount of mass in the stoichiometric gas cloud, and 
the fact that the jet fire mass flow is assumed to contain 10% hydrogen sulfide for the 
toxic dispersion portion. Wind speed was assumed to be 5 m/s in the positive-x 
direction.  
 Two versions of the case study are run: one with a low hydrogen sulfide release 
concentration to illustrate the effects of the mitigation formulation and one with a high 
hydrogen sulfide release concentration to illustrate the effect of toxic dispersion in 
conjunction with the mitigation formulation. 
In both studies, 5% of the volume of the section was assumed to be filled with 
flammable gas in order to find the amount of energy available for an explosion. The 
mass of the cloud was rounded to the nearest 5 with a minimum of 15 kg. This gives the 
wellhead 50 kg, the compressor area 40 kg, and the process, risers, and utilities 15 kg 
each. The platform dimension is 110’ by 150’. 
 
4.4.1.3 Objective Function 
 The objective function for this model is simply to minimize the summed risk 
over each scenario for each section of interest. The escape probability is introduced in 
section 4.6.1.1, the destruction probability is the same as in the prior chapter, and the 
toxic probability is the sum of the probabilities from each possible release direction 
divided by the number of possible release directions, in this case four: 
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 And the overall objective to minimize is: 
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So that each outcome is equally weighted against one another, but each section is 
weighted differently based on the expected population. 
 
4.4.1.4 Results – Low H2S Concentration 
 
Figure 30: Base layout for muster point case study 
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Figure 31: Optimal layout, no walls, two muster points  
 
 
The fixed layout in Figure 32 was run to determine the level of risk associated 
with the layout when escape routes are optimized with no walls, and one to five walls.  
Because the fixed layout cannot be rearranged, the risk is static other than the reductions 
that can be made due to escape routes and allocation of walls for mitigation. 
The layout was then allowed to move freely to minimize fire, blast, and toxic 
risk.  Scenarios were run for walls that only mitigate blast as well as walls that mitigate 
fire and blast.  A sample optimized layout for one blast wall is shown in Figure 3.  A 
summary of the results follows in Table 28.  
It can be seen that by simply allowing the layout to be manipulated, even when 
mitigation is not incorporated, the risk of the layout can be reduced by about 43%, 
mostly owing to improved fire scenario performance.  By adding walls, the performance 
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can be marginally improved further until the opportunity for mitigation no longer exists, 
at which point walls are still allocated but no longer serve any purpose.  This can be seen 
in Figure 31, where walls after the second in the case of blast walls or the third in the 
case of combined walls no longer improve safety performance greatly.  Note that the 
toxic risk in this case is relatively low.  This implies that layout is driven by fire and 
blast risks rather than minimization of toxic risk, since the risk is already almost 
negligible. 
 
 
 
Figure 32: 1-wall optimized layout, two muster points  
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Table 28: Combined risk for different layout configurations 
 
Fixed Layout – 0 
Walls 
Free Layout – 0 
Walls 
Free Layout – 1 
Blast Wall 
Free Layout – 1 
Blast/Fire Wall 
Toxic Effect 0.68 0.66 0.59 0.72 
Fire Effect 82.87 44.08 38.73 27.77 
Blast Effect 7.68 7.08 1.86 1.81 
Total 91.23 51.82 41.18 30.30 
 
 
 
Figure 33: Difference in risk reduction between blast walls and blast/fire walls 
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Figure 34: Evolution of the cumulative global minimum by iteration number, free layout, one wall 
 
 
Also of interest is the performance of the midpoint sampling in the optimization.  
Figure 36 shows the evolution of the cumulative minimum by iteration for an example 
scenario, which shows that there is an initial vast improvement in objective value that 
dwindles after several iterations.  The objective value improves by about 45% in the first 
three iterations, and then by about 14% over the next 27. While there is great variation in 
the local minima in this case, they tend to cluster around a case where the solution is 
about 15% higher than the final minimum, owing normally to a slightly heightened risk 
of failure to escape due to a change in allocation of muster points, whereas the highest 
local minima are typically due to a large divergence in layout from the minimal risk 
layout. This is to say that the highest values are pure layout problems, while the lower 
sub-optimal values are typically muster point allocation problems. Similar results are 
found in other cases. 
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4.4.1.5 Results – High H2S Concentration 
Hydrogen sulfide may be present in natural gas at concentrations of up to or 
exceeding 50% v/v [62].  This case study assumes that there is 50% hydrogen sulfide in 
a postulated natural gas leak.  Toxic considerations become more highly weighted, and 
the layouts change as a result.  Of interest is the assertion that mitigation walls may 
normally be considered as an ‘add-on’ [63] after the layout has been done, rather than 
directly in conjunction with the layout planning.  In order to test for possible risk 
reduction by considering the walls in conjunction with the layout, the initial layout 
without walls has been performed, and sections are then fixed in those places for the 
model to allocate walls as it finds to be optimal. 
Figures 37 and 38 show the optimal layouts in the high H2S case for the free 
layout case and the mitigation add-on case.  The outcome is vastly different, and the free 
case is found to be about 15% better in risk reduction, mostly owing to the improvement 
in toxic performance, where risk is reduced by 60% over the add-on layout.  This can be 
attributed to the use of the non-mitigated layout, which seeks to minimize the much 
greater fire risk at the cost of raising the toxic risk, whereas the free layout is able to take 
into account the risk reduction that can be gained by spacing sections differently to 
reduce congestion while using mitigation to reduce the risk of blast and fire scenarios.  It 
is indeed beneficial to consider the mitigation during the layout phase. 
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Figure 35: One blast/fire wall, free layout, wall considered during optimization 
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Figure 36: One blast/fire wall, wall considered as an add-on to optimization 
 
 
 Figure 39 presents risk information for each layout type and number of walls. As 
expected, either optimized layout outperforms the original layout, which suffers from a 
widely greater fire risk and a significantly larger toxic risk that cannot be mitigated, as 
toxic risk is governed by the layout of the platform and cannot be lowered without 
rearrangement. The original layout cannot take advantage of fire wall risk reduction as 
readily as the optimized layouts, leading to a lower marginal gain in risk performance 
per wall allocated and causing the relative performance of the fixed layout to fall from 
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about 1.8 times the risk of the optimized zero wall case to 2.8 times the risk of the 
optimized three wall case. 
 
 
 
Figure 37:  Layout Risk Comparison for High H2S Concentration Scenario 
 
 
4.4.1.6 CFD Validation 
 CFD validation using FLACS has been carried out in the high hydrogen sulfide 
case in order to verify that the model gives improved safety performance in practice. The 
difference in blast performance between the fixed no-wall case and the free no-wall case 
is almost negligible because of the high overpressures caused by the increase in mass in 
the gas clouds, but the optimization of the layout allows for a greater chance of escape. 
The CFD simulation corroborates this, showing that the overpressure felt by the shop 
and quarters are almost identical, both above the value needed for a 100% chance of 
destruction according to probit value. The wellhead overpressure is decreased from 0.25 
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bar to 0.15 bar, corresponding to a 15% decrease in destruction probability, which 
matches well with the optimization model value. 
  
 
Table 29: Maximum toxic concentration at monitor points for the fixed and one-wall free layouts 
 Wellhead Compressors Process 
 
Max C 
[ppm] 
Change 
Max C 
[ppm] 
Change 
Max C 
[ppm] 
Change 
Fixed 
Quarters 20000 - 10000 - 50000 - 
Shop 20000 - 10000 - 50000 - 
Wellhead 90000 - 10000 - 110000 - 
Optimized 
Quarters Negl. -100% Negl. -100% Negl. -100% 
Shop Negl. -100% Negl. -100% 9000 -82% 
Wellhead 50000 -44.4% 5000 -50% 30000 -72.7% 
 
 
The toxic concentrations at each of the monitor points of the key sections is 
reduced by over 40% and the toxic concentrations at several points is negligible, not 
rising appreciably due in large part to wind effects blowing the toxic gas away from the 
monitor point in the section. In most cases the toxic gas did intrude within the boundary 
of the section, but did not hit the center of the section where the monitor point was 
located; thus the toxic gas would have an effect on the section from a practical 
standpoint, but the concentration would be greatly decreased from the fixed case. An 
example of this is shown in the figures that follow.  
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Figure 38: Fixed layout toxic footprints by mole fraction. Quarters and shop located at the top of the 
platform 
 
 
 
Figure 39: Free layout toxic footprints by mole fraction. Quarters and shop located on bottom left of 
platform 
 
 
4.5 Conclusions 
 A model has been constructed that is able to optimize platform layout for three 
scenarios: blast, fire, and toxic dispersion. Toxic dispersion is approximated using a 
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correlation based on the flow rate of material, wind conditions, and amount of 
congestion in the direction of the release. Information for the dispersion correlation was 
gathered using a set of simulations in FLACS using an artificial congestion method, as 
the prior layout is not known. Mitigation is also considered as a binary choice of 
allocation of blast and fire walls. A blast wall can be allocated to any section on any side 
of the section and completely blocks any risk due to overpressure or radiation, but can 
only benefit the section if the blast or fire comes from the side that the wall is built on. 
 The results show that the risk can be greatly reduced over a fixed layout in either 
case and with all numbers and any method of mitigation. It further shows that 
considering walls as an add-on rather than as a part of the layout process may limit the 
effectiveness of the wall and cause the marginal risk improvement per wall to fall 
drastically when comparable or better results could be realized by consideration of 
mitigation in conjunction with an optimization. CFD studies confirm the superiority of 
the optimized layout to the fixed layout. 
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5. A FORMULATION TO ACCOUNT FOR DOMINO EFFECT AND OTHER 
SECONDARY EFFECTS IN OFFSHORE PLATFORM LAYOUT 
OPTIMIZATION 
5.1 Domino Effects 
 Many definitions for domino effect have been proposed. Among the earliest 
definitions, Lees, in the 1980 first edition of his encyclopedia Loss Prevention in the 
Process Industries, defined domino effect as “a factor to take account of the hazard that 
can occur if leakage of a hazardous material can lead to the escalation of the incident, 
e.g. a small leak which catches fire and damages by flame impingement a larger pipe or 
vessel with subsequent spillage of a large inventory of hazardous material” [64]. More 
recently, more specific definitions are used such as that of Cozzani [65], which stipulates 
three main components, which are now widely accepted as integral to the definition [66]: 
 
 Primary event occurring in one area 
 Propagation of event effects to another area where secondary events occur 
 Escalation, where the effect of the secondary effect is usually more severe than 
that of the first event 
 
These events are not infrequent. A recent study by Abdolhamidzadeh et al [67] 
identified 224 instances of domino effect culminating in fire or an explosion since 1917, 
with 67 of these events occurring since the year 2000 and 139 events since 1980. 
Though it is debatable whether the increase in frequency of domino effect incidents 
indicates a lack of understanding of and design for its effects rather than an increase in 
incident reporting and improvement in incident analysis, it is not debatable that domino 
effect is an important consideration in facility design, and that one of the best ways to 
design for domino effect is a proper layout. 
 Several domino effects will be explored in this chapter. Dispersion of flammable 
gas to a remote ignition point in another section leading to directionally-influenced 
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blasts, smoke propagation due to a fire event and its effect on probability of escape, and 
the expanded effect of layout on dispersion patterns, both for toxic and explosion 
scenarios, are implemented. Other improvements such as blast wall failure and fire 
modeling improvements are also incorporated. 
 
5.2 Pool Fire Modeling Improvement 
 In the previous chapters, pool fire has been taken into account, but only as a point 
source of radiation based on the floor in which the release occurs. In actuality, this is 
only a passable estimation of the heat radiation from a pool fire. Indeed, the flame from 
a pool fire may be substantial and can cause damage to equipment above the flame due 
to radiation and direct impingement [51], but would not necessarily be expected to 
damage equipment below the fire. The fire is also not necessarily expected to have a 
significant diminishing of radiation or temperature near the top of the flame as compared 
to the middle or base; rather it is found that the maximum temperature at the top of the 
flame may even exceed that of the bottom of the flame and fluxes are quite comparable 
[68], indicating that the upward radiation of the flame cannot be discounted. 
 Furthermore, tilt of the flame can play a role in the radiation that is received at a 
certain point above the base of the flame [31]. This tilt is a function of wind speed and 
can be estimated by the following equation: 
 
       (
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 Barbrauskas [69], argues in his pool fire model that due to the approximation of 
treating the flame as a cylinder, refined methods of approximating flux are not 
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necessarily justified, instead opting for a simple expression based on the heat of 
combustion, mass burning rate, diameter of the pool, distance from the pool, and an 
experimental correction factor: 
 
  
      ̇ 
   
 
  
 
 
 
 This equation is meant for a target on the ground a certain distance away from 
the pool fire. However, since there are multiple stories to offshore platforms and the aim 
is to be able to estimate effect on each floor, it is useful to make a modification to the 
equation. Because the surface emissive power over the surface of the flame is fairly 
constant, the diameter can be approximated at each point of interest, in this case each 
floor, and the heat flux as a function of distance from that component of the flame can be 
used. This is also useful in incorporating the tilt of the flame into the formulation, where 
the midpoint of the flame will be different for each point of interest due to the effect of 
wind. 
 
 
 
Figure 40: Cylindrical pool fire model, degree of tilt, and center point position modifier expressions 
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 Using this formulation, and assuming that the wind direction is positive-x, the 
modified center point can be found as: 
 
       
                            
          
  
 
Which can be used in the radiation calculation for a pool fire from section s affecting 
section k on a floor equal to or higher than s. 
  
5.3 Upward and Downward Dispersion 
 Grated decks are often installed in offshore facilities in order to aid ventilation in 
the case of a possible flammable release [70]. This is useful, as it may allow gas to 
escape the congested and confined spaces of the platform or allow it to disperse to below 
its flammability limit, but it also presents the possibility of a large flammable release 
having more opportunities to find an ignition source, a large toxic release affecting more 
of the platform area, or a pool fire affecting higher floors instead of impinging on a 
ceiling. Indeed, this is yet another trade-off that is associated with decisions made 
offshore. 
 In order to obtain a more accurate picture of the effect of more generalized 
dispersion on  toxic and blast effects, and their effects on the layout of an offshore 
platform, upward and downward dispersion have been incorporated into the model. 
 It is necessary for the model to discern where sections lie on the platform in 
relation to each other. Up to this point, the relationship between sections was defined by 
the non-overlap constraints (defining whether a section is left, right, above, or below 
another section), and the floor constraint, which simply defines whether two sections 
occupy the same floor. This information is now extended to define whether a section is 
‘up’ from or ‘down’ from another section with respect to a certain floor. 
 The following constraints are added in order to define a certain section, s, on 
floor f, which is above floor l, is ‘up’ from section k that is on floor l: 
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Where up
*
s,k,f,l defines whether section s on floor f is above section k on floor l, and 
ups,k,f defines in general whether s is above k regardless of the floor of k. Further 
constraints include defining the opposite binary – downs,k,f: 
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 In order to accommodate dispersion in all directions, the FLACS simulation 
introduced in Chapter 4 was rerun for the same set of parameters, but with three floors, 
and a leak in the center of the second floor. Monitor regions were added for the whole of 
the first and third floors while keeping the configuration of the monitor regions on the 
second deck. Two additional release sides also were given – an upward release and a 
downward release. The parameters for the concentration expression, calculated in the 
same way as in Chapter 4, are given in the table that follows. 
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Table 30: Correlation parameters for the generalized dispersion case 
Release 
Direction 
Monitor 
Region 
Base Congestion 
Coefficient (e) 
Proportional Wind 
Coefficient (f+i) 
Base Wind 
Coefficient (g) 
Base Flowrate 
Coefficient (a+c) 
+X 
+X 2.645E-5 2.710E-6 -9.706E-5 8.148E-4 
-X 7.933E-6 -1.093E-6 1.529E-5 -1.285E-4 
+Y 1.588E-5 8.181E-7 -3.875E-5 3.718E-4 
-Y 1.893E-5 6.976E-7 -4.020E-5 3.141E-4 
+Z 3.496E-5 -2.831E-6 -8.311E-5 2.758E-4 
-X 
+X 1.009E-05 1.572E-06 1.793E-04 -1.355E-04 
-X 2.258E-05 -2.535E-06 -4.375E-05 1.090E-03 
+Y 1.531E-05 -4.742E-07 7.398E-05 5.104E-04 
-Y 1.820E-05 -4.906E-07 6.324E-05 4.371E-04 
+Z 2.544E-05 -2.172E-06 -1.721E-04 1.176E-03 
+Y 
+X 1.704E-05 2.920E-06 -1.393E-05 6.020E-04 
-X 1.694E-05 -1.736E-06 -5.058E-05 1.821E-04 
+Y 2.493E-05 1.328E-07 -6.727E-06 -8.248E-05 
-Y 1.529E-06 9.632E-07 -5.719E-05 8.694E-04 
+Z 3.348E-05 -3.009E-06 -9.819E-05 4.732E-04 
-Y 
+X 1.704E-05 2.920E-06 -1.393E-05 6.020E-04 
-X 1.694E-05 -1.736E-06 -5.058E-05 1.821E-04 
+Y 1.529E-06 9.632E-07 -5.719E-05 8.694E-04 
-Y 2.493E-05 1.328E-07 -6.727E-06 -8.248E-05 
+Z 3.348E-05 -3.009E-06 -9.819E-05 4.732E-04 
 
 
5.4 Explosion Domino Effect 
 Domino effect of explosion effects is based on the simple principle that the gas 
dispersed from one section can be ignited and cause overpressure in another section that 
is a viable source of ignition. A key weakness in the TNO method when compared to the 
more sophisticated CFD method is that, while it accounts for congestion by scaling the 
perceived overpressure, it cannot account for directional effects [71], instead assuming 
that the overpressure is equal in all directions regardless of the size and shape of the 
cloud and the directional variation in congestion surrounding the ignition point. Even the 
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position of the ignition point in relation to the cloud has a profound effect on the 
overpressure footprint [72], where an end-ignition causes run-up effects leading to a high 
overpressure in the direction of the dispersed cloud and relatively little overpressure in 
the non-dispersed direction. This effect can be seen in the FLACS simulation below: 
 
 
 
Figure 41: Run-up effect of a non-symmetrical gas cloud ignition, from Hansen et al. [72] Ignition point 
on the –X side of the module 
 
 
 The directional effects of vapor cloud explosions, though they cannot be fully 
captured by a relatively simple model like the TNO method used in this optimization 
formulation, do show properties that can be exploited by the model. If it is assumed that 
the dispersed cloud ignites relatively quickly after entering the section, the overpressure 
can be assumed to propagate almost exclusively in the direction that the gas was 
dispersed from. Because the position of each section in relation to the other is defined by 
the non-overlap constraints, the overpressure effects can be filtered to only affect those 
sections that are in the direction of the expected blast propagation. Using the 
methodology already presented in this and the previous chapter, the concentration of 
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flammable gas within its flammable limits in a monitor region in direction M which 
section s occupies due to a release in direction R from section k is: 
 
      
 
                     
 
  
 
  
     
 
 
              
  
 
Where Mxs,k,f is the directional non-overlap constraint that corresponds to section s laying 
within monitor region M and the concentration is measured in mass units [kg/kg]. 
 This concentration in the monitor region of interest is assumed to be constant 
throughout the monitor region. To estimate the amount of energy available for the vapor 
cloud explosion, the mass in the flammable cloud must be ascertained. As an estimation, 
the full volume of the section is assumed to be filled with flammable gas at the monitor 
region’s concentration, and all of the gas contributes to the explosion: 
 
   
 
                 
                             
 
 The calculated energy is then used in the standard overpressure calculation to 
calculate the effect of an explosion in section s on any section j that lies in the opposite 
direction of the dispersion: 
 
   
 
      
       
        
 
    
    
 
       
 
  
 
 
 
 And the standard probit function for structural destruction can be used, where the 
overpressure is measured in Pa: 
 
R,MYs,k,f = -23.8 + 2.92ln R,MPs,k,f 
 
 Which, if the binary terms are extracted leads to: 
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Where R,Mc’s,k,f is: 
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 The expression of the probit function is useful because it eliminates multiples of 
binaries, leaving just summation. The natural logarithm terms for the binary variables 
are augmented by adding a very small number to the binary so that there is no numerical 
error if the binary is equal to zero, which has the effect of making the probit function 
highly negative if either condition is not true, and forcing the probability to zero; if the 
binary is true, the term approaches zero and does not affect the probit calculation. This 
can also be exploited to set a lower limit on the concentration needed for an explosion 
event. 
  
      
 
               
       
 
 R,MSs,k is a binary that  has a value of one if the LFL is exceeded and is left free if 
it is not. The minimization of the objective will force all free S terms to zero. This term 
is added to the probit expression in the same way as the other binaries, leaving: 
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 This value can be plugged into the original probit-to-probability equation to find 
the base probability that a dispersion in section k causing an explosion in section s will 
cause the structural destruction of section j. 
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 The values for the flammable mass correlation are tabulated in the following 
table: 
 
 
Table 31: Flammable mass correlated parameter values 
Release 
Direction 
Monitor 
Region 
Base Congestion 
Coefficient (e) 
Proportional Wind 
Coefficient (f+i) 
Base Wind 
Coefficient (g) 
Base Flowrate 
Coefficient (a+c) 
+X 
+X -1.889E-06 2.084E-06 -8.263E-05 7.505E-04 
-X 5.583E-08 -1.117E-08 3.350E-07 -1.675E-06 
+Y -5.207E-07 1.065E-06 -3.992E-05 4.176E-04 
-Y -7.064E-07 9.681E-07 -4.119E-05 3.273E-04 
+Z 1.317E-05 -6.974E-07 -8.155E-05 2.477E-04 
-X 
+X -1.544E-06 2.448E-06 -5.088E-05 2.617E-05 
-X -3.108E-06 -6.063E-07 -2.540E-05 8.484E-04 
+Y -1.679E-06 1.088E-06 -4.427E-05 4.883E-04 
-Y -2.085E-06 7.357E-07 -3.035E-05 3.791E-04 
+Z 1.190E-05 -8.669E-07 -1.085E-04 3.677E-04 
+Y 
+X -3.474E-06 2.385E-06 -6.662E-05 5.644E-04 
-X 4.386E-07 1.100E-07 -4.452E-05 2.442E-04 
+Y -3.283E-06 1.082E-07 -3.320E-06 -7.143E-06 
-Y -4.487E-06 2.370E-06 -1.081E-04 8.196E-04 
+Z 1.316E-05 -7.593E-07 -9.037E-05 2.647E-04 
-Y 
+X -3.474E-06 2.385E-06 -6.662E-05 5.644E-04 
-X 4.386E-07 1.100E-07 -4.452E-05 2.442E-04 
+Y -4.487E-06 2.370E-06 -1.081E-04 8.196E-04 
-Y -3.283E-06 1.082E-07 -3.320E-06 -7.143E-06 
+Z 1.316E-05 -7.593E-07 -9.037E-05 2.647E-04 
 
 
5.5 Smoke Modeling 
 Smoke is a key concern in the design of offshore platforms due to its 
physiological effects and reduction of visibility [73], and must be taken into account in 
escape considerations. Indeed, smoke was a key factor in most of the deaths aboard the 
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Piper Alpha and hindered escape aboard the Deepwater Horizon [7]. Unfortunately, as 
with the dispersion of other materials in the offshore environment, there are many 
properties that have an effect on how smoke disperses including weather conditions, 
congestion, size of the fire, propagation of the fire, material burning, among others. 
Thus, it can be difficult to predict how escape will be affected. 
 Nevertheless, the effect of loss of visibility may be more important in success of 
escape than the radiative effect on humans and must be accounted for. The effects of 
smoke can be broken into three groups: obscuration of sight, either due to interruption of 
light or scattering of light, pain from heat, and toxic effects of combustion materials, 
primarily carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide [74]. In this formulation, effects from 
obscuration of sight and toxic effects are considered. 
 Obscuration of sight is related to the optical density of smoke in the area which is 
naturally related to the concentration and composition of smoke, but also, according to 
Jin, physiological and psychological effects such as eye irritation and panic [75]. These 
factors, especially the psychological, may vary greatly from person to person based on 
gender, physical factors, and personality. Thus, psychological factors are not taken into 
account in this study; only the obscuration of sight and effects that can be verified 
physically and quantitatively will be used. 
 The visibility through the smoke must be quantified. Applicable information has 
been tabulated experimentally by Mulholland [76] as a function of mass concentration 
for different hydrocarbons for a visible wavelength. Jin [75], suggests that visibility and 
extinction coefficient, CS, can be related by the expression CS ⋅ V = 2 [m] for the 
visibility of floors, walls, stairways and doors for non-irritant smoke in indoor 
conditions. He further suggests that a visibility of 13 m for those unfamiliar with an area 
and 4 m for those that are familiar with an area are tenability limits for reliable escape. 
However, in another publication [77], he suggests a linear correlation between extinction 
coefficient and escape speed, where below a certain value of extinction coefficient the 
maximum speed is constant, and below a lower threshold value the area is for practical 
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purposes considered ‘dark’ where escaping personnel  were forced to feel along walls for 
their way or turn back. This relation can be expressed as: 
 
     {
                
          
 
 
Where vesc is measured in m/s. The threshold for the minimum escape speed is a 
visibility of about 2 m, which translates to a smoke concentration of approximately 4000 
ppm, which varies based on the burning material. 
 
 
 
Figure 42: Approximation to escape speed as a function of extinction coefficient. Dotted line represents 
actual function, solid line represents approximation 
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 As in Chapter 4, a logistic approximation is used, in this case of the form: 
  
                          
 
Is used to alleviate the difficulties of the piecewise function. The c parameter is taken to 
be 0.25, as the midpoint of the linear part of the function, the a and d parameters are 
chosen to make the initial and endpoint match the piecewise function, and b is optimized 
based on a least-squares approach to minimize the deviation between the approximation 
and the actual function. The a value is -0.9, the b value is 4.05, and the d value is 1.2. 
The maximum absolute difference is 0.07 m/s which occurs at the 0.5 extinction 
coefficient value, and the maximum percentage difference occurs at the same point at 
about 23%. Nevertheless, since the absolute differences are small and the original 
function is rather simplified in the first place, the accuracy of the approximation should 
be sufficient for this application. 
 This relation can be used to estimate the time to escape which can in turn be used 
either as a parameter for minimization in its own objective, or as the time scaling factor 
for toxic and fire effect in the probit function: 
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 The evolution of smoke products in comparison to other combustion products 
must be quantified in order to find the concentration and thus the escape velocity and 
time in a fire event. Smoke generation is a complicated phenomenon that depends highly 
on the chemical structure, with simple hydrocarbons such as methane and ethane 
producing less smoke and aromatic compounds producing relatively high levels of 
smoke, and moderately on fire size and level of ventilation, with underventilation 
causing higher smoke output due to incomplete burning [78]. Tabulated data on smoke 
and carbon monoxide generation from the experimental burning of alkanes, alkenes, 
alkynes, arenes, aliphatics, and aromatics is available from the work of Tewarson [79], 
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and can be used to estimate the evolution of smoke as well as two of the most common 
and impactful toxics in an offshore fire scenario: carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide. 
 Assuming that smoke is comprised of elemental carbon and that the sole 
reactants in a fire scenario are fuel and oxygen and the sole products are carbon dioxide, 
water, carbon monoxide, and smoke, the reaction stoichiometry is as follows: 
 
                                          
 
Where all coefficients are molar and the fuel is defined (a and b are known). It is clear 
from atom balances that: 
 
         
      
             
 
There are three equations and six unknowns, which can be resolved by using the yield of 
carbon monoxide and smoke, both on a mass per mass basis, from Tewarson: 
 
  
       
   
 
       
  
 
  
       
  
 
       
  
 
 
Implying: 
     
       
   
 
       
  
 
 
And the yield of carbon dioxide is: 
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Table 32: Experimental smoke and carbon monoxide evolution properties for typical compounds found 
offshore, with calculated carbon dioxide evolution. Adapted from Tewarson [79] 
Material 
Mfuel 
[g/mol] 
CO yield 
α [g/g] 
Smoke yield 
β [g/g] 
CO2 evolution 
y [mol/mol] 
CO2 yield 
γ [g/g] 
Ethane 30 0.005 0.013 1.962 2.878 
n-Octane 114 0.010 0.038 7.598 2.933 
Cyclohexane 84 0.019 0.061 5.516 2.889 
Xylene 106 0.065 0.177 6.190 2.570 
 
 
These numbers assume a stoichiometric amount of oxygen.  
 Toxic effects of these combustion products also exist, the most dangerous of 
which relate to asphyxia and loss of consciousness. Carbon monoxide poisoning can 
cause incapacitation through the buildup of carboxyhemoglobin in the blood. For short 
doses of high concentration carbon monoxide, Purser [80] suggests that the Stewart 
equation based on concentration of carbon monoxide and breathing rate can be used to 
find the time to incapacitation: 
 
        
     
                
         
 
 
Where the concentration of carbon monoxide is expressed in parts per million and RMV 
is the amount of air that is breathed by a person per minute, assumed to be 50 L/min for 
a person under high stress. At this level of exertion, incapacitation occurs at a 30% dose. 
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 Carbon dioxide can also cause asphyxiation and is generated in far higher 
proportions than either carbon monoxide or smoke. The time to incapacitation suggested 
by Purser is: 
 
                                 
 
 These concentration times are important because the doses of carbon monoxide 
and carbon dioxide that cause rapid death are generally quite high, but the possibility of 
unconsciousness, which in the case of a catastrophic event has a high probability of 
leading to death, is much lower and more likely to occur in a fire scenario. 
 Concentration, like other dispersion, is a function of release rate, congestion, and 
wind speed and direction. This release rate is modeled as a diffuse leak in FLACS with 
properties of combustion products of fire. This assumption is made because it is assumed 
that the smoke particles will follow the dispersion of the combustion products and will 
be dispersed in roughly equal concentrations. 
 
 
Table 33: Properties for combustion dispersion simulation 
Property Value Reasoning 
Fuel 
Natural gas: 
90% Methane 
10% Ethane 
Most likely combustion 
reactant 
Products 
Natural gas toxic and smoke combustion 
products: 
0.005 g/g CO 
1.962 g/g CO2 
0.013 g/g smoke particulates 
Amounts based on 
calculation in equations 
above 
Temperature 1000˚C Possible flame temperature 
Dispersion Diffuse 
Combustion products best 
modeled as a buoyant release 
without jet momentum 
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The dispersion coefficients ascertained from this simulation setup are as follows: 
 
 
Table 34: Correlation parameters for the smoke diffuse dispersion case 
Release 
Direction 
Monitor 
Region 
Base Congestion 
Coefficient (e) 
Proportional Wind 
Coefficient (f+i) 
Base Wind 
Coefficient (g) 
Base Flowrate 
Coefficient (a+c) 
Diffuse 
+X 1.861E-06 4.963E-06 1.038E-04 -1.100E-04 
-X 2.016E-06 1.329E-06 -1.198E-05 1.626E-05 
+Y 1.500E-06 2.983E-06 4.782E-05 -3.088E-05 
-Y 3.211E-06 2.908E-06 4.378E-05 -6.113E-05 
+Z 4.690E-05 -5.034E-06 -1.198E-04 6.831E-04 
 
 
5.6 Further Improvements to the Model 
Blast walls can be modeled as having a certain failure pressure, above which the 
structure will fail in the same way as if the wall was not there. To model this, a failure 
pressure for the blast wall is assumed and the probability of destruction of the section is 
shifted based on this failure pressure such that the probability of destruction at the yield 
pressure of the wall is 1% and grows at the normal probit-predicted rate from that point, 
which occurs at a nominal overpressure of 8660 Pa (1.26 psi). A modification to the 
pressure is proposed for this: 
 
                                                  
 
Where the nominal value of the overpressure is calculated as in the prior formulations, 
the rated value of the wall is a parametric input, the 1% destruction pressure is 1.26 psi, 
and BWs,k denotes the existence of a blast wall on section s that mitigates a blast from k. 
The mitigated pressure expression must be greater than or equal to rather than equal to 
because the pressure value must be strictly positive and the right-hand side can be 
negative. If the right-hand side is negative, the left-hand side will be forced upward to 
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zero and will not be forced higher due to the minimization of the objective. The explicit 
calculation of the destruction probability then reverts back to the original probability 
formulation, unmodified by the blast wall binary. 
 A background congestion is also added to the formulation. This is used to 
simulate the congestion that is not related to specific sections, but nevertheless exists in 
the platform due to extraneous equipment, pipes, and other objects. Also included is a 
characteristic congestion for each section, taking into account that some may add less to 
the congestion than others. The new formulation for blockage ratio in a direction is a 
linear interpolation expressed as follows: 
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5.7 Case Studies 
Two case studies are presented to demonstrate the applicability of the 
formulation. The first case study is the standard muster point case study which is 
presented as a common thread between all three iterations of the model for comparison. 
The second case study is the application of the completed model to a Floating 
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Production Storage Offloading (FPSO) unit, showing that the model can be applied to 
other offshore-related facilities that show similar characteristics to a normal offshore 
platform. Both case studies use the same formulation; the only changes made are 
parametric and not constraint-based, objective-based, or variable-based: the size of the 
facility, the sections that are included, and the operating conditions and properties (area 
and number of stories, for example) of those sections are modified. 
 
5.7.1 Objective Function and Components 
 The base objective function for the model is unchanged from the previous 
formulation: 
 
      ∑            
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                    ) 
 
However, the escape probability is modified to include the possibility of incapacitation 
due to carbon dioxide and carbon monoxide poisoning while trying to escape. 
Furthermore, the exposure time to fire and toxic hazards is now based on the smoke-
scaled time to escape rather than on an assumption of exposure time. Destruction 
probability is based on the greater of risk from a base vapor cloud explosion within 
section k affecting section s or a dispersed cloud from section j igniting in section k and 
affecting section s. As before, the section cost is used as a scaling factor and is based on 
the average number of personnel that are expected to be in a section. The input 
parameters for the operating conditions were changed slightly so as to give a more 
balanced base probability to each of the risk components. 
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5.7.2 Muster Point Case Study 
 Five different cases were studied in this iteration: Fixed sections, free sections, 
walls that could fail under a low pressure, high toxic concentrations, and a flipped 
platform where the x and y-dimensions were exchanged. The lowered failure pressure 
for walls may estimate a worst-case scenario where a wall fails at a much lower pressure 
than expected and allow for design around this case. For the purposes of this study, the 
lowered failure pressure is 5 psi, while the nominal failure pressure is 15 psi. The 
nominal toxic scenario for combustion products assumes the normal combustion of 
natural gas, while the high toxic concentration scenario multiplies the amount of carbon 
monoxide and carbon dioxide by 5. In this case study, the shop is considered an 
additional source of ignition and the storage area is considered an additional source of 
fuel. 
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Figure 43: 0 Wall Base Case 
 
 The simulation consists of 9,225 variables, of which 1,863 are discrete, and 
10,315 constraints. The average time to solution was about 3 hours, using the stochastic 
method outlined in Chapter 4. The model was solved in DICOPT using CONOPT as the 
NLP solver and CPLEX as the MIP solver.  
 As expected, the optimization reduces the risk in any of the cases against the 
fixed case by between 20 and 40%. An interesting result of the optimization, and not 
wholly unexpected, is that the muster points tend to be closer to the costliest sections in 
order to expedite escape, as the smoke concentration in the air lowers escape velocity, 
often to the minimum value of 0.3 m/s, and the toxic and radiation effects depend on the 
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time to escape more heavily than in previous formulations. Because of this, escape risk 
cannot be lowered as readily as in the previous formulations – for most scenarios, the 
risk reduction in escape by adding a wall is no longer realized after the first, wheras in 
the previous formulation the majority of risk reduction was a product of the wall 
allowing for a better escape layout. 
 
 
 
Figure 44: 1 wall free – blast wall failure 5 psi 
 
 
As an example of the model’s decision-making, consider the 0-wall free case and 
the 1-wall free case with a wall that fails at low blast pressure. The two cases are nearly 
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symmetrical, reflected in the x-axis which would be equivalent in the model, as only the 
wind (which is in the +x-direction) causes directional effects. As the wall is added to the 
quarters in the +x-direction, the section is moved to where the wall can absorb the most 
possible damage with three sources of overpressure to the side. It still sees a small 
amount of destruction probability due to the close proximity of the compressors, but it 
moves away from the stronger overpressures of the wellhead area. In the same way, the 
shop stays nearer the wellhead despite the higher overpressure in order to avoid the 
multiple sources that it cannot withstand without a wall. 
 
 
 
Figure 45: Comparison of risk for the cases 
 
 
 CFD validation on the overpressure effects of the wall failure case and the smoke 
propagation properties between the fixed and free layouts was performed in FLACS. The 
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one-wall failure case places a wall on the quarters, which moves to the bottom corner 
near the compressors and away from the wellhead. 
 
 
 
Figure 46: Overpressure profile for one-wall failure case, 5 psi, explosion from compressors 
 
 
The overpressure on the quarters from the compressors is relatively high, but 
most of the damage is assumed to be deflected by the wall, which lowers the probability 
of destruction from 1 to about 0.26. Importantly, the movement of the quarters forces the 
escape cost down because it is farther away from the wellhead and it lessens the effect of 
smoke and toxic effects. Meanwhile, the shop stays close to the wellhead, protecting it 
from the compressors, but heightening the probability of failure to escape. 
As in the previous chapter, wind effects tend to keep the toxic gas and smoke 
away from the high-value areas. This lowers the probability of failure to escape and the 
probability of death by toxic inhalation. In particular, smoke effects are also mitigated by 
siting high-value sections on the ground floor rather than on the second floor. Buoyancy 
effects prove to raise the concentration of smoke on the second floor by a factor of about 
5 compared to the ground floor. 
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Figure 47: Smoke evolution from the wellhead. Upward directional effects are seen in the left figure 
while lateral wind effects are seen in the right. 
5.7.3 FPSO Case Study 
In order to demonstrate the applicability of the model to other offshore facilities, 
as well as to demonstrate that in constrained cases the model shows good agreement 
with human layouts, a more novel application of an FPSO has been studied. FPSO are 
widely utilized outside of the Gulf of Mexico, with 156 operating worldwide and 6 
active in North America as of August 2012 according to Wood Group Mustang [81]. 
Like fixed platforms, they are a relatively small space with a large amount of congestion, 
though they are normally larger and have a higher aspect ratio than fixed platforms since 
they are boat-shaped for transportation, so the layout considerations are relatively similar 
[82]. General information about size and personnel distribution have been taken from the 
aforementioned survey by Wood Group Mustang, and a sample layout has been taken 
from Bechtel [83]. 
136 
Figure 48: Sample layout for an FPSO [83] 
This layout has been simplified to ten sections, of which there are six sources of 
fuel, six sources of ignition, and four sources of people (section cost). Information 
pertaining to the simulation is presented in the table that follows: 
Table 35: FPSO optimization information 
Section Fuel Ignition Cost Area [ft
2
]
Control NO NO 40 10000 
Generation YES YES 0 20000 
Utilities YES YES 0 10000 
Compression YES YES 0 20000 
Flare NO YES 0 5000 
Pumps YES NO 0 10000 
Separations YES NO 0 20000 
Production YES YES 10 10000 
Shop/Lab NO YES 30 10000 
Quarters NO NO 60 20000 
FPSO Area 1000’x200’ = 200000 sq. ft. 
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 Properties for the sections are comparable to the prior case studies, natural gas is 
the main flammability hazard and crude oil pool fires are considered. No walls are 
considered, but toxic effects due to a high concentration of hydrogen sulfide as well as 
carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide are possible. The following layouts show the 
original product and the optimized product. 
 
 
 
Figure 49: Original layout for FPSO, optimized musters 
 
 
 
Figure 50: Optimized layout for FPSO 
 
 
 The optimized layout is found to be about 10% better in performance compared 
to the original layout, but the most striking feature is that with the exception of the 
production and flare, the layouts are largely similar. The difference in the position of the 
production module is most likely due to the fact that it is assigned a section cost that 
splits it away from the other sources of fuel and ignition, which contributes to a portion 
of the risk reduction. The other main component of the risk reduction is the movement of 
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the generation module from closer to the costly sections to the other side of the FPSO. 
The flare in the optimized formulation moves to the center of the FPSO, which, as a 
source of ignition, would seem to be a strange choice, but the dispersed amount of 
flammable is not high enough to have a great impact on the sections with a cost. Further, 
the directional explosion effect of a dispersed cloud would dictate that the flare, as a 
source of ignition but not fuel, would only be able to propagate an explosion in the 
direction of a dispersed cloud, and since all sources of fuel other than the production are 
to the opposite side of all key sections, this layout makes sense from the optimization 
standpoint. The production, being a key section and a source of fuel is more difficult to 
prognosticate, but stays on the opposite side of the sources of fuel in order to protect it 
from the dispersed explosion, while its own dispersed cloud will cause an effect on other 
key sections. The cost of this event does not, however, outweigh the cost of the effect on 
the production section. Muster points are allocated to be close to the sections they serve. 
 As is an underlying theme of these optimizations, the human layouts balance 
both cost and practicality in flow – the FPSO that is not optimized makes sense from a 
flow perspective, whereas the optimized layout may not pose much of a challenge from a 
piping perspective, but does not flow as linearly. 
 In a way, the question of layout on large FPSOs more approximates the onshore 
layout problem because there is ample space to separate sections where personnel may 
be present from the sources of fuel and ignition, but still retains the offshore problem of 
escape and high congestion ratios. It is expected that human layouts of FPSO facilities 
would be relatively close to what is predicted by the model because of the extra spacing 
available. 
 
5.8 Conclusions 
 An optimization model that takes into account domino effect from dispersed 
flammable gas causing an explosion in another section, wind effects on pool fires, smoke 
effects on time to escape, combustion products’ toxicity, and failing blast walls has been 
formulated. The explosion domino effect component uses the dispersion formulation 
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proposed in Chapter 4 and extends it to flammable gases and determination whether the 
gas would be within its flammability limit. The explosions include directional effects 
that are often present in dispersed cloud explosions. 
 Smoke modeling is also carried out using the formulation found in Chapter 4 and 
is used to determine the speed at which personnel are able to escape from a fire event. 
The time to escape becomes an important variable as it affects the time of exposure to 
radiation and toxic gas, which is taken into account in the probability of failure to 
escape. It is seen that the muster points are modified such that they are now much closer 
to the sections that have high cost, sometimes at the expense of the escape routes being 
closer to sources of fire. 
 The model is applied to two cases showing its application to the standard 
platform as well as to an FPSO. The standard platform gives greatly different results 
than the fixed actual layout with great gains in risk performance over a span of many 
cases, while the FPSO case gives a marginal increase in risk performance and a very 
similar layout to the actual layout. This leads to the conclusion that though the model is 
applicable to larger facilities, the formulation may lead to it being less useful since there 
is readily available spacing between the sources of fuel and ignition and the sections that 
are expected to have personnel.  
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
Several optimization models of varying degrees of complexity have been 
proposed for the layout of offshore platforms. The models take risk of the greatest 
expected hazards – explosion, fire, and toxic release – into account. In the base case, 
explosions are assumed to be caused by a fixed amount of flammable gas finding 
ignition in the section of origination. This explosion can cause the destruction of other 
sections, some of which may be populated, based on the expected overpressure. The 
expected overpressure is based on a modification to the standard TNO multi-energy 
method that allows for the explosion overpressure to be simply calculated as a function 
of material reactivity, obstruction, and amount of material.  
Fire modeling in the base case is based on a release of flammables that does not 
meet the criteria for an explosion. The main outcome of a fire is obstruction of escape 
paths due to radiant flux, which is a function of the material released, amount released, 
and the distance from the release to the point of interest, which includes the section 
itself, the muster point, and intermediate points on the escape route. Escape route choice 
is variable based on which route minimizes the probability of failure to escape.  
Toxic modeling is based upon the notion that dispersion concentration is a strong 
function of release rate, weather conditions, and congestion in the direction of the 
release. Indeed, it is found that the congestion in the direction of the release is far more 
important than the congestion in any other direction and can be taken as the sole 
consideration in congestion’s effect on dispersion. A correlation is proposed for the 
relation of these three factors of interest to the concentration of toxic gas given a leak of 
a certain flow rate in an environment with a certain wind speed and a certain congestion 
level in the direction of the release. This, along with known toxic effect criteria, can be 
used to estimate the effect of a toxic release on a section laying a certain direction from 
the release. 
Great improvements in safety performance can be realized through the simple 
optimization of layout, both as measured against the optimization criteria and through 
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CFD validation. CFD validation was carried out in FLACS and was found to agree with 
the results of the optimization with respect to all major components – blast, toxic 
dispersion, and smoke dispersion – that can be measured by the tool. 
Mitigation of the blast and fire is done with the incorporation of blast and fire 
wall modeling, consisting in the base case of an impervious wall that cannot fail no 
matter the load it bears. The optimization strategy can allocate blast and fire walls as part 
of the initial optimization or as an add-on for safety considerations, as is most often done 
in offshore facility design presently. As expected, the marginal benefit of blast walls 
goes down with each further wall allocated, and considering walls in conjunction with 
the original layout gives better risk reduction than considering them as an add-on. 
Finally, advanced fire modeling is explored, and smoke modeling and directional 
effects of dispersion and explosion are taken into account through the aforementioned 
generalized dispersion correlation. Because of the small spaces that platforms occupy, it 
is important to take each of these effects into account for a more accurate model. 
Propagation of smoke is perhaps the most hazardous event that can occur in a 
catastrophic event offshore. To incorporate this effect into the escape model, a 
correlation is used to estimate the time that escape will take and use this as the time 
scaling for the probability of failure to escape due to heat radiative flux. This is 
comparable to surveys that are currently done in offshore risk modeling where the 
expected time to escape is estimated, and it is attempted to maximize this value. Toxic 
effects of the smoke are also added into the model, with incapacitation due to inhalation 
of carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide assumed to cause failure to escape. The time to 
incapacitation can be calculated as a function of the concentration of either combustion 
product and can be measured against the average time to escape as a function of smoke 
concentration and distance from the escape point. 
The direction and speed of wind can have a profound effect on the heat radiated 
onto a point from the fire at different elevations, as well as on the dispersion of smoke 
from a fire and flammable dispersion. The center-point of the fire is modified for each of 
the floors based on the wind conditions and fire properties, which makes it safer, with 
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respect to fire radiation, for sections to be placed upwind of a possible fire scenario. 
However, dispersion to explosion domino effect is more difficult to prognosticate 
because being upwind of a dispersion means that there will often be a higher 
concentration of flammable gas downwind, where an explosion will propagate back 
toward the upwind direction. In this way, an optimization model is incredibly useful to 
take into account the many trade-offs and difficult-to-quantify effects of the change of 
layout. 
The main objective of this research was to create an optimization formulation for 
the layout of an offshore platform with respect to minimization of combined risk, taking 
into account the following considerations: 
 Account for the lack of space on an offshore platform as it relates to the added 
risk from catastrophic events and balance trade-offs that occur due to this lack of 
space 
 Create a multi-floor model that resolves the differences in risk from catastrophic 
events at different points in space with different elevations 
 Quantify effects of added congestion and confinement on explosions, fire, and 
dispersion 
 Facilitate escape through optimal placement of sections and muster points 
associated with the sections to minimize the effects of heat radiation and smoke 
effects from fire 
 Incorporate domino effect, where flammable gas may disperse to another section 
and be ignited, and account for directional effects of the ensuing blast 
 Ensure that the optimization models solve in a reasonable amount of time, and 
create the model in such a way that efficiency is maximized 
 Take into account relevant existing guidance in the field of offshore layout and 
design as useful 
 Verify the findings using advanced risk analysis models such as CFD 
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These objectives have all been accomplished and verified through CFD 
validation. The models all solve in an acceptable amount of time, and could be used in 
practice for the layout of an offshore platform based on a relatively small amount of 
information that could realistically be known before the design phase. It is shown that 
the model is a positive step into an area that has sparsely been considered, contributing a 
framework for the integrated consideration of several key risk factors in the  offshore 
realm that, as yet, have been unexplored from the numerical optimization viewpoint. 
Nevertheless, there are still improvements that could be made to the model. 
These improvements and other opportunities for future research, both directly related to 
this work and other research directions are presented in the next chapter. 
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7. FUTURE WORK 
Though a detailed and practical model has been presented for the optimal layout 
of offshore platforms facing fire, toxic, and blast scenarios, there are still opportunities 
for improvement of the model and other avenues for research in the future. These 
include extensions of the basic model proposed in this research, refocus of the objective 
of the model, and integration of other process safety topics such as human error and 
reliability into the facility layout problem. Several of these opportunities are presented in 
this chapter. 
 
7.1 Further Analysis of Mitigation 
 The extent of the current mitigation formulation is explicit consideration of fire 
walls and blast walls, and implicit consideration of the mitigating effects of spacing and 
relative placement of sections. However, there are more mitigations used in offshore 
environments than just these.  
Deluge is commonly used on offshore platforms, especially with regards to well 
testing [84], but more generally as a mitigation in any flammable release scenario [9]. 
However, the use of deluge is not as simple as activation at the first sign of a flammable 
gas release – according to Spouge there is a tradeoff between the lowered probability of 
eventual ignition due to the deluge and lowered overpressure in the case of an explosion, 
balanced against the increase in probability of an immediate ignition of the cloud due to 
sparking of static or shorting of electrical equipment. Furthermore, the effect of deluge 
on initial overpressures may be a positive one, with higher overpressures realized due to 
increased turbulence and mixing effects [85]. Reliability is also a concern, with 
probability of failure on demand generally accepted as about 1% and up to 50% on older 
platforms considering human error [86]. There exists a great research opportunity for the 
optimization of common deluge parameters such as flowrate, outlet spacing and layout, 
activation criteria, and reliability and human error concerns for better mitigation of 
overpressure, minimization of the turbulent effects of deluge, coverage of possible 
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hazards, and greater reliability. Research may be guided by the 4 BFETS Phase II large-
scale experimental tests, which measured the effect of deluge on explosion overpressures 
[87], continuing work of research institutions and corporations such as GexCon AS,  and 
optimization formulations such as the research put forth in this dissertation and others 
such as the gas-detection work by Benavides [88]. 
 
7.2 Emphasis on Domino Effects 
Just as explosions can cause firewalls to fail, which can, in turn, cause 
heightened dispersion or flame impingement among other consequences, many other 
types of domino effect are possible on an offshore platform. The proposed model 
considers domino effect in that a dispersion from one section may ignite in another 
section and cause an overpressure in the opposite direction of the dispersion. Further 
improvements to be considered in an offshore optimization may include the following 
components: 
 
 Effect of blast walls and fire walls on ventilation rates and flammable/toxic gas 
dispersion patterns 
 Blasts or fire leading to the loss of functionality of the platform through a 
decapitation mechanism or inability to access critical controls 
 Possibility of an explosion causing loss of containment of hydrocarbons and a 
secondary event 
 Fire impingement (particularly jet fire and pool fire) on piping and structural 
integrity 
 Projectiles from explosions 
 
These considerations are of high importance due to the close spacing of the 
offshore environment, which yields a greater probability of domino effects [66].  
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7.3 Improvement of Escape Modeling 
A foundation for escape modeling as a part of the optimization has been laid with 
this research, but there are areas for improvement. Primarily, the number of intermediate 
points of interest in the escape route could be expanded.  A lack of resolution in points 
where the radiant flux is calculated may lead to poor decisions being made as to path, 
where an escape path may lead personnel directly by a source of fire that is not captured 
adequately. More intermediate points can be added, but the model will become ever 
more complex as these constraints and variables are added. For each iteration of addition 
of intermediate points, the number of constraints will be 
  
      ∑         
 
   
 
 
where F is the number of fire scenarios considered, S is the number of sections in the 
formulation, and N is the number of iterations of additions to intermediate points (the 
first iteration is number 1 and is simply the four vertices of the rectangle and a single 
intermediate point on all edges and in the middle. If three fires are considered and eight 
sections are used, the number of constraints increases from 96 to 216 to 456 to 936 when 
increased from simply the vertices of the rectangle to a formulation with 5 intermediate 
points.  
 Other methods of determining escape adequacy can also be explored. For 
example, a framework for adequate time to escape has been created as part of the smoke 
modeling formulation of this work. Time allowed for escape can be found as a function 
of fire intensity and placement, as a human can only withstand the radiation for a finite 
amount of time and firewalls have finite periods of survival, toxic and escape effects of 
smoke, and toxic effects of the dispersion of gases such as hydrogen sulfide. The time to 
escape can be minimized or the time allowed for escape can be maximized if the effect 
of these factors on time can be quantified. 
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7.4 Improvement Based on Ventilation Rates, Weather Conditions, and Solid 
Obstructions 
 A formulation to incorporate wind speed and direction is proposed in this 
research. Ventilation and obstruction are considered as part of the congestion level. 
However, the effect of ventilation blockage by solid obstructions and dispersion effects 
of interior configuration is not specifically studied. Though this is an application that 
CFD is best suited to, it could have a large effect on the optimal layout of equipment and 
modules. This could be extended to the layout of the equipment within a section before 
the layout of the sections so as to facilitate the flow of air through the platform and to 
help the dispersed flammable or toxic exit the area. 
 
7.5 Further Applications of a Layout Model 
 Offshore platforms are not necessarily as idealized as is modeled in this research, 
though it would not be a stretch to model more unique or novel configurations, such as a 
production platform with an accommodation platform connected to it. In this case, it 
may be an interesting study to consider the distance between the platforms and the 
configuration in order to minimize the effect of an event on the production platform and 
maximize the probability of escape of the personnel on with platform. 
 An obvious extension of this model, which was purposely avoided during this 
research, is to balance the cost considerations of the platform such as pumping cost, 
marginal cost of increasing size, number of floors, or number of separate platforms (in 
the case of having a separate accommodations platform). This was not explored in this 
research for several reasons, the first being that the focus and objective of the research 
was to decrease safety risk without concern to cost considerations insomuch as the 
layout remained practical. Further, the incorporation of monetary costs requires either a 
monetary value put on the loss of personnel or a utility function relating the two values, 
each of which is difficult to define and may vary drastically from scenario to scenario 
based on many factors. Finally, cost considerations are often used in facility layout 
models to balance safety factors because the hazards can, for the most part, be mitigated 
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by separation of the asset from the hazard. In this formulation, because the distance is 
necessarily finite, this balance is not necessary (though it may not be undesirable). 
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APPENDIX A: SAMPLE GAMS CODE FOR OFFSHORE FLP 
*############################################################################### 
*                                                                              # 
* Josh Richardson                                                              # 
* 25-Feb-2015                                                                  # 
* Constrained FLP                                                              # 
* Fire, Explosion, Toxic, Smoke All Dispersion Effects                         # 
*                                                                              # 
*############################################################################### 
 
$eolcom # 
$inlinecom 
 
*############################################################################### 
*Set, Scalar, and Parameter Definition########################################## 
*############################################################################### 
 
Sets 
        s        sections        /       Wellhead, Quarters, Compressors, Storage, 
                                         Utilities, Process, Risers, Shop        / 
 
        m        musters         /       M1, M2, M3, M4  / 
 
        f        floors          /       1, 2      / 
 
        h        monitor dir     /       PosX, NegX, PosY, NegY, Top, Bottom     /; 
 
        Alias (s,k); 
        Alias (s,j); 
        Alias (m,r); 
        Alias (f,l); 
        Alias (h,g);                                                             #h is the monitor 
direction, g is the release direction 
 
Scalars 
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        Wx               x-direction size of the platform                        /110/ 
        Wy               y-direction size of the platform                        /150/ 
        sep              minimum separation distance between sections            /0/ 
        FloorSpacing     spacing in between floors                               /20/ 
        N                Big M scalar for disjunction relation 
        T                Big M scalar for toxic relation 
        Patm             Atmospheric pressure (Pa)                               /101300/ 
        epsilon          A small number                                          /0.001/ 
        time             response time to a leak (s)                             /100/ 
        CD               discharge coefficient                                   /0.85/ 
        AmbDensity       density of ambient air [kg per m3]                      /1.2/ 
        ExpansionFactor  Isentropic expansion factor                             /1.4/ 
        MWalls           Maximum number of blast walls                           /1/ 
        MaxPop           Maximum number of people at a muster                    /40/ 
        WindSpeed        Wind speed (m per s)                                    /5/ 
        IDLH             IDLH of interest (ppm)                                  /100/ 
        IDLHConc         IDLH of interest (kg per m3) 
        FireM            Big M value for fire-muster exclusion interaction       /10/ 
        FtExposure       Time of exposure to fire (s)                            /3/ 
        TtExposure       Time of exposure to toxic (min)                         /3/ 
 
Parameters 
        Stories(s) Number of floors a section takes up 
 
                        /        Wellhead         2 
                                 Quarters         1 
                                 Compressors      2 
                                 Storage          1 
                                 Utilities        1 
                                 Process          1 
                                 Risers           2 
                                 Shop             1      / 
 
        Area(s) Area allowed for section s 
 
                         /       Wellhead         4950 
                                 Quarters         1800 
                                 Compressors      2376 
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                                 Storage          825 
                                 Utilities        330 
                                 Process          900 
                                 Risers           150 
                                 Shop             1800   / 
 
        AR(s) Maximum aspect ratio between longest and shortest side 
 
                         /       Wellhead         2.5 
                                 Quarters         1.4 
                                 Compressors      1.9 
                                 Storage          1.4 
                                 Utilities        3.3 
                                 Process          1.5 
                                 Risers           6.0 
                                 Shop             1.4    / 
 
        SectionCost(s) A cost to put in the objective function 
 
                         /       Wellhead         5 
                                 Quarters         30 
                                 Compressors      0 
                                 Storage          0 
                                 Utilities        0 
                                 Process          0 
                                 Risers           0 
                                 Shop             10     / 
 
        Const(s) Explosion intercept constant 
 
                         /       Wellhead         0.35 
                                 Quarters         0 
                                 Compressors      0.12 
                                 Storage          0 
                                 Utilities        0.075 
                                 Process          0.12 
                                 Risers           0.12 
                                 Shop             0      / 
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        MIE(s) Minimum ignition energy of the material in section s (mJ) 
 
                         /       Wellhead         0.28 
                                 Quarters         0.28 
                                 Compressors      0.80 
                                 Storage          0.28 
                                 Utilities        0.28 
                                 Process          0.28 
                                 Risers           0.80 
                                 Shop             0.28   / 
 
        AIT(s) Autoignition temperature of the material in section s (F) 
 
                         /       Wellhead         1112 
                                 Quarters         1112 
                                 Compressors      406 
                                 Storage          1112 
                                 Utilities        1112 
                                 Process          1112 
                                 Risers           406 
                                 Shop             1112   / 
 
        ProcessT(s) Process temperature of the material in section s (F) 
 
                         /       Wellhead         200 
                                 Quarters         1 
                                 Compressors      500 
                                 Storage          1 
                                 Utilities        200 
                                 Process          200 
                                 Risers           200 
                                 Shop             1      / 
 
        ProcessP(s) Process pressure of the material in section s (psig) 
 
                         /       Wellhead         1000 
                                 Quarters         500 
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                                 Compressors      200 
                                 Storage          500 
                                 Utilities        100 
                                 Process          100 
                                 Risers           100 
                                 Shop             500    / 
 
        FR(s) Flowrate of the material in section s (lb per s) 
 
                         /       Wellhead         225 
                                 Quarters         1 
                                 Compressors      225 
                                 Storage          1 
                                 Utilities        225 
                                 Process          225 
                                 Risers           225 
                                 Shop             1      / 
 
        Reactivity(s) Reactivity of the material in section s 
 
                         /       Wellhead         1 
                                 Quarters         0.3 
                                 Compressors      1 
                                 Storage          0.3 
                                 Utilities        0.3 
                                 Process          0.3 
                                 Risers           1 
                                 Shop             0.3   / 
 
        GasHoC(s) Heat of Combustion of the material in section s for a gas leak [kJ per kg] 
 
                         /       Wellhead         55700 
                                 Quarters         55700 
                                 Compressors      46800 
                                 Storage          55700 
                                 Utilities        55700 
                                 Process          55700 
                                 Risers           46800 
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                                 Shop             55700  / 
 
        MassCloud(s) Mass of the stoichiometric vapor cloud in section s [kg] 
 
                         /       Wellhead         50 
                                 Quarters         0 
                                 Compressors      40 
                                 Storage          0 
                                 Utilities        15 
                                 Process          15 
                                 Risers           15 
                                 Shop             0       / 
 
        HoleD(s) Leak Diameter [in] 
 
                         /       Wellhead         1 
                                 Quarters         0 
                                 Compressors      1 
                                 Storage          0 
                                 Utilities        1 
                                 Process          1 
                                 Risers           1 
                                 Shop             0        / 
 
        PoolHoC(s) Heat of Combustion of the material in section s for a pool fire [kJ per kg] 
 
                         /       Wellhead         42800 
                                 Quarters         42800 
                                 Compressors      42800 
                                 Storage          42800 
                                 Utilities        42800 
                                 Process          42800 
                                 Risers           42800 
                                 Shop             42800     / 
 
        MassPool(s) Mass flowrate of material in pool [kg per s] 
 
                         /       Wellhead         1 
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                                 Quarters         1 
                                 Compressors      1 
                                 Storage          1 
                                 Utilities        1 
                                 Process          1 
                                 Risers           1 
                                 Shop             1          / 
 
        LeakSource(s) Denotes whether a section is a source of fuel 
 
                         /       Wellhead         1 
                                 Quarters         0 
                                 Compressors      1 
                                 Storage          1 
                                 Utilities        0 
                                 Process          0 
                                 Risers           1 
                                 Shop             0           / 
 
        IgnSource(s) Denotes whether a section is a source of fuel 
 
                         /       Wellhead         1 
                                 Quarters         0 
                                 Compressors      1 
                                 Storage          0 
                                 Utilities        0 
                                 Process          1 
                                 Risers           0 
                                 Shop             1           / 
 
        Table te(g,h) Release in g direction and monitor in h direction (x10^-5) 
 
                           PosX      NegX      PosY      NegY      Top      Bottom 
                 PosX      9.75      2.71      5.80      6.46      9.75     9.75 
                 NegX      3.63      7.14      5.68      6.37      3.63     3.63 
                 PosY      6.19      5.92      9.18      3.15      6.19     6.19 
                 NegY      6.19      5.92      3.15      9.18      6.19     6.19 
                 Top       9.75      2.71      5.80      6.46      9.75     9.75 
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                 Bottom    9.75      2.71      5.80      6.46      9.75     9.75 ; 
 
        Table tfi(g,h) Release in g direction and monitor in h direction (x10^-5) 
 
                           PosX      NegX      PosY      NegY      Top      Bottom 
                 PosX      0.125     -0.298    -0.0922   -0.0971   0.125    0.125 
                 NegX      -0.0977   -0.759    -0.602    -0.617    -0.0977  -0.0977 
                 PosY      0.339     -0.630    -0.307    -0.0328   0.339    0.339 
                 NegY      0.339     -0.630    -0.0328   -0.307    0.339    0.339 
                 Top       0.125     -0.298    -0.0922   -0.0971   0.125    0.125 
                 Bottom    0.125     -0.298    -0.0922   -0.0971   0.125    0.125        ; 
 
        Table tg(g,h) Release in g direction and monitor in h direction (x10^-5) 
 
                           PosX      NegX      PosY      NegY      Top      Bottom 
                 PosX      -24.1     5.04      -8.92     -9.04     -24.1    -24.1 
                 NegX      59.9      -38.2     29.0      24.6      59.9     59.9 
                 PosY      -0.591    -13.6     -16.0     1.80      -0.591   -0.591 
                 NegY      -0.591    -13.6     1.80      -16.0     -0.591   -0.591 
                 Top       -24.1     5.04      -8.92     -9.04     -24.1    -24.1 
                 Bottom    -24.1     5.04      -8.92     -9.04     -24.1    -24.1          ; 
 
        Table tac(g,h) Release in g direction and monitor in h direction (x10^-5) 
 
                           PosX      NegX      PosY      NegY      Top      Bottom 
                 PosX      112       -50.9     32.3      29.7      112      112 
                 NegX      -89.0     129       71.7      70.6      -89.0    -89.0 
                 PosY      59.6      32.2      143       -49.9     59.6     59.6 
                 NegY      59.6      32.2      -49.9     143       59.6     59.6 
                 Top       112       -50.9     32.3      29.7      112      112 
                 Bottom    112       -50.9     32.3      29.7      112      112       ; 
 
        Table ee(g,h) Release in g direction and monitor in h direction (x10^-5) 
 
                           PosX      NegX      PosY      NegY      Top      Bottom 
                 PosX      9.75      2.71      5.80      6.46      9.75     9.75 
                 NegX      3.63      7.14      5.68      6.37      3.63     3.63 
                 PosY      6.19      5.92      9.18      3.15      6.19     6.19 
 166 
 
                 NegY      6.19      5.92      3.15      9.18      6.19     6.19 
                 Top       9.75      2.71      5.80      6.46      9.75     9.75 
                 Bottom    9.75      2.71      5.80      6.46      9.75     9.75      ; 
 
        Table efi(g,h) Release in g direction and monitor in h direction (x10^-5) 
 
                           PosX      NegX      PosY      NegY      Top      Bottom 
                 PosX      0.125     -0.298    -0.0922   -0.0971   0.125    0.125 
                 NegX      -0.0977   -0.759    -0.602    -0.617    -0.0977  -0.0977 
                 PosY      0.339     -0.630    -0.307    -0.0328   0.339    0.339 
                 NegY      0.339     -0.630    -0.0328   -0.307    0.339    0.339 
                 Top       0.125     -0.298    -0.0922   -0.0971   0.125    0.125 
                 Bottom    0.125     -0.298    -0.0922   -0.0971   0.125    0.125          ; 
 
        Table eg(g,h) Release in g direction and monitor in h direction (x10^-5) 
 
                           PosX      NegX      PosY      NegY      Top      Bottom 
                 PosX      -24.1     5.04      -8.92     -9.04     -24.1    -24.1 
                 NegX      59.9      -38.2     29.0      24.6      59.9     59.9 
                 PosY      -0.591    -13.6     -16.0     1.80      -0.591   -0.591 
                 NegY      -0.591    -13.6     1.80      -16.0     -0.591   -0.591 
                 Top       -24.1     5.04      -8.92     -9.04     -24.1    -24.1 
                 Bottom    -24.1     5.04      -8.92     -9.04     -24.1    -24.1        ; 
 
        Table eac(g,h) Release in g direction and monitor in h direction (x10^-5) 
 
                           PosX      NegX      PosY      NegY      Top      Bottom 
                 PosX      112       -50.9     32.3      29.7      112      112 
                 NegX      -89.0     129       71.7      70.6      -89.0    -89.0 
                 PosY      59.6      32.2      143       -49.9     59.6     59.6 
                 NegY      59.6      32.2      -49.9     143       59.6     59.6 
                 Top       112       -50.9     32.3      29.7      112      112 
                 Bottom    112       -50.9     32.3      29.7      112      112       ; 
 
$onecho>a 
        Table se(g,h) Release in g direction and monitor in h direction (x10^-5) 
 
                           PosX      NegX      PosY      NegY      Top      Bottom 
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                 PosX      9.75      2.71      5.80      6.46      9.75     0 
                 NegX      3.63      7.14      5.68      6.37      3.63     0 
                 PosY      6.19      5.92      9.18      3.15      6.19     0 
                 NegY      6.19      5.92      3.15      9.18      6.19     0 
                 Top       9.75      2.71      5.80      6.46      9.75     0 
                 Bottom    0         0         0         0         0        0    ; 
 
        Table sfi(g,h) Release in g direction and monitor in h direction (x10^-5) 
 
                           PosX      NegX      PosY      NegY      Top      Bottom 
                 PosX      0.125     -0.298    -0.0922   -0.0971   0.125    0 
                 NegX      -0.0977   -0.759    -0.602    -0.617    -0.0977  0 
                 PosY      0.339     -0.630    -0.307    -0.0328   0.339    0 
                 NegY      0.339     -0.630    -0.0328   -0.307    0.339    0 
                 Top       0.125     -0.298    -0.0922   -0.0971   0.125    0 
                 Bottom    0         0         0         0         0        0     ; 
 
        Table sg(g,h) Release in g direction and monitor in h direction (x10^-5) 
 
                           PosX      NegX      PosY      NegY      Top      Bottom 
                 PosX      -24.1     5.04      -8.92     -9.04     -24.1    0 
                 NegX      59.9      -38.2     29.0      24.6      59.9     0 
                 PosY      -0.591    -13.6     -16.0     1.80      -0.591   0 
                 NegY      -0.591    -13.6     1.80      -16.0     -0.591   0 
                 Top       -24.1     5.04      -8.92     -9.04     -24.1    0 
                 Bottom    0         0         0         0         0        0    ; 
 
        Table sac(g,h) Release in g direction and monitor in h direction (x10^-5) 
 
                           PosX      NegX      PosY      NegY      Top      Bottom 
                 PosX      112       -50.9     32.3      29.7      112      0 
                 NegX      -89.0     129       71.7      70.6      -89.0    0 
                 PosY      59.6      32.2      143       -49.9     59.6     0 
                 NegY      59.6      32.2      -49.9     143       59.6     0 
                 Top       112       -50.9     32.3      29.7      112      0 
                 Bottom    0         0         0         0         0        0    ; 
$offecho 
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Parameters 
         se(h) 
                 /       PosX            9.75 
                         NegX            3.63 
                         PosY            6.19 
                         NegY            6.19 
                         Top             9.75 
                         Bottom          9.75         / 
 
         sfi(h) 
                 /       PosX            0.125 
                         NegX            -0.0977 
                         PosY            0.339 
                         NegY            0.339 
                         Top             0.125 
                         Bottom          0.125        / 
 
         sg(h) 
                 /       PosX            -24.1 
                         NegX            59.9 
                         PosY            -0.591 
                         NegY            -0.591 
                         Top             -24.1 
                         Bottom          -24.1        / 
 
         sac(h) 
                 /       PosX            112 
                         NegX            -89.0 
                         PosY            59.6 
                         NegY            59.6 
                         Top             112 
                         Bottom          112          / 
 
 
        UBx(s)                           Upper bound for the length of section s in the x direction 
        LBx(s)                           Lower bound for the length of section s in the x direction 
        UBy(s)                           Upper bound for the length of section s in the y direction 
        LBy(s)                           Lower bound for the length of section s in the y direction 
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        ImmIgnFactor(s)                  Determination of T-AIT factor 
        DelIgnFactor(s)                  Scaling factor for delayed ignition 
        PImmIgn(s)                       Probability of immediate ignition 
        PDelIgn(s)                       Probability of delayed ignition 
        PExp(s)                          Probability of an explosion given delayed ignition 
        TotalPExp(s)                     Total probability of an explosion event 
        TotalPFire(s)                    Total probability of a fire event 
        TotalPEnv(s)                     Total probability of an environmental event 
        FireballE(s)                     Total energy available for fireball event [J] 
        E(s)                             Total energy available for vapor cloud event [kJ] 
        FireballSize(s)                  Size of fireball in section s [ft] 
        FireballDuration(s)              Duration of Fireball [s] 
        LeakA(s)                         Leak Area [m2] 
        JetFireMassFlow(s)               Mass released for jet fire [kg per s] 
        JetFireQ(s)                      Heat released for jet fire [kW] 
        JetFireL(s)                      Length of jet fire flame [m] 
        MassBurning(s)                   Mass burning rate [kg per s m2] 
        PoolD(s)                         Pool diameter [m] 
        PoolFireQ(s)                     Heat released from pool fire [kW] 
        PoolFireH(s)                     Pool fire height [m] 
        PoolFireE(s)                     Pool fire emission [kW] 
        TotalArea                        Total area of the platform 
        AreaRatio                        Ratio of occupied area to total area of platform 
        Qk(s)                            Unused 
        LFLVol                           Lower flammability fraction by volume 
        FlammableDensity                 Density of flammable gas in [kg per m3] 
        LFLMass                          Lower flammability fraction by mass 
        MassFracFlam                     Mass fraction of flammable material in jet fire 
        MassFracToxic                    Mass fraction of toxic material in jet fire 
        FireScale                        Scaling factor for heat radiation (facilitates solution of 
model) 
        Eexp(s)                          Explosion energy [J] 
        random(s)                        Random number 
        Ustar(s)                         Scaled wind speed 
        FlameAngle(s)                    Pool fire angle 
        xprime(s)                        Height modification of fire radiation 
        MaxWalls                         Maximum number of walls available; 
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**General Parameters and Scalars 
        UBx(s) = min((Area(s)*AR(s))**(1/2), Wx); 
        UBy(s) = min((Area(s)*AR(s))**(1/2), Wy); 
        LBx(s) = Area(s)/UBx(s); 
        LBy(s) = Area(s)/UBy(s); 
        N = max(Wx,Wy); 
        T = 100; 
        TotalArea = sum(s,Stories(s)*Area(s)); 
        AreaRatio = TotalArea/(Wx*Wy)/card(f); 
 
**Fireball Parameters 
        FireScale = 10000; 
        FireballE(s) = GasHoC(s)*MassCloud(s)/FireScale;                        #kJ of available 
energy 
        FireballSize(s) = (5.8*MassCloud(s)**(1/3))/0.3048; 
        FireballDuration(s) = 0.45*MassCloud(s)**(1/3); 
 
**Jet Fire Parameters 
        LeakA(s) = 3.14*(HoleD(s)*0.3048/12/2)**2; 
        JetFireMassFlow(s) = 
CD*LeakA(s)*sqrt((2*(ProcessP(s)*101325/14.7)/AmbDensity)*(ExpansionFactor/(ExpansionFactor-1))*(1-
(Patm/(ProcessP(s)*101325/14.7))**((ExpansionFactor-1)/ExpansionFactor))); 
        JetFireQ(s) = JetFireMassFlow(s)*GasHoC(s)/FireScale;                   #kJ of available 
energy 
        JetFireL(s) = 0.2*JetFireQ(s)**0.4; 
 
**Pool Fire Parameters 
        MassBurning(s) = 0.05; 
        PoolD(s) = ((4*MassPool(s))/(3.14*MassBurning(s)))**(1/2); 
        PoolFireQ(s) = PoolHoC(s)*((0.5*PoolD(s))**2)*3.14*MassBurning(s)/FireScale; 
        PoolFireH(s) = 0.23*(PoolFireQ(s)*FireScale)**(2/5)-1.02*PoolD(s); 
        PoolFireE(s) = (58*(10**(-0.00823*PoolD(s))))*(MassPool(s)/(MassPool(s)+epsilon)); 
        FlammableDensity = 0.6; 
        Ustar(s)$(LeakSource(s) ne 0) = 
max(1,(WindSpeed/((9.81*MassBurning(s)*PoolD(s)/FlammableDensity)**(1/3)))); 
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        FlameAngle(s)$(LeakSource(s) ne 0) = (pi/2) - arctan((1/sqrt(Ustar(s)))/(sqrt(1-
((1/sqrt(Ustar(s)))*(1/sqrt(Ustar(s)))))+0.0001));  #arccos found using arccos(y) = pi/2 - 
arctan(y/sqrt(1-y*y)), y in (-1,1) 
        xprime(s) = 0; 
        xprime(s)$(PoolFireE(s) gt max(JetFireQ(s),FireballE(s))) = FloorSpacing/(sin(pi/2-
FlameAngle(s))/cos(pi/2-FlameAngle(s))); 
 
**Fire Overall Parameters 
        E(s) = max(FireballE(s),PoolFireE(s),JetFireQ(s)); 
 
**Explosion Parameters 
        Eexp(s) = FireballE(s)*1000;                                            #J of available 
energy 
 
**Dispersed Vapor Cloud Explosion Parameters 
        LFLVol = 0.05; 
        LFLMass = LFLVol*(AmbDensity/FlammableDensity); 
        MassFracFlam = 0.95; 
 
**Dispersed Toxic Parameters 
        Qk(s) = (JetFireMassFlow(s)+uniform(0.1,0.2))/2.25; 
        IDLHConc = (IDLH/1000000)*AmbDensity; 
        MassFracToxic = 1-MassFracFlam; 
 
**Probability Parameters 
        ImmIgnFactor(s) = ProcessT(s)/AIT(s); 
        DelIgnFactor(s) = (0.6-log10(MIE(s)))*(7*exp(0.642*log(FR(s))-4.67))*(1-(1-
LeakSource(s))*exp(-0.015*LeakSource(s)*time)); 
        PImmIgn(s)$(ImmIgnFactor(s) < 0.9) = 0; 
        PImmIgn(s)$(ImmIgnFactor(s) > 1.2) = 1; 
        PImmIgn(s)$(ImmIgnFactor(s) > 0.9 and ImmIgnFactor(s) < 1.2) = (1-5000*exp(-
9.5*ImmIgnFactor(s)))+((0.0024*ProcessP(s)**(1/3))/(MIE(s)**(2/3))); 
        PDelIgn(s)$(DelIgnFactor(s) > 1) = 1-(0.7/DelIgnFactor(s)); 
        PDelIgn(s)$(DelIgnFactor(s) < 1) = 0.3*DelIgnFactor(s); 
        PExp(s) = Reactivity(s)*0.024*(FR(s)**0.435); 
        TotalPExp(s) = PExp(s)*PDelIgn(s)*(1-PImmIgn(s)); 
        TotalPFire(s) = PImmIgn(s)+((1-PExp(s))*(PDelIgn(s))*(1-PImmIgn(s))); 
        TotalPEnv(s) = (1-PDelIgn(s))*(1-PImmIgn(s)); 
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**Wall Parameters 
        MaxWalls = MWalls; 
 
**Random number 
        random(s) = uniform(0.1,0.2); 
 
 
*############################################################################### 
*Variables###################################################################### 
*############################################################################### 
 
 
Variables 
**Variable declaration__________________________________________________________ 
***Midpoint and side length 
        x(s)                             midpoint in x-direction of section s 
        y(s)                             midpoint in y-direction of section s 
        Lx(s)                            length in x-direction of section s [ft] 
        Ly(s)                            length in y-direction of section s [ft] 
 
***Muster variables 
        mx(m)                            x-coordinate of muster point m 
        my(m)                            y-coordinate of muster point m 
        ex1(s,m)                         half muster x-coordinate for s 
        ex2(s,m)                         muster x-coordinate for s 
        ey1(s,m)                         half muster y-coordinate for s 
        ey2(s,m)                         muster y-coordinate for s 
        ma(m)                            binary variable for muster point on left edge of platform 
        mb(m)                            binary variable for muster point on right edge of platform 
        mc(m)                            binary variable for muster point on bottom edge of platform 
        md(m)                            binary variable for muster point on top edge of platform 
        SectionMuster(s,m)               binary variable for section s assigned to muster m 
 
***Floor variables 
        NF                               number of floors 
        Floor(s)                         floor that section s is assigned to 
        FO(f)                            binary variable defining whether floor f is occupied 
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        V(s,f)                           binary variable for section assignment to floor 
        ZZ(s,k,f)                        binary variable for sections s and k allocated to the same 
floor 
 
***Non-overlap variables 
        a(s,k,f)                         binary variable for non-overlap constraint left 
        b(s,k,f)                         binary variable for non-overlap constraint right 
        c(s,k,f)                         binary variable for non-overlap constraint below 
        d(s,k,f)                         binary variable for non-overlap constraint above 
        upstar(s,k,f,l)                  intermediate binary variable to determine non-overlap 
constraint up 
        downstar(s,k,f,l)                intermediate binary variable to determine non-overlap 
constraint down 
        up(s,k,f)                        binary variable for non-overlap constraint up floor 
        down(s,k,f)                      binary variable for non-overlap constraint down floor 
        Dx(s,k)                          minimum separation distance between sections s and k in the 
x-direction 
        Dy(s,k)                          minimum separation distance between sections s and k in the 
y-direction 
 
***Blast wall variables 
        wa(s)                            blast wall right of section s 
        wb(s)                            blast wall left of section s 
        wc(s)                            blast wall above section s 
        wd(s)                            blast wall below section s 
        BWa(s,k)                         blast from k affected by blast wall on s 
        BWb(s,k)                         blast from k affected by blast wall on s 
        BWc(s,k)                         blast from k affected by blast wall on s 
        BWd(s,k)                         blast from k affected by blast wall on s 
        BW(s,k)                          blast from k affected by blast wall on s 
 
***Explosion variables 
        P(s,k)                           overpressure on s due to an explosion in k 
        EProbit(s,k)                     probit value of s due to an explosion in k 
        DestructionProbability(s,k)      calculated probability of destruction 
        MitigatedProb(s,k)               mitigated probability of destruction for section s after 
considering mitigation 
 174 
 
        eSD(s,h)                         scaled dispersion to the h direction of s on floor f due to 
a release in direction g 
        dispE(s,k,h)                     dispersed energy in section s lying in monitor region h due 
to a release in section k in the g direction 
        cprime(s,k,j,h)                  base overpressure from s due to a dispersion from k 
        LFLExceed(s,h)                   binary to denote whether the LFL is exceeded in region h by 
a release by s 
 
***Fire variables 
        I1(s,k,m)                        Top route fire intensity 
        I2(s,k,m)                        Bottom route fire intensity 
        I3(s,k,m)                        Middle route fire intensity 
        I4(s,k)                          Midpoint fire intensity 
        I5(s,k,m)                        Radiation at muster point 
        I(s,k,m)                         fire intensity of the escape path between s and m due to a 
fire in k 
        FProbit(s,k,m)                   probit value of the escape path from s to m due to a fire in 
k 
        FProbitEscape(s,k,m)             probit value of the escape path from s to m due to a fire in 
k 
        FProbitMidpoint(s,k)             probit value of the section s due to a fire in k 
        FProbitMuster(s,k,m)             probit value of the muster point m section s is assigned to 
due to a fire in k 
        Fa(s,m)                          determines escape path 
        Fb(s,m)                          determines escape path 
        Fc(s,m)                          determines escape path 
        EscapeProbability(s,k,m)         calculated probability of escape blockage 
        EscapeProbabilityMidpoint(s,k,m) calculated probability of escape blockage 
 
***Toxic variables 
        BR(s,f,h)                        blockage ratio to the h direction of s on floor f 
        tSD(s,f,g,h)                     scaled dispersion to the h direction of s on floor f due to 
a release in direction g 
        ToxicProbit(s,k,f,g,h)           probit value of a g-direction release in k on floor f 
causing toxic effect in section s to the h direction of k 
        ToxicProbability(s,k)            calculated probability of toxic effect from a release in k 
on s 
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***Smoke variables 
        sSD(s,f,h)                       scaled dispersion to the h direction of s on floor f due to 
a release in direction g 
        vesc(s)                          escape speed from section s 
        tesc(s,m)                        escape time from section s to muster point m 
        tincCO(s)                        time to incapacitation by carbon monoxide 
        tincCO2(s)                       time to incapacitation by carbon dioxide 
        Incap(s,m)                       whether incapacitation is likely to occur between section s 
and muster point m 
 
***Objective 
        Prob                             cost to be minimized for FLP; 
 
 
**Variable definition___________________________________________________________ 
***Midpoint and side length 
        positive variable x; 
        positive variable y; 
        positive variable Lx; 
        positive variable Ly; 
 
***Muster variables 
        positive variable mx; 
        positive variable my; 
        positive variable ex1; 
        positive variable ex2; 
        positive variable ey1; 
        positive variable ey2; 
        binary variable ma; 
        binary variable mb; 
        binary variable mc; 
        binary variable md; 
        binary variable SectionMuster; 
 
***Floor variables 
        positive variable Floor; 
        integer variable NF; 
        integer variable TotalFloors; 
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        binary variable V; 
        binary variable ZZ; 
        binary variable FO; 
 
***Non-overlap variables 
        binary variable a; 
        binary variable b; 
        binary variable c; 
        binary variable d; 
        binary variable up; 
        binary variable upstar; 
        binary variable downstar; 
        binary variable down; 
        positive variable Dx; 
        positive variable Dy; 
 
***Blast wall variables 
        binary variable wa; 
        binary variable wb; 
        binary variable wc; 
        binary variable wd; 
        binary variable BWa; 
        binary variable BWb; 
        binary variable BWc; 
        binary variable BWd; 
        integer variable BW; 
 
***Explosion variables 
        positive variable P; 
        variable EProbit; 
        positive variable DestructionProbability; 
        positive variable MitigatedProb; 
        positive variable eSD; 
        positive variable dispE; 
        positive variable cprime; 
        binary variable LFLExceed; 
 
***Fire variables 
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        binary variable Fa; 
        binary variable Fb; 
        binary variable Fc; 
        positive variable I1; 
        positive variable I2; 
        positive variable I3; 
        positive variable I4; 
        positive variable I5; 
        positive variable I; 
        variable FProbitEscape; 
        variable FProbitMidpoint; 
        variable FProbitMuster; 
        positive variable EscapeProbability; 
        positive variable EscapeProbabilityEscape; 
        positive variable EscapeProbabilityMidpoint; 
 
***Toxic variables 
        positive variable Conc; 
        positive variable BR; 
        positive variable tSD; 
        variable ToxicProbit; 
        positive variable ToxicProbability; 
 
***Smoke variables 
        positive variable sSD; 
        positive variable vesc; 
        positive variable tesc; 
        positive variable tincCO; 
        positive variable tincCO2; 
        binary variable Incap; 
 
 
 
*############################################################################### 
*Variable Initial Values and Bounds############################################# 
*############################################################################### 
 
**Essential Fixed Variables_____________________________________________________ 
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***Muster Points fixed to sides 
*$onecho>a 
ma.fx('M1') = 1; 
mb.fx('M2') = 1; 
mc.fx('M3') = 1; 
md.fx('M4') = 1; 
mx.fx('M1') = 0; 
mx.fx('M2') = Wx; 
my.fx('M3') = 0; 
my.fx('M4') = Wy; 
my.lo('M1') = 0; 
my.up('M1') = Wy; 
my.lo('M2') = 0; 
my.up('M2') = Wy; 
mx.lo('M3') = 0; 
mx.up('M3') = Wx; 
mx.lo('M4') = 0; 
mx.up('M4') = Wx; 
*$offecho 
 
*$onecho > a 
**Fixed Variables and Strict Limits_____________________________________________ 
 
***Midpoints 
x.lo(s) = 0; 
x.up(s) = Wx; 
y.lo(s) = 0; 
y.up(s) = Wy; 
 
***Section length less than length of platform 
Lx.lo(s) = 0; 
Lx.up(s) = Wx; 
Ly.lo(s) = 0; 
Ly.up(s) = Wy; 
 
***Exclusion length less than length of platform 
Dx.lo(s,k) = 0; 
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Dx.up(s,k) = Wx; 
Dy.lo(s,k) = 0; 
Dy.up(s,k) = Wy; 
 
***Escape Radiation Points 
ex1.lo(s,m) = 0; 
ex1.up(s,m) = Wx; 
ex2.lo(s,m) = 0; 
ex2.up(s,m) = Wx; 
ey1.lo(s,m) = 0; 
ey1.up(s,m) = Wy; 
ey2.lo(s,m) = 0; 
ey2.up(s,m) = Wy; 
 
***Disjunction Relation Constraints 
a.fx(s,s,f) = 0; 
b.fx(s,s,f) = 0; 
c.fx(s,s,f) = 0; 
d.fx(s,s,f) = 0; 
up.fx(s,s,f) = 0; 
up.l(s,k,f) = 0; 
upstar.fx(s,s,f,l) = 0; 
upstar.fx(s,k,f,f) = 0; 
*upstar.fx(s,k,f,l)$(ord(f) lt ord(l)) = 0; 
down.fx(s,s,f) = 0; 
down.l(s,k,f) = 0; 
 
***Floor Constraints 
NF.lo = 1; 
NF.up = card(f); 
Floor.lo(s) = 1; 
Floor.up(s) = card(f); 
ZZ.fx(s,s,f) = 0; 
 
***Blast Walls 
BW.up(s,k) = 1; 
 
***Explosion 
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****Explosion Effect 
P.lo(s,k) = 0; 
P.fx(s,s) = 0; 
 
****Explosion Probit 
EProbit.lo(s,k) = -100; 
EProbit.up(s,k) = 100; 
 
****Explosion Probability 
DestructionProbability.fx(s,s) = 0; 
DestructionProbability.lo(s,k) = 0; 
eSD.lo(s,h) = 0; 
eSD.up(s,h) = 1; 
cprime.up(s,k,j,h) = 1000000; 
LFLExceed.lo(s,h) = 0; 
LFLExceed.up(s,h) = 1; 
 
****Mitigated Probability 
MitigatedProb.fx(s,s) = 0; 
MitigatedProb.lo(s,k) = 0; 
 
****Dispersed Cloud 
DispE.lo(s,k,h) = 0; 
DispE.up(s,k,h) = 1000000; 
 
***Fire 
****Fire Effect 
I1.fx(s,s,m) = 0; 
I2.fx(s,s,m) = 0; 
I3.fx(s,s,m) = 0; 
I4.fx(s,s) = 0; 
I5.fx(s,s,m) = 0; 
I.fx(s,s,m) = 0; 
I.up(s,k,m) = 10; 
I1.up(s,k,m) = 10; 
I2.up(s,k,m) = 10; 
I3.up(s,k,m) = 10; 
I4.up(s,k) = 10; 
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I5.up(s,k,m) = 10; 
 
****Fire Probit 
FProbit.lo(s,k,m) = -1000; 
FProbit.up(s,k,m) = 1000; 
FProbitEscape.lo(s,k,m) = -1000; 
FProbitEscape.up(s,k,m) = 1000; 
FProbitMidpoint.lo(s,k) = -1000; 
FProbitMidpoint.up(s,k) = 1000; 
 
****Escape Probability 
EscapeProbability.fx(s,s,m) = 0; 
EscapeProbability.lo(s,k,m) = 0; 
EscapeProbability.up(s,k,m) = 4; 
 
****Muster Constraints 
Fa.lo(s,m) = 0; 
Fb.lo(s,m) = 0; 
Fc.lo(s,m) = 0; 
 
***Toxic 
****Blockage Ratio 
BR.lo(s,f,h) = 0; 
BR.up(s,f,h) = 2; 
 
****Toxic Effect (Scaled Dispersion) 
tSD.lo(s,f,g,h) = 0; 
tSD.up(s,f,g,h) = 4; 
 
****Toxic Probit 
ToxicProbit.lo(s,k,f,g,h) = -200; 
ToxicProbit.up(s,k,f,g,h) = 200; 
 
****Toxic Probability 
ToxicProbability.fx(s,s) = 0; 
ToxicProbability.lo(s,k) = 0; 
ToxicProbability.up(s,k) = 10; 
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***Smoke 
sSD.lo(s,f,h) = 0; 
sSD.up(s,f,h) = 1; 
vesc.lo(s) = 0.3; 
vesc.up(s) = 1000; 
tesc.lo(s,m) = 0; 
tesc.up(s,m) = 1000; 
tincCO.lo(s) = 0; 
tincCO.up(s) = 1000000; 
tincCO2.lo(s) = 0; 
tincCO2.up(s) = 10000000; 
Incap.lo(s,m) = 0; 
Incap.up(s,m) = 1; 
 
*$offecho 
 
**Fixes Sections________________________________________________________________ 
 
$onecho > a 
x.fx('Wellhead') = 33.81941804; 
x.fx('Quarters') = 23.9696637; 
x.fx('Compressors') = 88.81941804; 
x.fx('Storage') = 16.97781598; 
x.fx('Utilities') = 105; 
x.fx('Process') = 97.75255129; 
x.fx('Risers') = 107.5; 
x.fx('Shop') = 23.88984567; 
y.fx('Wellhead') = 113.4085957; 
y.fx('Quarters') = 18.77373023; 
y.fx('Compressors') = 121.9554448; 
y.fx('Storage') = 51.05268945; 
y.fx('Utilities') = 77.41088961; 
y.fx('Process') = 75.53971653; 
y.fx('Risers') = 15; 
y.fx('Shop') = 18.83645488; 
Lx.fx('Wellhead') = 67.63883607; 
Lx.fx('Quarters') = 47.93932739; 
Lx.fx('Compressors') = 42.36116393; 
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Lx.fx('Storage') = 33.95563196; 
Lx.fx('Utilities') = 10; 
Lx.fx('Process') = 24.49489743; 
Lx.fx('Risers') = 5; 
Lx.fx('Shop') = 47.77969133; 
Ly.fx('Wellhead') = 73.18280869; 
Ly.fx('Quarters') = 37.54746047; 
Ly.fx('Compressors') = 56.08911039; 
Ly.fx('Storage') = 24.2964113; 
Ly.fx('Utilities') = 33; 
Ly.fx('Process') = 36.74234614; 
Ly.fx('Risers') = 30; 
Ly.fx('Shop') = 37.67290976; 
$offecho 
 
$onecho > a 
Lx.fx('Wellhead') = 110; 
Ly.fx('Wellhead') = 45; 
x.fx('Wellhead') = 55; 
y.fx('Wellhead') = 88.5; 
Lx.fx('Quarters') = 50; 
Ly.fx('Quarters') = 36; 
x.fx('Quarters') = 55; 
y.fx('Quarters') = 132; 
Lx.fx('Compressors') = 36; 
Ly.fx('Compressors') = 66; 
x.fx('Compressors') = 18; 
y.fx('Compressors') = 33; 
Lx.fx('Storage') = 25; 
Ly.fx('Storage') = 33; 
x.fx('Storage') = 67.5; 
y.fx('Storage') = 16.5; 
Lx.fx('Utilities') = 10; 
Ly.fx('Utilities') = 33; 
x.fx('Utilities') = 105; 
y.fx('Utilities') = 16.5; 
Lx.fx('Process') = 36; 
Ly.fx('Process') = 25; 
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x.fx('Process') = 67.5; 
y.fx('Process') = 53; 
Lx.fx('Risers') = 5; 
Ly.fx('Risers') = 30; 
x.fx('Risers') = 95; 
y.fx('Risers') = 15; 
Lx.fx('Shop') = 50; 
Ly.fx('Shop') = 36; 
x.fx('Shop') = 55; 
y.fx('Shop') = 132; 
 
V.fx('Wellhead','1') = 1; 
V.fx('Wellhead','2') = 1; 
V.fx('Quarters','1') = 0; 
V.fx('Quarters','2') = 1; 
V.fx('Compressors','1') = 1; 
V.fx('Compressors','2') = 1; 
V.fx('Storage','1') = 1; 
V.fx('Storage','2') = 0; 
V.fx('Utilities','1') = 1; 
V.fx('Utilities','2') = 0; 
V.fx('Process','1') = 1; 
V.fx('Process','2') = 0; 
V.fx('Risers','1') = 1; 
V.fx('Risers','2') = 1; 
V.fx('Shop','1') = 1; 
V.fx('Shop','2') = 0; 
$offecho 
 
*############################################################################### 
*Equation Initialization######################################################## 
*############################################################################### 
 
Equations 
**Area, AR, and Side Length Equations___________________________________________ 
        AreaConstraint(s)                        constrains the side lengths of section s to fit the 
area parameter 
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        LengthConstraintXLo(s)                   constrains the length of the x side to be within 
lower aspect ratio limits 
        LengthConstraintXHi(s)                   constrains the length of the x side to be within 
upper aspect ratio limits 
        LengthConstraintYLo(s)                   constrains the length of the y side to be within 
lower aspect ratio limits 
        LengthConstraintYHi(s)                   constrains the length of the y side to be within 
upper aspect ratio limits 
 
**Separation Distance___________________________________________________________ 
        DefineDx(s,k)                            defines Dx of section s 
        DefineDy(s,k)                            defines Dy of section s 
 
**Boundary Constraints__________________________________________________________ 
        BoundaryX1(s)                            constrains the sections to be within the lower x 
boundary of the platform 
        BoundaryX2(s)                            constrains the sections to be within the upper x 
boundary of the platform 
        BoundaryY1(s)                            constrains the sections to be within the lower y 
boundary of the platform 
        BoundaryY2(s)                            constrains the sections to be within the upper y 
boundary of the platform 
 
**Non-Overlap Constraints_______________________________________________________ 
        LeftConstraint(s,k,f)                    non-overlapping constraint bounds section s to the 
left of section k 
        RightConstraint(s,k,f)                   non-overlapping constraint bounds section s to the 
right of section k 
        BelowConstraint(s,k,f)                   non-overlapping constraint bounds section s to be 
below section k 
        AboveConstraint(s,k,f)                   non-overlapping constraint bounds section s to be 
above section k 
        DisjunctionCheck1(s,k,f)                 if a is left of b then b must be right of a and 
vice-versa 
        DisjunctionCheck2(s,k,f)                 if a is above b then b must be below a and vice-
versa 
 
*Decision Variables to Select Non-Overlap Constraint____________________________ 
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        DecisionConstraint(s,k,f)                decides which non-overlapping constraint to use 
        DecisionConstraint2(s,k)                 makes sure that ZZ is only defined for stories that 
s and k occupy 
        DecisionConstraint3(s,k,f)               makes sure that ZZ is equal for both s and k on a 
certain floor 
 
**Muster Point Constraints______________________________________________________ 
        MusterAssign(s)                          assigns one muster to a section 
        EscapeX1(s,m)                            defines ex1 - a point of fire impact on escape 
        EscapeY1(s,m)                            defines ey1 - a point of fire impact on escape 
        EscapeX2(s,m)                            defines ex2 - a point of fire impact on escape 
        EscapeY2(s,m)                            defines ey2 - a point of fire impact on escape 
        MusterLimit(m)                           assigns at most two sections to one muster 
 
**Blast Wall Constraints________________________________________________________ 
        BlastWallA(s,k)                          Defines BW (whether blast wall s affects blast from 
k) 
        BlastWallB(s,k)                          Defines BW (whether blast wall s affects blast from 
k) 
        BlastWallC(s,k)                          Defines BW (whether blast wall s affects blast from 
k) 
        BlastWallD(s,k)                          Defines BW (whether blast wall s affects blast from 
k) 
        BlastWall(s,k)                           Defines BW (whether blast wall s affects blast from 
k) 
        MaxBlastWalls                            Defines maximum number of blast walls 
 
**Floor Constraints_____________________________________________________________ 
        OneFloor(s)                              assigns a section to only one floor 
        FloorConstraint1(s,k,f)                  defines ZZ (sections s and k allocated to same 
floor) 
        FloorConstraint2(s,k,f)                  defines ZZ (sections s and k allocated to same 
floor) 
        FloorConstraint3(s,k,f)                  defines ZZ (sections s and k allocated to same 
floor) 
        FloorOccupied1(f)                        defines FO (1 if floor occupied 0 if not) 
        FloorOccupied2(s,f)                      defines FO (1 if floor occupied 0 if not) 
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        FloorOrder(f,l)                          floor f must be occupied before any floors above it 
can be occupied 
        NumberOfFloors(f)                        defines NF - the number of floors in the platform 
        NumberOfFloors2                          defines NF - the number of floors in the platform 
        FloorNumber(s)                           defines Floor - the effective floor number of 
section s 
        FloorAdjacent(f,l,s)                     Forces floors to be adjacent for a multi-story 
section 
*$onecho>a 
        RelativeFloor1(s,k,f,l)                  Defines up* 
        RelativeFloor2(s,k,f,l)                  Defines up* 
        RelativeFloor3(s,k,f,l)                  Defines up* 
        RelativeFloor4(s,k,f,l)                  Defines up 
        RelativeFloor5(s,k,f,l)                  Defines up 
        RelativeFloor6(s,k,f,l)                  Defines down 
        RelativeFloor7(s,k,f,l)                  a 
        RelativeFloor8(s,k,f)                    a 
        RelativeFloor9(s,k,f,l)                  Defines down 
        RelativeFloor10(s,k,f,l)                  a 
        RelativeFloor11(s,k,f)                    a 
*$offecho 
 
**Explosion_____________________________________________________________________ 
***Explosion Effect 
        ExpPressure(s,k)                         Determines pressure from explosion in s on k 
 
**Explosion Probit 
        ExpProbit(s,k)                           Determines probit value of explosion overpressure 
 
**Explosion Probability 
        DestProbability(s,k)                     Determines the probability of destruction of s due 
to explosion in k 
        ModifiedProbability(s,k)                 Defines the mitigated probability after blast walls 
intergrated 
 
**Dispersed Cloud Explosion 
        eScaledDispersion(s,f,g,h)               Defines the mass fraction of flammable material in 
monitor region h due to a g-direction release in s on floor f 
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        DispersedEnergy(s,k,f,h)                 Defines the amount of energy available for a 
dispersed cloud explosion 
        DispersedBase(s,k,j,h)                   Defines the base pressure of a dispersed cloud 
explosion 
        LFLExceedance(s,k,h)                     Determines whether the LFL is exceeded in the 
potential explosion domain 
 
*$onecho>a 
        DispersedEProbitPosX(s,k,j,f,h)          Determines the probit value for a dispersed cloud in 
the positive x monitor region 
        DispersedEProbitNegX(s,k,j,f,h)          Determines the probit value for a dispersed cloud in 
the negative x monitor region 
        DispersedEProbitPosY(s,k,j,f,h)          Determines the probit value for a dispersed cloud in 
the positive y monitor region 
        DispersedEProbitNegY(s,k,j,f,h)          Determines the probit value for a dispersed cloud in 
the negative y monitor region 
        DispersedEProbitTop(s,k,j,f,h)           Determines the probit value for a dispersed cloud in 
the top monitor region 
        DispersedEProbitBottom(s,k,j,f,h)        Determines the probit value for a dispersed cloud in 
the bottom monitor region 
*$offecho 
 
**Fire__________________________________________________________________________ 
***Fire Intensity Equations 
        FireIntensity1(s,k,m)                    Determines flash fire intensity from fire in k on 
key escape points 
        FireIntensity2(s,k,m)                    Determines flash fire intensity from fire in k on 
key escape points 
        FireIntensity3(s,k,m)                    Determines flash fire intensity from fire in k on 
key escape points 
        FireIntensity4(s,k,m)                    Determines flash fire intensity from fire in k on 
key escape points 
        FireIntensity5(s,k,m)                    Determines flash fire intensity from fire in k on 
key escape points 
        FireIntensity6(s,k,m)                    Determines flash fire intensity from fire in k on 
key escape points 
        FireIntensity7(s,k,m)                    Determines flash fire intensity from fire in k on 
key escape points 
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        FireIntensity8(s,k)                      Determines flash fire intensity from fire in k on 
key escape points 
        FireIntensity9(s,k,m)                    Determines flash fire intensity from fire in k on 
key escape points 
 
***Escape Path Equations 
        PathChoice(s,k,m)                        Determines escape path 
        PathConstraint(s,m)                      Constrains escape path 
 
***Fire Probit 
        FireProbitEscape(s,k,m)                  Determines probit value of fire 
        FireProbitMuster(s,k,m)                  Determines probit value of fire 
        FireProbitMidpoint(s,k)                  Determines probit value of fire 
 
***Fire Probability 
        EscProbability(s,k,m)                    Determines the probability of failure of escape from 
s to m 
 
**Toxic_________________________________________________________________________ 
***Blockage 
        LeftBlockage(s,f)                        Defines blockage ratio BR to the left of s on floor 
f 
        RightBlockage(s,f)                       Defines blockage ratio BR to the right of s on floor 
f 
        BelowBlockage(s,f)                       Defines blockage ratio BR above on floor f 
        AboveBlockage(s,f)                       Defines blockage ratio BR below s on floor f 
        UpBlockage(s,f)                          Defines blockage ratio BR on top of s on floor f 
        DownBlockage(s,f)                        Defines blockage ratio BR under s on floor f 
 
***Scaled Dispersion 
        tScaledDispersion(s,f,g,h)               Defines the mass fraction of toxic material in 
monitor region h due to a g-direction release in s on floor f 
 
***Toxic Probit 
        RightToxicProbit(s,k,f,g)                Defines the toxic probit of section k due to a g-
direction release on floor f from section s in the positive-x monitor direction 
        LeftToxicProbit(s,k,f,g)                 Defines the toxic probit of section k due to a g-
direction release on floor f from section s in the negative-x monitor direction 
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        AboveToxicProbit(s,k,f,g)                Defines the toxic probit of section k due to a g-
direction release on floor f from section s in the positive-y monitor direction 
        BelowToxicProbit(s,k,f,g)                Defines the toxic probit of section k due to a g-
direction release on floor f from section s in the negative-y monitor direction 
        TopToxicProbit(s,k,f,g)                  Defines the toxic probit of section k due to a g-
direction release on floor f from section s in the top monitor direction 
        BottomToxicProbit(s,k,f,g)               Defines the toxic probit of section k due to a g-
direction release on floor f from section s in the bottom monitor direction 
 
***Toxic Probability 
        CombinedToxicEffect(s,k)                 Defines the combined probability of all release 
directions and monitor regions and floors that a release from section k affects section s 
 
**Smoke_________________________________________________________________________ 
        sScaledDispersion(s,f,h)                 Scaled dispersion of smoke in region h from a fire 
in s on floor f due to a release in the g direction 
        EscapeSpeed(s,k,f,h) 
        EscapeTime(s,m) 
        IncapacitationCO(s,k,f,h) 
        IncapacitationCO2(s,k,f,h) 
        IncapacitatedCO(s,m) 
        IncapacitatedCO2(s,m) 
 
**Objective Function____________________________________________________________ 
        Objective                                Defines objective function for FLP; 
 
 
*############################################################################### 
*Equation Definition############################################################ 
*############################################################################### 
 
**Objective Function____________________________________________________________ 
*$onecho>a 
         Objective ..                                                            Prob =e= 
sum(s$(SectionCost(s) ne 0),SectionCost(s)*sum(k$(LeakSource(k) ne 0), 
sum(m,EscapeProbability(s,k,m))))+0.001*sum((s,k,m),SectionMuster(s,m)*(I(s,k,m)+I4(s,k)+I5(s,k,m))) 
                                                                                         
+sum(s$(SectionCost(s) ne 0),((SectionCost(s))*(sum(k$(LeakSource(k) ne 0), MitigatedProb(s,k))))) 
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+sum(s$(SectionCost(s) ne 0),SectionCost(s)*sum(k$(LeakSource(k) ne 0), 
ToxicProbability(s,k)))+0.0001*sum((s,f,g,h),tSD(s,f,g,h)); 
 
*$offecho 
*        Objective ..                                                            Prob =e= 
sum((s,k,f),up(s,k,f)+down(s,k,f)); 
*        Objective ..                                                            Prob =e= 1; 
 
**Area, AR, and Side Length Equations___________________________________________ 
         AreaConstraint(s) ..                                                    Area(s) =e= 
Lx(s)*Ly(s); 
         LengthConstraintXLo(s) ..                                               Lx(s) =g= LBx(s); 
         LengthConstraintXHi(s) ..                                               Lx(s) =l= UBx(s); 
         LengthConstraintYLo(s) ..                                               Ly(s) =g= LBy(s); 
         LengthConstraintYHi(s) ..                                               Ly(s) =l= UBy(s); 
 
 
*Separation Distance____________________________________________________________ 
         DefineDx(s,k)$(ord(s) ne ord(k)) ..                                     Dx(s,k) =e= (Lx(s) + 
Lx(k))/2 + sep; 
         DefineDy(s,k)$(ord(s) ne ord(k)) ..                                     Dy(s,k) =e= (Ly(s) + 
Ly(k))/2 + sep; 
 
 
*Boundary Constraints___________________________________________________________ 
         BoundaryX1(s) ..                                                        x(s) =g= Lx(s)/2; 
         BoundaryX2(s) ..                                                        x(s) =l= Wx - 
Lx(s)/2; 
         BoundaryY1(s) ..                                                        y(s) =g= Ly(s)/2; 
         BoundaryY2(s) ..                                                        y(s) =l= Wy - 
Ly(s)/2; 
 
 
*Non-Overlap Constraints________________________________________________________ 
         LeftConstraint(s,k,f)$(ord(s) gt ord(k)) ..                             x(s) =l= (1-
a(s,k,f))*N + (x(k) - Dx(s,k)); 
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         RightConstraint(s,k,f)$(ord(s) gt ord(k)) ..                            x(s) =g= (x(k) + 
Dx(s,k)) - (1-b(s,k,f))*N; 
         BelowConstraint(s,k,f)$(ord(s) gt ord(k)) ..                            y(s) =l= (1-
c(s,k,f))*N + (y(k) - Dy(s,k)); 
         AboveConstraint(s,k,f)$(ord(s) gt ord(k)) ..                            y(s) =g= (y(k) + 
Dy(s,k)) - (1-d(s,k,f))*N; 
         DisjunctionCheck1(s,k,f) ..                                             a(s,k,f) =e= 
b(k,s,f); 
         DisjunctionCheck2(s,k,f) ..                                             c(s,k,f) =e= 
d(k,s,f); 
 
 
*Decision Variables to Select Non-Overlap Constraint____________________________ 
         DecisionConstraint(s,k,f)$(ord(s) gt ord(k)) ..                         a(s,k,f) + b(s,k,f) 
+ c(s,k,f) + d(s,k,f) - ZZ(s,k,f) =e= 0; 
         DecisionConstraint2(s,k)$(ord(s) gt ord(k)) ..                          sum(f,ZZ(s,k,f)) =l= 
Stories(s); 
         DecisionConstraint3(s,k,f)$(ord(s) gt ord(k))..                         ZZ(s,k,f) =e= 
ZZ(k,s,f); 
 
 
*Muster Point Constraints_______________________________________________________ 
         MusterAssign(s) ..                                                      
sum(m,SectionMuster(s,m)) =e= 2; 
         EscapeX1(s,m) ..                                                        ex1(s,m) =e= 
(mx(m)+x(s))/2; 
         EscapeY1(s,m) ..                                                        ey1(s,m) =e= 
(my(m)+y(s))/2; 
         EscapeX2(s,m) ..                                                        ex2(s,m) =e= mx(m); 
         EscapeY2(s,m) ..                                                        ey2(s,m) =e= my(m); 
         MusterLimit(m) ..                                                       sum(s, 
SectionMuster(s,m)) =l= 5; 
 
 
*Blast Wall_____________________________________________________________________ 
         BlastWallA(s,k)$(LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(s) ne 0) ..         BWa(s,k) =l= (1-
(1/(Stories(s)+1)))*(sum(f, a(s,k,f)/Stories(s))+wa(s)); 
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         BlastWallB(s,k)$(LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(s) ne 0) ..         BWb(s,k) =l= (1-
(1/(Stories(s)+1)))*(sum(f, b(s,k,f)/Stories(s))+wb(s)); 
         BlastWallC(s,k)$(LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(s) ne 0) ..         BWc(s,k) =l= (1-
(1/(Stories(s)+1)))*(sum(f, c(s,k,f)/Stories(s))+wc(s)); 
         BlastWallD(s,k)$(LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(s) ne 0) ..         BWd(s,k) =l= (1-
(1/(Stories(s)+1)))*(sum(f, d(s,k,f)/Stories(s))+wd(s)); 
         BlastWall(s,k)$(LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(s) ne 0) ..          BW(s,k) =e= 
BWa(s,k)+BWb(s,k)+BWc(s,k)+BWd(s,k); 
         MaxBlastWalls ..                                                        MaxWalls =e= sum(s, 
wa(s)+wb(s)+wc(s)+wd(s)); 
 
 
*Floor Constraints______________________________________________________________ 
         OneFloor(s) ..                                                          sum(f, V(s,f)) =e= 
Stories(s); 
         FloorConstraint1(s,k,f)$(ord(s) gt ord(k)) ..                           ZZ(s,k,f) =g= 
V(s,f)+V(k,f)-1; 
         FloorConstraint2(s,k,f)$(ord(s) gt ord(k)) ..                           ZZ(s,k,f) =l= 1-
V(s,f)+V(k,f); 
         FloorConstraint3(s,k,f)$(ord(s) gt ord(k)) ..                           ZZ(s,k,f) =l= 
1+V(s,f)-V(k,f); 
         FloorOccupied1(f) ..                                                    FO(f) =l= 
sum(s,V(s,f)); 
         FloorOccupied2(s,f) ..                                                  FO(f) =g= V(s,f); 
         FloorOrder(f,l)$(ord(l) gt ord(f)) ..                                   FO(f) =g= FO(l); 
         NumberOfFloors(f) ..                                                    NF =g= ord(f)*FO(f); 
         NumberOfFloors2 ..                                                      NF =l= card(f); 
*         FloorAdjacent(f,l,s)$(ord(l) gt ord(f)) ..                              ord(f) =g= 
V(s,f)*V(s,l)*ord(l)-Stories(s)+1; 
         FloorAdjacent(f,l,s)$(ord(l) eq ord(f)-Stories(s)) ..                   V(s,f)+V(s,l) =l= 1; 
         FloorNumber(s) ..                                                       Floor(s) =e= sum(f, 
ord(f)*V(s,f)/Stories(s)); 
 
$onecho>a 
         RelativeFloor1(s,k,f,l)$(ord(f) gt ord(l) and ord(s) ne ord(k)) ..      upstar(s,k,f,l) =l= 
1+log(V(s,f)+0.61)+log(V(k,l)+0.61); 
         RelativeFloor1(s,k,f,l)$(ord(f) gt ord(l) and ord(s) ne ord(k)) ..      upstar(s,k,f,l) =e= 
V(s,f)*V(k,l); 
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         RelativeFloor2(s,k,f,l)$(ord(f) gt ord(l) and ord(s) ne ord(k)) ..      upstar(s,k,f,l) =l= 
1-V(s,f)+V(k,l); 
         RelativeFloor3(s,k,f,l)$(ord(f) gt ord(l) and ord(s) ne ord(k)) ..      upstar(s,k,f,l) =g= 
V(s,f)+V(k,l)-1; 
         RelativeFloor4(s,k,f,l)$(ord(f) gt ord(l) and ord(s) ne ord(k)) ..      up(s,k,f) =g= 
upstar(s,k,f,l); 
*         RelativeFloor5(s,k,f)$(ord(s) ne ord(k)) ..                             up(s,k,f) =l= 
sum(l, upstar(s,k,f,l)); 
*         RelativeFloor6(s,k,f,l)$(ord(f) gt ord(l) and ord(s) ne ord(k)) ..      up(s,k,f) =e= 
down(k,s,l); 
*         RelativeFloor7(s,k,f)$(ord(s) ne ord(k)) ..                             
up(s,k,f)+down(s,k,f) =l= V(s,f); 
*         RelativeFloor7(s,k,f,l)$(ord(s) ne ord(k)) ..                             upstar(s,k,f,l) 
=l= V(s,f); 
*         RelativeFloor7(s,k,f)$(ord(s) ne ord(k)) ..                             
up(s,k,f)+down(s,k,f)+ZZ(s,k,f) =e= 1; 
*         RelativeFloor8(s,k,f,l)$(ord(f) lt ord(l) and ord(s) ne ord(k)) ..      upstar(s,k,f,l) =e= 
0; 
$offecho 
 
$onecho>a 
         RelativeFloor1(s,k,f,l)$(ord(f) gt ord(l) and ord(s) ne ord(k)) ..      upstar(s,k,f,l) =l= 
V(s,f); 
         RelativeFloor2(s,k,f,l)$(ord(f) gt ord(l) and ord(s) ne ord(k)) ..      upstar(s,k,f,l) =l= 
V(k,l); 
         RelativeFloor3(s,k,f,l)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and ord(l) lt ord(f)) ..      upstar(s,k,f,l) =g= 
V(s,f)+V(k,l)-1; 
         RelativeFloor4(s,k,f,l)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and ord(l) lt ord(f)) ..      up(s,k,f) =g= 
upstar(s,k,f,l); 
         RelativeFloor5(s,k,f)$(ord(s) ne ord(k)) ..                             up(s,k,f) =l= sum(l, 
upstar(s,k,f,l)); 
         RelativeFloor6(s,k,f,l)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and ord(f) gt ord(l)) ..      up(s,k,f) =e= 
down(k,s,l); 
*         RelativeFloor7(s,k,f)$(ord(s) ne ord(k)) ..                             
up(s,k,f)+down(s,k,f) =l= ZZ(s,k,f); 
$offecho 
 
$onecho>a 
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         This works for upstar! 
         RelativeFloor1(s,k,f,l)$(ord(f) eq ord(l) and ord(s) ne ord(k)) ..      upstar(s,k,f,l) =l= 
(2-ZZ(s,k,f)-ZZ(s,k,l)); 
         RelativeFloor2(s,k,f,l)$(ord(f) gt ord(l) and ord(s) ne ord(k)) ..      upstar(s,k,f,l) =g= 
V(s,f)+V(k,l)-1; 
         RelativeFloor3(s,k,f,l)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and ord(l) lt ord(f)) ..      upstar(s,k,f,l) =l= 
1-V(s,f)+V(k,l); 
         RelativeFloor4(s,k,f,l)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and ord(l) lt ord(f)) ..      upstar(s,k,f,l) =l= 
V(s,f); 
         RelativeFloor5(s,k,f,l)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and ord(l) lt ord(f)) ..      upstar(s,k,f,l) =l= 
1+V(s,f)-V(k,l); 
         RelativeFloor6(s,k,f,l)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and ord(f) lt ord(l)) ..      upstar(s,k,f,l) =e= 
0; 
$offecho 
 
         RelativeFloor1(s,k,f,l)$(ord(f) eq ord(l) and ord(s) ne ord(k)) ..      upstar(s,k,f,l) =l= 
(2-ZZ(s,k,f)-ZZ(s,k,l)); 
         RelativeFloor2(s,k,f,l)$(ord(f) gt ord(l) and ord(s) ne ord(k)) ..      upstar(s,k,f,l) =g= 
V(s,f)+V(k,l)-1; 
         RelativeFloor3(s,k,f,l)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and ord(l) lt ord(f)) ..      upstar(s,k,f,l) =l= 
1-V(s,f)+V(k,l); 
         RelativeFloor4(s,k,f,l)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and ord(l) lt ord(f)) ..      upstar(s,k,f,l) =l= 
V(s,f); 
         RelativeFloor5(s,k,f,l)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and ord(l) lt ord(f)) ..      upstar(s,k,f,l) =l= 
1+V(s,f)-V(k,l); 
         RelativeFloor6(s,k,f,l)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and ord(f) lt ord(l)) ..      upstar(s,k,f,l) =e= 
0; 
         RelativeFloor7(s,k,f,l)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and ord(l) lt ord(f)) ..      up(s,k,f) =g= 
upstar(s,k,f,l); 
         RelativeFloor8(s,k,f)$(ord(s) ne ord(k)) ..                             up(s,k,f) =l= 
sum(l$(ord(l) lt ord(f)),upstar(s,k,f,l)); 
         RelativeFloor9(s,k,f,l)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and ord(l) lt ord(f)) ..      upstar(s,k,f,l) =e= 
downstar(k,s,l,f); 
         RelativeFloor10(s,k,f,l)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and ord(l) gt ord(f)) ..     down(s,k,f) =g= 
downstar(s,k,f,l); 
         RelativeFloor11(s,k,f)$(ord(s) ne ord(k)) ..                            down(s,k,f) =l= 
sum(l$(ord(l) gt ord(f)), downstar(s,k,f,l)); 
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*Vapor Cloud Explosion Constraints______________________________________________ 
**Local Explosion 
         ExpPressure(s,k)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(s) ne 0) ..                   
P(s,k) =e= Const(k)*(Patm*(Eexp(k)/Patm)**(1/3))/((sqrt(sqr((x(s)-x(k))+epsilon)+sqr(y(s)-
y(k))+epsilon)*0.3048)); 
         ExpProbit(s,k)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(s) ne 0) ..                     
EProbit(s,k) =g= -23.8+2.92*((log(P(s,k)+epsilon)+(1/3)*log(FireScale))); 
         DestProbability(s,k)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(s) ne 0) ..               
DestructionProbability(s,k) =e= errorf((EProbit(s,k)-5)/sqrt(2))*TotalPExp(k); 
         ModifiedProbability(s,k)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(s) ne 0) 
..           MitigatedProb(s,k) =e= (1-BW(s,k))*DestructionProbability(s,k); 
 
**Dispersed Cloud Explosion 
*$onecho>a 
         eScaledDispersion(s,f,g,h)$(LeakSource(s) ne 0) ..                                                      
eSD(s,h) =g= (10**(-
5))*LeakSource(s)*JetFireMassFlow(s)*(100*BR(s,f,h)*(ee(g,h)+efi(g,h)*WindSpeed)+eg(g,h)*WindSpeed+ea
c(g,h)); 
         DispersedEnergy(s,k,f,h)$(LeakSource(k) ne 0 and IgnSource(s) ne 0) ..                                  
dispE(s,k,h) =g= eSD(k,h)*Area(s)*FloorSpacing*FlammableDensity*GasHoC(k)/(FireScale*10000); 
         DispersedBase(s,k,j,h)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(k) ne 0 and IgnSource(s) ne 0) ..               
cprime(s,k,j,h) =g= Const(s)*(Patm*((dispE(s,k,h)+1)/Patm)**(1/3))/((sqrt(sqr((x(s)-
x(j))+epsilon)+sqr(y(s)-y(j))+epsilon)*0.3048)); 
         LFLExceedance(s,k,h)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(s) ne 0 and IgnSource(k) ne 0) ..                 
eSD(s,h) =l= (1-LFLExceed(s,h))*LFLMass; 
 
         DispersedEProbitPosX(s,k,j,f,h)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and ord(k) ne ord (j) 
                 and LeakSource(s) ne 0 and IgnSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(j) ne 0) ..                        
EProbit(s,k) =g= -
23.8+2.92*(log(cprime(s,k,j,'PosX')+0.001)+10*log(b(j,s,f)+0.00001)+10*log(a(s,k,f)+0.00001)+10*log(L
FLExceed(s,'PosX')+0.00001)+(1/3)*log(FireScale*10000)); 
         DispersedEProbitNegX(s,k,j,f,h)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and ord(k) ne ord (j) 
                 and LeakSource(s) ne 0 and IgnSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(j) ne 0) ..                        
EProbit(s,k) =g= -
23.8+2.92*(log(cprime(s,k,j,'NegX')+0.001)+10*log(a(j,s,f)+0.00001)+10*log(b(s,k,f)+0.00001)+10*log(L
FLExceed(s,'NegX')+0.00001)+(1/3)*log(FireScale*10000)); 
         DispersedEProbitPosY(s,k,j,f,h)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and ord(k) ne ord (j) 
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                 and LeakSource(s) ne 0 and IgnSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(j) ne 0) ..                        
EProbit(s,k) =g= -
23.8+2.92*(log(cprime(s,k,j,'PosY')+0.001)+10*log(c(j,s,f)+0.00001)+10*log(d(s,k,f)+0.00001)+10*log(L
FLExceed(s,'PosY')+0.00001)+(1/3)*log(FireScale*10000)); 
         DispersedEProbitNegY(s,k,j,f,h)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and ord(k) ne ord (j) 
                 and LeakSource(s) ne 0 and IgnSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(j) ne 0) ..                        
EProbit(s,k) =g= -
23.8+2.92*(log(cprime(s,k,j,'NegY')+0.001)+10*log(d(j,s,f)+0.00001)+10*log(c(s,k,f)+0.00001)+10*log(L
FLExceed(s,'NegY')+0.00001)+(1/3)*log(FireScale*10000)); 
         DispersedEProbitTop(s,k,j,f,h)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and ord(k) ne ord (j) 
                 and LeakSource(s) ne 0 and IgnSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(j) ne 0) ..                        
EProbit(s,k) =g= -
23.8+2.92*(log(cprime(s,k,j,'Top')+0.001)+10*log(down(j,s,f)+0.00001)+10*log(up(s,k,f)+0.00001)+10*lo
g(LFLExceed(s,'Top')+0.00001)+(1/3)*log(FireScale*10000)); 
         DispersedEProbitBottom(s,k,j,f,h)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and ord(k) ne ord (j) 
                 and LeakSource(s) ne 0 and IgnSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(j) ne 0) ..                        
EProbit(s,k) =g= -
23.8+2.92*(log(cprime(s,k,j,'Bottom')+0.001)+10*log(up(j,s,f)+0.00001)+10*log(down(s,k,f)+0.00001)+10
*log(LFLExceed(s,'Bottom')+0.00001)+(1/3)*log(FireScale*10000)); 
*$offecho 
$onecho>a 
         eScaledDispersion(s,f,g,h)$(LeakSource(s) ne 0) ..                                                      
eSD(s,h) =g= 0; 
         DispersedEnergy(s,k,f,h)$(LeakSource(k) ne 0 and IgnSource(s) ne 0) ..                                  
dispE(s,k,h) =g= 0; 
         DispersedBase(s,k,j,h)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(k) ne 0 and IgnSource(s) ne 0) ..               
cprime(s,k,j,h) =g= 0; 
         LFLExceedance(s,k,h)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(s) ne 0 and IgnSource(k) ne 0) ..                 
(1-LFLExceed(s,h))*LFLMass =l= eSD(s,h); 
 
         DispersedEProbitPosX(s,k,j,f,h)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and ord(k) ne ord (j) 
                 and LeakSource(s) ne 0 and IgnSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(j) ne 0) ..                        
EProbit(s,k) =g= -100; 
         DispersedEProbitNegX(s,k,j,f,h)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and ord(k) ne ord (j) 
                 and LeakSource(s) ne 0 and IgnSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(j) ne 0) ..                        
EProbit(s,k) =g= -100; 
         DispersedEProbitPosY(s,k,j,f,h)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and ord(k) ne ord (j) 
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                 and LeakSource(s) ne 0 and IgnSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(j) ne 0) ..                        
EProbit(s,k) =g= -100; 
         DispersedEProbitNegY(s,k,j,f,h)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and ord(k) ne ord (j) 
                 and LeakSource(s) ne 0 and IgnSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(j) ne 0) ..                        
EProbit(s,k) =g= -100; 
         DispersedEProbitTop(s,k,j,f,h)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and ord(k) ne ord (j) 
                 and LeakSource(s) ne 0 and IgnSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(j) ne 0) ..                        
EProbit(s,k) =g= -100; 
         DispersedEProbitBottom(s,k,j,f,h)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and ord(k) ne ord (j) 
                 and LeakSource(s) ne 0 and IgnSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(j) ne 0) ..                        
EProbit(s,k) =g= -100; 
$offecho 
 
*Fire Constraints_______________________________________________________________ 
**Fire Effect 
         FireIntensity1(s,k,m)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(s) ne 0) ..              
I1(s,k,m) =g= LeakSource(k)*((E(k))/((4*3.14*(1+(sqr((x(s)-(x(k)+(Floor(s)-
Floor(k))*xprime(k)))*0.3048)+sqr((ey1(s,m)-y(k))*0.3048)+sqr(((Floor(s)-
Floor(k))*FloorSpacing)*0.3048)))))); 
         FireIntensity2(s,k,m)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(s) ne 0) ..              
I1(s,k,m) =g= LeakSource(k)*((E(k))/((4*3.14*(1+(sqr((x(s)-(x(k)+(Floor(s)-
Floor(k))*xprime(k)))*0.3048)+sqr((ey2(s,m)-y(k))*0.3048)+sqr(((Floor(s)-
Floor(k))*FloorSpacing)*0.3048)))))); 
         FireIntensity3(s,k,m)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(s) ne 0) ..              
I1(s,k,m) =g= LeakSource(k)*((E(k))/((4*3.14*(1+(sqr((ex1(s,m)-(x(k)+(Floor(s)-
Floor(k))*xprime(k)))*0.3048)+sqr((ey2(s,m)-y(k))*0.3048)+sqr(((Floor(s)-
Floor(k))*FloorSpacing)*0.3048)))))); 
 
         FireIntensity4(s,k,m)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(s) ne 0) ..              
I2(s,k,m) =g= LeakSource(k)*((E(k))/((4*3.14*(1+(sqr((ex1(s,m)-(x(k)+(Floor(s)-
Floor(k))*xprime(k)))*0.3048)+sqr((y(s)-y(k))*0.3048)+sqr(((Floor(s)-
Floor(k))*FloorSpacing)*0.3048)))))); 
         FireIntensity5(s,k,m)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(s) ne 0) ..              
I2(s,k,m) =g= LeakSource(k)*((E(k))/((4*3.14*(1+(sqr((ex2(s,m)-(x(k)+(Floor(s)-
Floor(k))*xprime(k)))*0.3048)+sqr((y(s)-y(k))*0.3048)+sqr(((Floor(s)-
Floor(k))*FloorSpacing)*0.3048)))))); 
         FireIntensity6(s,k,m)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(s) ne 0) ..              
I2(s,k,m) =g= LeakSource(k)*((E(k))/((4*3.14*(1+(sqr((ex2(s,m)-(x(k)+(Floor(s)-
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Floor(k))*xprime(k)))*0.3048)+sqr((ey1(s,m)-y(k))*0.3048)+sqr(((Floor(s)-
Floor(k))*FloorSpacing)*0.3048)))))); 
 
         FireIntensity7(s,k,m)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(s) ne 0) ..              
I3(s,k,m) =e= LeakSource(k)*((E(k))/((4*3.14*(1+(sqr((ex1(s,m)-x(k))*0.3048)+sqr((ey1(s,m)-
y(k))*0.3048)+sqr((Floor(s)-Floor(k))*FloorSpacing*0.3048)))))); 
         FireIntensity8(s,k)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(s) ne 0) ..                
I4(s,k) =e= (LeakSource(k)*((E(k))/((4*3.14*(1+(sqr((x(s)-(x(k)+(Floor(s)-
Floor(k))*xprime(k)))*0.3048)+sqr((y(s)-y(k))*0.3048)+sqr(((Floor(s)-
Floor(k))*FloorSpacing)*0.3048)))))))*(1-BW(s,k))+0.0001; 
         FireIntensity9(s,k,m)$(LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(s) ne 0) ..                                   
I5(s,k,m) =e= LeakSource(k)*((E(k))/((4*3.14*(1+(sqr((ex2(s,m)-(x(k)+(Floor(s)-
Floor(k))*xprime(k)))*0.3048)+sqr((ey2(s,m)-y(k))*0.3048)+sqr(((Floor(s)-
Floor(k))*FloorSpacing)*0.3048)))))); 
 
**Muster Choice 
         PathChoice(s,k,m)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(k) ne 0) ..                                          
I(s,k,m) =e= LeakSource(k)*(Fa(s,m)*I1(s,k,m)+Fb(s,m)*I2(s,k,m)+Fc(s,m)*I3(s,k,m)); 
         PathConstraint(s,m) ..                                                                                  
Fa(s,m) + Fb(s,m) + Fc(s,m) =e= 1; 
 
 
**Fire Probit and Probability 
         FireProbitEscape(s,k,m)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(s) ne 0) ..            
FProbitEscape(s,k,m) =e= -
14.9+2.56*(log((tesc(s,m)*((I(s,k,m))**(4/3))+0.0001))+(4/3)*log(FireScale)); 
         FireProbitMidpoint(s,k)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(s) ne 0) ..            
FProbitMidpoint(s,k) =e= -14.9+2.56*(log(FtExposure*((I4(s,k))**(4/3))+0.0001)+(4/3)*log(FireScale)); 
         FireProbitMuster(s,k,m)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(s) ne 0) ..            
FProbitMuster(s,k,m) =e= -
14.9+2.56*(log(FtExposure*((I5(s,k,m))**(4/3)+0.0001))+(4/3)*log(FireScale)); 
         EscProbability(s,k,m)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(s) ne 0) ..              
EscapeProbability(s,k,m) =e= SectionMuster(s,m)*TotalPFire(k)*((((errorf((FProbitEscape(s,k,m)-
5)/sqrt(2))) 
                                                                                                                         
+(errorf((FProbitMuster(s,k,m)-5)/sqrt(2))))+(errorf((FProbitMidpoint(s,k)-
5)/sqrt(2))))/4+Incap(s,m)); 
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*         EscProbability(s,k,m)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(s) ne 0) ..              
EscapeProbability(s,k,m) =e= 0.5; 
 
*Toxic Constraints______________________________________________________________ 
**Blockage Ratios 
         RightBlockage(s,f)$(LeakSource(s) ne 0) ..                                                              
BR(s,f,'PosX') =e= LeakSource(s)*sum(k, a(s,k,f)*Area(k))/((Wx-x(s)+epsilon)*Wy); 
         LeftBlockage(s,f)$(LeakSource(s) ne 0) ..                                                               
BR(s,f,'NegX') =e= LeakSource(s)*sum(k, b(s,k,f)*Area(k))/((x(s)+epsilon)*Wy); 
         AboveBlockage(s,f)$(LeakSource(s) ne 0) ..                                                              
BR(s,f,'PosY') =e= LeakSource(s)*sum(k, c(s,k,f)*Area(k))/((Wy-y(s)+epsilon)*Wx); 
         BelowBlockage(s,f)$(LeakSource(s) ne 0) ..                                                              
BR(s,f,'NegY') =e= LeakSource(s)*sum(k, d(s,k,f)*Area(k))/((y(s)+epsilon)*Wx); 
         UpBlockage(s,f)$(LeakSource(s) ne 0) ..                                                                 
BR(s,f,'Top') =e= V(s,f)*LeakSource(s)*sum(k, up(s,k,f)*Area(k)/(Wx*Wy)); 
         DownBlockage(s,f)$(LeakSource(s) ne 0) ..                                                               
BR(s,f,'Bottom') =e= V(s,f)*LeakSource(s)*sum(k, down(s,k,f)*Area(k)/(Wx*Wy)); 
 
 
**Scaled Dispersion 
         tScaledDispersion(s,f,g,h)$(LeakSource(s) ne 0) ..                                                      
tSD(s,f,g,h) =g= (10**(-
5))*LeakSource(s)*JetFireMassFlow(s)*(100*BR(s,f,h)*(te(g,h)+tfi(g,h)*WindSpeed)+tg(g,h)*WindSpeed+ta
c(g,h)); 
 
 
**Toxic Probit and Probability 
         RightToxicProbit(s,k,f,g)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(s) ne 0 and SectionCost(k) ne 
0)..           ToxicProbit(s,k,f,g,'PosX') =e= (1-a(s,k,f))*(-T)+(-
31.42+3.008*1.43*log(epsilon+tSD(s,f,g,'PosX'))+3.008*1.43*log(1000000)+3.008*log(TtExposure)); 
         LeftToxicProbit(s,k,f,g)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(s) ne 0 and SectionCost(k) ne 0)..            
ToxicProbit(s,k,f,g,'NegX') =e= (1-b(s,k,f))*(-T)+(-
31.42+3.008*1.43*log(epsilon+tSD(s,f,g,'NegX'))+3.008*1.43*log(1000000)+3.008*log(TtExposure)); 
         AboveToxicProbit(s,k,f,g)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(s) ne 0 and SectionCost(k) ne 
0)..           ToxicProbit(s,k,f,g,'PosY') =e= (1-c(s,k,f))*(-T)+(-
31.42+3.008*1.43*log(epsilon+tSD(s,f,g,'PosY'))+3.008*1.43*log(1000000)+3.008*log(TtExposure)); 
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         BelowToxicProbit(s,k,f,g)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(s) ne 0 and SectionCost(k) ne 
0)..           ToxicProbit(s,k,f,g,'NegY') =e= (1-d(s,k,f))*(-T)+(-
31.42+3.008*1.43*log(epsilon+tSD(s,f,g,'NegY'))+3.008*1.43*log(1000000)+3.008*log(TtExposure)); 
         TopToxicProbit(s,k,f,g)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(k) ne 0)..             
ToxicProbit(s,k,f,g,'Top') =e= (1-up(s,k,f))*(-T)+(-
31.42+3.008*1.43*log(epsilon+tSD(s,f,g,'Top'))+3.008*1.43*log(1000000)+3.008*log(TtExposure)); 
         BottomToxicProbit(s,k,f,g)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(k) ne 
0)..          ToxicProbit(s,k,f,g,'Bottom') =e= (1-down(s,k,f))*(-T)+(-
31.42+3.008*1.43*log(epsilon+tSD(s,f,g,'Bottom'))+3.008*1.43*log(1000000)+3.008*log(TtExposure)); 
         CombinedToxicEffect(s,k)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(s) ne 0)..            
ToxicProbability(s,k) =e= LeakSource(k)*TotalPEnv(k)*sum(f,sum(g,sum(h, 
errorf((ToxicProbit(k,s,f,g,h)-5)/sqrt(2)))))/5; 
 
 
*Smoke Modeling Constraints_____________________________________________________ 
$onecho>a 
**Escape 
         sScaledDispersion(s,f,h)$(LeakSource(s) ne 0) ..                                                        
sSD(s,f,h) =g= (10**(-
5))*LeakSource(s)*JetFireMassFlow(s)*(100*BR(s,f,h)*(se(h)+sfi(h)*WindSpeed)+sg(h)*WindSpeed+sac(h)); 
         EscapeSpeed(s,k,f,h)$(LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(s) ne 0) ..                                    
vesc(s) =l= 1.2-1.8*sSD(k,f,h); 
         EscapeTime(s,m)$(SectionCost(s) ne 0) ..                                                                
tesc(s,m) =e= SectionMuster(s,m)*((sqrt(sqr(x(s)-mx(m)))+sqrt(sqr(y(s)-my(m))))/(vesc(s)+0.01)); 
 
**Toxic 
         IncapacitationCO(s,k,f,h)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(s) ne 0 and SectionCost(k) ne 0) 
..          tincCO(s) =l= 30/((3.317E-5)*sSD(s,f,h)*50+0.001); 
         IncapacitationCO2(s,k,f,h)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(s) ne 0 and SectionCost(k) ne 0) 
..         tincCO2(s) =l= exp(6.1623-0.5189*sSD(s,f,h)); 
         IncapacitatedCO(s,m) ..                                                                                 
tesc(s,m) =g= (Incap(s,m))*tincCO(s); 
         IncapacitatedCO2(s,m) ..                                                                                
tesc(s,m) =g= (Incap(s,m))*tincCO2(s); 
$offecho 
*$onecho>a 
**Escape 
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         sScaledDispersion(s,f,h)$(LeakSource(s) ne 0) ..                                                        
sSD(s,f,h) =g= (10**(-
7))*LeakSource(s)*JetFireMassFlow(s)*(100*BR(s,f,h)*(se(h)+sfi(h)*WindSpeed)+sg(h)*WindSpeed+sac(h)); 
         EscapeSpeed(s,k,f,h)$(LeakSource(k) ne 0 and SectionCost(s) ne 0) ..                                    
vesc(s) =l= 1.2-1.8*sSD(k,f,h); 
         EscapeTime(s,m)$(SectionCost(s) ne 0) ..                                                                
tesc(s,m) =e= SectionMuster(s,m)*((sqrt(sqr(x(s)-mx(m))+0.01)+sqrt(sqr(y(s)-
my(m))+0.01))/(vesc(s)+0.01)); 
 
**Toxic 
         IncapacitationCO(s,k,f,h)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(s) ne 0 and SectionCost(k) ne 0) 
..          tincCO(s) =l= 30/((3.317E-5)*sSD(s,f,h)*50+0.1); 
         IncapacitationCO2(s,k,f,h)$(ord(s) ne ord(k) and LeakSource(s) ne 0 and SectionCost(k) ne 0) 
..         tincCO2(s) =l= exp(6.1623-0.5189*sSD(s,f,h)); 
         IncapacitatedCO(s,m) ..                                                                                 
1000*(Incap(s,m))+tincCO(s) =g= tesc(s,m); 
         IncapacitatedCO2(s,m) ..                                                                                
1000*(Incap(s,m))+tincCO2(s) =g= tesc(s,m); 
*$offecho 
 
 
*############################################################################### 
*Model########################################################################## 
*############################################################################### 
 
Model 
$onecho>a 
      Initialization      /First, 
AreaConstraint1,LengthConstraintXLo,LengthConstraintXHi,LengthConstraintYLo,LengthConstraintYHi, 
                           DefineDx, DefineDy, BoundaryX1, BoundaryX2, BoundaryY1, BoundaryY2, 
LeftConstraint, RightConstraint, 
                           AboveConstraint, BelowConstraint, DecisionConstraint, OneFloor, 
FloorConstraint1, FloorConstraint2, 
                           FloorConstraint3, FloorOccupied1, FloorOccupied2, FloorOrder, 
NumberOfFloors, NumberOfFloors2, 
                           MusterAssign, MusterLimit, FloorNumber/ 
$offecho 
      Initialization      /all/ 
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      FLP                 /all/ 
 
 
*############################################################################### 
*Options######################################################################## 
*############################################################################### 
 
Option iterlim = 100000000; 
Option sysout = on; 
Option subsystems; 
*Option minlp = Convert; 
FLP.OPTFILE = 1; 
FLP.reslim = 100000000; 
*FLP.SCALEOPT = 1; 
$onecho > cplex.opt 
printoptions yes 
quality yes 
scaind 0 
simdisplay 2 
names yes 
*epgap 0.0003 
*optcr = 0.4 
$offecho 
$onecho > dicopt.opt 
stop 0 
*nlptracefile nlptrace 
*maxcycles 10 
*maxcycles 5 
*maxcycles 4 
maxcycles 3 
*maxcycles 2 
*maxcycles 1 
NLPSolver CONOPT 
MIPSolver CPLEX 
mipoptfile cplex.opt 
nlpoptfile conopt.opt 
epsmip 1e-4 
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$offecho 
$onecho > conopt.opt 
*lstcrs = t 
*lsanrm = t 
*rtnwmi = 1 
*rtnwma = 1 
*rtnwtr = 1 
*rtobjr = 1 
$offecho 
 
*############################################################################### 
*Solve########################################################################## 
*############################################################################### 
 
*solve Initialization using minlp minimizing z; 
*solve FLP using minlp minimizing Prob; 
scalar q; 
scalar globiter; 
scalar globmin ; globmin = inf ; 
scalar globscale; globscale = inf; 
parameter globx(s); 
parameter globy(s); 
parameter globLx(s); 
parameter globLy(s); 
parameter globmx(m); 
parameter globmy(m); 
parameter globFloor(s); 
parameter globSectionMuster(s,m); 
parameter globMitigatedProb(s,k); 
parameter globEscapeProbability(s,k,m); 
parameter globToxicProbability(s,k); 
parameter globBW(s,k); 
 
option bratio = 1; 
 
for (q = 1 to 100, 
         x.l(s) = uniform(0.2*Wx,0.8*Wx); 
         y.l(s) = uniform(0.2*Wy,0.8*Wy); 
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         solve FLP using minlp minimizing Prob; 
         if (FLP.modelstat ne 9 and FLP.solvestat eq 1, 
                 if (Prob.l le globmin, 
                         globmin = Prob.l; 
                         globiter = q; 
                         globx(s) = x.l(s); 
                         globy(s) = y.l(s); 
                         globLx(s) = Lx.l(s); 
                         globLy(s) = Ly.l(s); 
                         globmx(m) = mx.l(m); 
                         globmy(m) = my.l(m); 
                         globFloor(s) = Floor.l(s); 
                         globSectionMuster(s,m) = SectionMuster.l(s,m); 
                         globMitigatedProb(s,k) = MitigatedProb.l(s,k); 
                         globEscapeProbability(s,k,m) = EscapeProbability.l(s,k,m); 
                         globToxicProbability(s,k) = ToxicProbability.l(s,k); 
                         globBW(s,k) = BW.l(s,k); 
                     ); 
             ); 
     ); 
 
$onecho>a 
Display Prob.l, BW.l, BWa.l, BWb.l, BWc.l, BWd.l, wa.l, wb.l, wc.l, wd.l, a.l, b.l, c.l, d.l, x.l, 
y.l, 
        Floor.l, ZZ.l, TotalPExp, P.l, EProbit.l, random, JetFireMassFlow, BR.l, SD.l, mx.l, my.l, 
        I.l, TotalArea, AreaRatio, DestructionProbability.l,MitigatedProb.l, EscapeProbability.l, 
        ToxicProbability.l, ToxicProbit.l, SectionMuster.l,TotalPFire,TotalPExp,TotalPEnv,I4.l; 
$offecho 
 
Display Prob.l, SectionMuster.l, mx.l, my.l, I.l, I4.l, I5.l, Fa.l, Fb.l, Fc.l, FProbitEscape.l, 
FProbitMidpoint.l, FProbitMuster.l, EscapeProbability.l, 
         DestructionProbability.l, MitigatedProb.l, P.l, EProbit.l, wa.l, wb.l, wc.l, wd.l, BWa.l, 
BWb.l, BWc.l, BWd.l, BW.l, 
         JetFireMassFlow, tac, tfi, te, tg, a.l, b.l, c.l, d.l, BR.l, tSD.l, ToxicProbit.l, 
ToxicProbability.l, FireScale, globscale, globmin, globiter, 
         globx, globy, globLx, globLy, globmx, globmy, globFloor, globSectionMuster, 
globMitigatedProb, globEscapeProbability, globToxicProbability, globBW 
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         UStar, FlameAngle, PoolD, PoolFireQ, PoolFireH, xprime, sSD.l, Incap.l, Floor.l, up.l, 
down.l, dispE.l, upstar.l; 
 
$onecho > a 
execute_unload "DebugCMPModel.gdx" x.l, y.l, Lx.l, Ly.l, Floor.l, mx.l, my.l, SectionMuster.l 
 
execute 'gdxxrw.exe DebugCMPModel.gdx SQ=N var=Ly.l rng=NewSheet!a4:i4' 
execute 'gdxxrw.exe DebugCMPModel.gdx SQ=N var=Lx.l rng=NewSheet!a3:i3' 
execute 'gdxxrw.exe DebugCMPModel.gdx SQ=N var=y.l rng=NewSheet!a2:i2' 
execute 'gdxxrw.exe DebugCMPModel.gdx SQ=N var=x.l rng=NewSheet!a1:i1' 
 
execute 'gdxxrw.exe DebugCMPModel.gdx SQ=N var=Floor.l rng=NewSheet!a10:i10' 
 
execute 'gdxxrw.exe DebugCMPModel.gdx SQ=N var=my.l rng=NewSheet!a15:i15' 
execute 'gdxxrw.exe DebugCMPModel.gdx SQ=N var=mx.l rng=NewSheet!a14:i14' 
execute 'gdxxrw.exe DebugCMPModel.gdx SQ=N var=SectionMuster.l rng=NewSheet!a18:i30' 
$offecho 
 
$onecho>a 
execute_unload "UpwardDispersionCMPModelGlobal.gdx" globx, globy, globLx, globLy, globFloor, globmx, 
globmy, globSectionMuster 
 
execute 'gdxxrw.exe UpwardDispersionCMPModelGlobal.gdx SQ=N par=globLy rng=NewSheet!a4:i4' 
execute 'gdxxrw.exe UpwardDispersionCMPModelGlobal.gdx SQ=N par=globLx rng=NewSheet!a3:i3' 
execute 'gdxxrw.exe UpwardDispersionCMPModelGlobal.gdx SQ=N par=globy rng=NewSheet!a2:i2' 
execute 'gdxxrw.exe UpwardDispersionCMPModelGlobal.gdx SQ=N par=globx rng=NewSheet!a1:i1' 
 
execute 'gdxxrw.exe UpwardDispersionCMPModelGlobal.gdx SQ=N par=globFloor rng=NewSheet!a10:i10' 
 
execute 'gdxxrw.exe UpwardDispersionCMPModelGlobal.gdx SQ=N par=globmy rng=NewSheet!a15:i15' 
execute 'gdxxrw.exe UpwardDispersionCMPModelGlobal.gdx SQ=N par=globmx rng=NewSheet!a14:i14' 
execute 'gdxxrw.exe UpwardDispersionCMPModelGlobal.gdx SQ=N par=globSectionMuster 
rng=NewSheet!a18:i30' 
$offecho 
